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INTRODUCTION
The seventeenth century philosopher Francis Bacon
once wryly noted that philosophers "make imaginary laws
for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as
the stars which give little light because they are so high."
This observation could be applied equally to our presentday poets and philosophers who weave dreams of a perfectly
harmonious and oeautiful world.

Unfortunately conservation

policymaking is not that simple; rather, the wise use of
our natural resources often involves a complexity of human
affairs, personal piques, bureaucratic conflicts, tough
lobbying, and

Dwight Eisenhower correctly perceived.

this process: "But the other power is exercised by lobbies
and congressional blocs, power contesting with power, for
motives sometimes obvious, sometimes obscure, with little
of the resulting contest revealed fully and accurately to
the public for whom the fight is presumably waged. 111

In

other words, politics is often the dark and bloody ground
upon which the real conservation battles are fought and
decided.

To the victors of these battles go the spoils--

and these spoils--oil, natural gas, electric power, timber,
land, water and atomic energy--are indeed valuable prizes.
Thus, if we are ever to acquire- that beautiful and harmonious
1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956:
The White House Years (New York, 1963), 394.
1

2

environment the poets and philosophers envisage, we must
first come to fully appreciate the political process out
of which our federal conservation policy is forged.

Ac-

cordingly, this dissertation has a dual purpose: first, to
investigate the importance of conservation in the nineteen
fifties and, secondly, to gain a glimpse into the historical
workings of the American political process.

CHAPI'ER I

THE NEW DEAL AS BOLD RELIEF
With the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold
War, certain issues involving the formulation of a coherent
federal natural resources policy made their impact immediately.

In 1952, Stephen Raushenbush correctly forecasted

that the three fundamental questions awaiting the attention
of professional conservationists and public servants during
the Eisenhower presidency would be: (1) "How is the national
need [for natural resources] to be met at reasonable prices
when resource owners (particularly the small areas) refuse
or are unable to adopt good conservation practices and the
higher immediate costs that attend them?;" (2) " ••• How can
the governmental part of the conservation job be done efficiently?"; and, (3) " ••• For whose benefit should national
aid to conservation and development be undertaken?" 1

WhiJe

men of widely differing political faiths could easily agree
on the need for conservation, questions such as those raised
by Raushenbush evoked widely different answers.

For exam-

ple, David Lilienthal felt that industrial bigness and free
"""--·

. enterprise was an undeniable asset to better conservation
of natural resources, while Barrow Lyons pointed a hostile

1 stephen Raushenbush, "Conservation in 1952," Annals

of the.: :Ainer:ican Academ~ of Poli ticaJ. and Social Science,

(Philad"'"eo1p.hia, 1952),

•

3
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finger at the past performance of American industry in this
area. 2 If industry's increased need for resources was not
enough reason for a consistent federal resources policy,
the rising rate of population with all its accompanying demands certainly pressed hard for one.

In the 1940's the

American population increased nineteen million; between 1946
and 1955 it rose 16.9 percent.3
But it was in the political arena that these questions
were raised, debated, and some of the answers .;'inally

fo~d.

The Eisenhower Administration's answer to these.conservation
questions was summed up in one word: partnership.

Essential-

ly this policy constituted a strongly conservative, free
enterprise, and anti-New Deal orientation that

~ad

laid fal-

low during much of the thirties but had gained great accepin the forties.

~ance

This philosophy was in sharp contrast

to the New Deal.
The New Deal was not so much the beginning of something
new as it was the culmination of a long process of attempting to come to grips with the basic problems of .the twentieth
century.

For the fundamental question facing post-Civil War

America had been how to bring a semblance of order out of
the chaos in which the new dominant industrial economy found
itself.

And the answer eventually agreed upon was govern-

mental management and regulation of the economy through
2 David Lilienthal, Big Business: A New Era (New York,
1952); Barrow Lyons, Tomorrow's Birthrir:ht: A Political and
Economic Interpretation of Our Natural Resources (New York,

1955).

3Lyons,·iromorrow's Birthright, ch. 3, "Fertility Uncontrolled.""·
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bureaucracy.

A vague notion of bureaucracy probably dated

from the nineteenth century movement for civil service reform.
Before the inception of the New Deal there existed two
types of federal bureaucracy, management and regulatory.

The

Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, National Park
Service, Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service
fell into the management category.

Ea.ch bureau was charged

with the responsibility of managing a particular area of the
federal domain.

The regulatory bureaucracy was born as a

result of the Progressive Era's attempt to confront the gnawing problem of unfettered industrial monopoly.

The Federal

Trade Commission, Federal Power Commission, Food and Drug
Administration, Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal Reserve System are examples of regulatory bureaucracy.
The New Deal simply brought this trend toward bureaucraticization of the American economy and government to a head.
Several new regulatory agencies, such as the Securities .Exchange Commission, were introduced and, in at least one instance, a former management bureau even became regulatory.
Under the Taylor Grazing Act (1934) grazing on the public
domain now became subject to regulation by the Department of
Interior--an objective supported by many conservationists
dating from the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy of the Progressive Era,.
While it established some order in the economy, the growth
of bureaucracy also created new problems.

Many of the bur-

eaus found themselves at cross purposes.

The Forest Service

6

and Bureau of Reclamation tangled during the heated BallingerPinchot controversy; the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of
Reclamation often fought over commonly desired western areas
for dam construction; and the Bureau of Reclamation.often
attempted to invade areas under the protective arm of the
National Park Service.

With a view toward streamlining the

bureaucracy and eliminating such conflicts, commission after
commission has been established to study the situation and
to make recommendations.

And repeatedly these recommenda-

tions have not been enacted.

Furthermore, a serious question

has been raised regarding the actual independence of the regulatory commissions: Are the regulated actually running the
regulatory agencies, rather than vice versa?

There is, for

example, substantial reason to suspect that the Federal Power
Commission, which is charged with overseeing the activities
of the electrical and natural gas industries, is actually run
by industry representatives.

An integral part of the New Deal

was governmental intervention in the economy and the bureaucracy was Franklin Roosevelt's tool for accomplishing this
end.

The New Deal was thus the bold relief against which the
politics of partnership was arrayed. 4
During Franklin Roosevelt's first term a policy of direct governmental intervention in the economy emerged and it
certainly was not anywhere more apparent than in the
4 For a detailed background on FDR's conservation policy
see Anna Lou Reisch, "Conservation under Franklin Roosevelt"
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin,
1952).
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.Administration's attitude toward conservation.

Under the

New Deal public power became an established fact.

The Ten-

nessee Valley Authority (TVA) was one of FDR's earliest
accomplishments, followed in 1935 by passage.of the controversial Public Utilities Holding Company Act and the creation
of the Rural Electrification Administration (REA).

Under tre

leadership of Harold .Ickes the Department of Interior advocated greatly increased federal planning and construction of
dams.

The Department's Bureau of Reclamation was thus an

important political instrument for advancing the New Deal
philosophy. · Soil conservation was not neglected either as
the Soil Conservation Service (SCS)·was created within the
Department of Agriculture.

Furthermore, the Civilian Conser-

vation Corps (CCC) provided thousands of youths with jobs.5
Politically, the conservation policy of the New Deal
translated its

b~geoning

bureaucracy into a political weapon

for the enforcement of the President's and his administrators'
own philosophy.

By creating agencies such as the TVA, REA,

SCS, CCC, and others, the President created wholly new constituencies which, over the long run, made valuable contributions toward sustaining himself and his successor, Harry
Truman, in office for five consecutive terms.

s.

The Rural

Electrification Administration was a case in point.

Under

5The growth of bureaucracy·and its impact on American life
has received voluminous treatment. The following is only a
sample of the scholarship in the area: Samuel P. Hays, Conservatiort and the Gosnel of Efficiency. The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (New York, 1959); Gabriel Kolleo, The
.Trium h of Conservatism. A Reinter retation of American History, 1900-1916 Chicago, 1963 ; and Robert H. Wiebe, The
Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York, 1967) and Businessmen
and Reform, A Study of the Progressive Movement (Chicago, 1962).

8

Morris Llewellyn Cooke the REA revolutionized life in rural
America and it became an obvious success.

Cooke took an ac-

tive personal interest in the creation of nonprofit co-operatives.

After six years in existence, four out of ten American
far.ms had electricity; in 1950, it was nine out of ten. 6 The
National Rural Electric Co-Operative Association was formed to
influence legislation favorable to the REA and, conversely, to
defend the REA from anti-New Deal attacks.

Other pressure

groups were also created tb accomplish like.results for their
interests.

The TVA became so politically potent that no poli-

tician from a TVA state dared defy it, lest his or her political life be cut short.

The Soil Conservation Districts pro-

tected the Soil Conservation Service.

The National Reclama-

tion Association was organized in 1952 when the Bureau of
Reclamation.appeared threatened by Congress.

The Association

feared the Bureau's appropriations would be cut and its functions transferred to the Department of Agriculture.

Organized

labor, always an important element in FDR's coalition, also
came to the aid of the New Deal conservation program.
Economically, the New and Fair Deals introduced certain
innovative and controversial principles.

Under FDR deficit

spending became an accepted fact of economic life.

In terms

of public power the New Deal planted the principle of pref erence more firmly in the soil of American law.

The principle

simply stated that in the sale of power from federal dams and
6 william E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the
New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York, 1963), 158.

9
other power installations preference would always be assured
to public power agencies and cooperatives over private enterprise.

In other words, the federal government would give

preference to the TVA, REA, and other public power groups.
Moreover, the federal government was actively competing with
th~

private sector of the economy.

The TVA most poignantly

demonstrated the extent to which FDR would actively push the
federal government into the economy.

Here the federal govern-

ment directly owned and operated a power installation.

When

the critics called it "socialism," FDR explained that the TVA
actually represented only a "yardstick" by which to measure
the price rates charged by the private electric firms.7
The New Deal did not face any serious opposition to its
programs until after FDR's stunning re-election in 1936.

A

coalition of businessmen, disgruntled over the President's
meddling with the free enterprise system, conservative southern
Democrats, convinced their position in the Party was dwindling,
and, of course, the Republicans, yearning to throw the Democrats out of office, took definite shape.

The business commun-

ity had to a large extent initially feared FDR anyway, but,
because many business and community leaders had been discredited by the depression, many congressmen reluctantly went along
with the Administration's legislative proposals.

By 1937,

however, the business community no longer feared whatever
7For a brief background on the growth of the public power
philosophy see John D. Hicks, Re~ublican AscendencyE 1921-1933
(New York, 1963), 124-26; specifically for FDR's pu lie power
philosophy see Reisch, "Conservation under Franklin Roosevelt,"

298-99.

'
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chaos might ensue from open dissent to the New Deal.

Many

congressmen, disenchanted with the New Deal for a variety of
reasons, now listened more attentively to these influential
businessmen. 8
Through the congressional seniority system "the solid
South" gradually regained the political influence it had lost
during the Civil War.

Southern political leaders willingly

supported the New Deal so long as it did not disturb southern
agricultural, industrial, or social patterns.

But after the

1936 elections, when the northern wing of. the party, dominated
by minority groups and labor unions, began to predominate, a
southern revolt became inevitable.

While southern political

leaders might buck the national party, there was no chance they
would officially turn Republican since southern voter antipathy for

Republica~s

remained strong and the South's political

power depended on its committee chairmanships.

Of course this

did not preclude southern political leaders from quietly working for the same objectives as their Republican ideological
counterparts.9
The crux of Southern opposition to the New Deal derived
from a difference in economic philosophy.

Dixie had been one

of Woodrow Wilson's leading supporters for a regulated economy. 10
8 James T. Patterson, Con~ressional Conservatism and the
New Deal (University of KentuCkY Press, 196?), 335-36.
9Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 132.
10John Robert Moore, "Senator Josiah w. Bailey and the
'Conservative Manifesto' of 1937," Journal of Southern History,
XXXI (Feb. 1965), 21-39; Anna F. Scott, 11 A Progressive wind
for the South., 1906-1913," J·ournal of Southern History, XXIX

11
So long as the New Deal did not venture beyond that the South
remained loyal to FDR.

But by 1936 the New Deal had gone a

step beyond the Wilsonian regulatory state to more direct intervention in the economy.

Southern political leaders inter-

preted this development as a threat to the burgeoning economy
of "the new South."

As it had become industrialized in the

twentieth century the South took on a "growth psychology" which
made her conservative in economic complexion.

Thus, the

South's thinkbg was heavily biased in favor of states' rights,
a balanced budget, and free enterprise.

Obviously, deficit

spending and support for labor unions and minorities were diametrically contrary to these concepts.

By 1940, the South

found herself on the threshold of her greatest economic growth.
Reflecting these attitudes, such important Southern senators
\

as Walter F. George of Georgia, Tom Connally of Texas, and
Josiah Bailey of South Carolina began to openly oppose the
economic policies of the New Dealo 11
The circle of
party.

o~position

was completed by the Republican

Roosevelt's first administration had so routed the

G.O.P. that after the 1936 elections there was serious speculation the Republican party might never recover. 12 As a result
(Feb. 1963), 53-70; Arthur s. Link, "The Progressive Movement
in the South, 1870-1917," North Carolina Historical Review,
XXIII (April, 1946), 172-19$.
11More, "Senator Josiah Bailey," 22; Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 44-45, 112-13; George Brown Tindall, The
Emer ence of the New South 1913-194 (Louisiana State-Univer'
; George 1owry, The Urban Nation (New
York, 1965), 246-47; Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (Uew York, 1956), 118-20.
12As a result of the election the Republicans occupied
88 seats in the House and 16 in the Senate.

r
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of this sad state of affairs Republican congressional

leader~

under the leadership of Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan,
agreed upon a strategy of silence.

The Republicans would

henceforth vote as a bloc with Democratic conservatives but
would let their newly-found bedfellows lead the vocal attacks
on the New Dea1. 1 3
Until 193?, the anti-New Deal coalition had not been
firmly knitted together.

In that year Republicans and Dixie-

crats worked together to oppose the sit-down strikes, a wages
and hours bill, and government reorganization.

What finally

cemented the coalition together, however, was Roosevelt's
attempt to pack "the Supreme Court.

Under Vandenberg's leader-

ship the Republicans pursued their strategy of silence, content to let the southerners denounce the plan.

Senator Charles

McNary, one of the leading Republican opponents of the court
packing scheme, commented: "Let the boys across the aisle [the
southern Democrats] do the talking.

We'll do the voting."
Their strategy forced FDR to relent. 14 As a result of this

victory, in December, 193?, the coalition leaders collaborated
in writing a conservative manifesto.

Nearly all of the Demo-

crats who had fought the court packing scheme, particularly
Senators Millard Tydings of Maryland and Walter George, as
1 3cr. c. David Tompkins, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg:
The :&Iler ence of a Modern Renublican 1884-1945 (Michigan
tate University Press, 1
, c • XII, "The Crisis of Roosevelt's Leadership;" and Patterson, Congressional Conservatism,
102 t 108-09.
'
14Tompkins, Vandenberg, 145-50; Moore, "Senator Josiah
Bailey," 23-24; Tindall, :Emergence of New South, 60?-49; Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, lol-07; Leuchtenberg,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 254.

13
well as several Republicans, notably Vandenberg and Senator
Warren R. Austin of Vermont, joined in the preparation of
this ten-point declaration.

The document, "An Address to the

People of the United States," was a direct prelude to the
Eisenhower philosophy of partnership.

Briefly, the document

expressed a desire for free enterprise, states' rights, a
balanced budget, and opposition to "unnecessary" government
competition with free enterprise.

They contended that Roose-

velt was leading the nation down the dangerous path of socialism.

The newspapers got hold of it and published it premature-

ly, making it politically necessary for the participants to
deny any collusion.

Nevertheless, the document pointed to

the formation of a congressional alliance between Dixiecrats
and the Republican party. 1 5
Roosevelt recognized the danger this coalition presented
and decided to blunt it in the off-year elections of 1938.

By

the end of 193? the President's liberal, northern, urban advisors, Harry Hopkins, Tommy Corcoran, Harold Ickes, and James
Roosevelt, the President's son, began to explore the possibility of purging the Democratic party of some of the leaders of
the conservative opposition.

When Calude Pepper of Florida

and Lister Hill of Alabama, both ardent supporters of the New
Deal, won their primary contests for the Senate, the "elimination committee," as it was dubbed, decided to work actively
for the defeat of select Democratic anti--New Dealers.

Roosevelt

l5Tompkins, Vandenber§, 145-50; Tindall, Emergence of
New South, 624-25; Moore, Senator Josiah Bailey, 11 21-39.

r
14
personally campaigned against such powerful Senate figures
as Walter F. George, Millard Tydings and Cotton Ed Smith of
South Carolina.

Roosevelt's efforts failed, however, as all

·three men were returned to the Senate.
The 1938 elections had even greater significance for the
Republicans, for the G.O.P. once again became a viable political force.

The Republicans picked up eighty-one seats in

the House, eight in the Senate, and captured thirteen governorships.
defeat.

No Republican incumbent running for the House suffered
The President's close political advisor, James A.

Farley, correctly called this election "the great turnover. 1116
With the 1938 elections the conservative, anti-New Deal
coalition came into undisputed control of Capitol Hill.

In

years to come, the coalition showed its fiber by preventing
passage of further liberal programs.

Administration-sponsored

measures repeatedly felt the sting of defeat.

For example,

the coalition turned back efforts to create "seven little
TVAs," to establish a permanent National Resources Planning
Board, and to initiate a Columbia Valley Authority. 1 7
16Lubell, Future, 13; Milton Plesur, "The Republican Congressional Comeback of 1938," Review of Politics, XXIV (Oct.
1962), 525-62; Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, chs. 89; Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 266-73; Reisch, "Conservation under Franklin D. Roosevelt," 144; Tindall, Emer~ence of New South, 625-30; James MacGregor Burns, TheDeadock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America (New Jersey,

1963), 166-6?.

l?Reisch, "Conservation under Franklin D. Roosevelt,"
259-8?; Charles McKinley, Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest:
Federal Management of Natural Resources in the Columbia River
Valley (Berkeley, 1952), 543-617; Leuchtenberg,"Roosevelt,
Norris, and the 'Seven Little TVAs,'" Journal of Politics,
XIV (August, 1952).

15
The Republican victories of 1938 insured that the Party
would once again be an important national political force.
In that year Robert Taft of Ohio was elected to his first
term in the Senate.

Under Taft's and Vandenberg's leadership

the Republican party increased its influence in Congress.
And from 1938 onward the Party made steady gains in the House.
By 1942 the Republicans reduced formal Democratic control of
the House to five seats and, finally, in 1946, the G.O.P.
won control of both houses of Congress.
the Midwest and West, whose thinking lay

The Republicans from
much closer to the

old progressivism than to the liberalism of the Eastern Republicans, took control of the congressional party.

Robert Taft

became majority leader of the Senate, Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska the majority whip, Eugene Milliken cf Colorado chairman
of the Republican caucus, and Styles Bridges of New Hampshire
chairman of the Appropriations Committee.

Moreover, Taft and

Vandenberg agreed to split their official duties, with Taft
representing the Party on domestic issues and Vandenberg on
foreign affairs.

Basically the Republican leadership was fis-

cally conservative and pre-New Deal in its social theory.

It

was overwhelmingly representative of nonurban states or those,
like Ohio, with a strong tradition of conservative voting.
In its rural and ideological background, the Republican leadership shared much in common with the conservative Southern
Democrats.

In fact Taft wanted to be the Republican party's

spokesman for domestic affairs precisely so he could expand
his ideological alliance with the South.

Taft, harboring

16
presidential ambitions, knew full well that southern votes
would be important to satisfying that thirst. 18
The Republicans had dented the "solid South" in 1928 and
the Party's appeal continued to increase throughout the forties.

Between 1940 and 1948, for example, the Republican

presidential vote in the South leaped fifty percent.

The

Republicans made gains particularl;r'.in the most urbanized
states, Texas, Florida, Virginia, and North Carolina.

During

this period the G.O.P.'s tally in Houston and Dallas more
than doubled.

In the 1948 election Truman lost four states

in the deep South.

In 1950 Southern liberalism suffered two

crushing primary defeats when Claude Pepper of Florida and
Frank Graham of North Carolina lost their bids for the Senate.
Significantly, a precinct-by-precinct breakdown in the major
cities revealed a remarkably close corelation between the vote
cast against Graham and Pepper and the Republican-Dixicrat
showing of 1948.

Furthermore, the Republicans made substan-

tial gains in the November, 1950 elections.

The G.O.P. in-

ereased its Senate membership from 42 to 47 and its House membership from 171 to 199. 1 9 Thus, by 1952, the RepublicanDixicrat alliance was in a firm position to seize control of
both the presidency and congress.
18Mowry, Urban Nation, 228-29; Tompkins, Vandenber§, 178;
Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), The Private Papers or ;enator
Vandenber5 (Boston, 1952), 318-19; Malcolm E. Jewell, Senatorial Politics and Foreign Policy (University of Kentucky, Press,

1962), 72-74.

l9Mowry, Urban Nation, 225-28, 234-35; George H. Mayer,
The Republican ~ar
-1966 (New York, 1967), 479; Lubell,
Future, 107, 11 -1 ,
•

l?
In 1952, Robert Taft, the undisputed leader of Republican
conservatives, dominated the Party's thinking and was the logical candidate for its presidential nomination.

Taft feared

that if the New Deal-Fair Deal policies continued to prevail,
the American political system would give way to government by
pressure groups unrelated to the old political constituencies.
He, therefore, was more interested in curtailing the power of
the New Deal interest groups and bureaucracy than in indiscriminately repealing FDR's legislation.

Taft clearly dis-

tinguished between the legitimate recovery measures that conformed to American political, social, and economic principles
and the New Deal innovations that he felt would revolutionize
the fabric of American society, thereby retarding the country's
growth.

Conssquently, the Taft-Hartley Act was not aimed at

destroying labor unions so much as it was an attempt to restore
a balance between labor and management.

The Ohio senator also

supported subsidies for low-cost housing and even tolerated
the social security program.

But Taft, an intransigent dis-

ciple of free enterprise, vigorously opposed projects like the
TVA.

To him the TVA, or

11

King Kilowatt," as its conservative

critics called it, was destroying the private utility industry
and was operating as an
gressional control.

a~tonomous

monopoly almost beyond con-

In a more general sense, then, Taft and

his followers equated the New Deal with socialism, likening it
to a malignant cancer that must be cut from the American body
politic.

During the 1938 campaign Taft succinctly explained

his opposition to the New

De~l

and the idea of a regulated

18

economy:
In spite of manipulation of the currency, in spite

of devaluing the dollar, in spite of deficits amounting to $15 billion and the pouring out of public
funds, in spite of unlimited power given to regulate
farm industry, the coal industry, the utility industry, and the issue of securities, in spite of countless additional powers as great as could be granted
within the constitution, we are faced today with
complete failure.
This was a theme to. which Taft and his followers repeatedly
returned in attacking the New Deal-Fair Deal.

Instead of

government intervention, Taft advocated a balanced economy,
states' rights, and the other traditional principles that had
already been outlined in the conservative manifesto of 1937. 20
The Republican convention in 1952 was not the lovefest
one might have expected now that it finally appeared the Democrats could be beaten; instead, the Party split wide open
between the old guard conservatives and the Ea.stern liberals.
Robert Taft was the easy choice of the Party's conservative
wing.

After a couple of primaries the Eastern liberals nar-

rowed their choice to Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The Ea.stern Re-

publicans believed Taft's ideological rigidity would doom.the
Party to defeat; this conviction was confirmed by various
opinion polls.
particulars.

Eisenhower fitted neatly into their bill of
As Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in

World War II and Commander of the NATO forces, he was a popular military leader. 21 More than anything else, Eisenhower's
20

Ru~sel Kirk and James McClellan, The Political Principles of Robert A. Taft (New York, 1967), 16-17, 19, c4-25, 4955; I1ayer, Republican Party, 483.
21 Mayer, Republican Party, 487.

19
qualifications for the Republican nomination rested on the
fact that as an unknown political quantity he had not offended
anyone, as Taft had over the years.

Ike possessed the image

of a fair man and appealed to all colors in the political
spectrum.
Eisenhower had been reluctant to enter politics while
still in uniform.

Nevertheless, after Senator Henry Cabot

Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts urged him, Eisenhower issued a
statement in January 1952, testifying to his membership in
the Republican Party.
went to work.

With this concession, Ike's supporters

They showed their potential strength by defeat-

ing Taft in the New Hampshire primary in March and by picking
up 100,000 write-in votes in the Minnesota primary.

In April,

however, Taft laid to waste any illusions that he might be an
ineffective campaigner by defeating both Governor Harold Stassen of Minnesota and Governor Earl Warren of California in the
Wisconsin primary.

When it became clear that Taft could wrap

up the nomination unless Eisenhower departed from Paris and
returned to the United States to actively campaign for the
nomination, he resigned as Supreme Commander of NATo. 22
Ironically, the crucial fight for the nomination turned
on the seating of the delegates from Texas, Georgia, and Louisiana.

The Southern wing of the Party was supposedly one of

Taft's strongholds and the Eisenhower forces conceded that if
Taft's delegates from these states were seated at the

22~·t 482.
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convention, the senator from Ohio could conceivably win a
first ballot nomination.

The Eastern Republicans determined

to stop Taft by charging his forces with blatant delegate
fraud in these states.

Eisenhower even described this so-

called fraud as a "betrayal of the whole Republican party and
its principles."

Rather than fraud, however, the real issue

was control of southern Republican state politics.
For decades the southern Republicans had been reluctant
to broaden the Party's appeal by bringing new blood into the
Party, even.though some southern states had occasionally deserted Roosevelt and Truman.

Since the local Republicans fed

from the small trough of patronage supplied by the Taft wing,
their object was not to win elections.

On the contrary, they

desired to keep the local party small and exclusive so that
the Washington spoils would not_ have to be divided too thinly.
But the South was crucial to the election of Eisenhower.

This

meant the Party's appeal would have to be broadened beyond
anything the Republican regulars had ever envisioned.
die was cast by the time the convention convened. 2 3

The

The Taft-controlled Republican National Committee offered
a compromise whereby 16 of the 38 Texas seats would go to Ike.
Lodge, Eisenhower's campaign manager, refused the offer and
instead vowed to take the issue to the floor of the convention.
Aiid this Eisenhower's strategists did.
After dispensing with the preliminaries the Eisenhower
forces wasted no time getting to the heart of the matter.
2 3Burns, Deadlock, 183-84.
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When Senator John W. Bricker qf Ohio offered the usual motion
that the convention follow the 1948 rules, Governor Arthur
Langlie of

Washin~ton

jumped to his feet with a substitute

motion that had been carefully prepared by Eisenhower's strategists.

Langlie requested that the contested delegations of

Georgia and Texas and thirteen delegates from Louisiana be
denied the right to participate in the convention or on any.
of its committees until their qualifications had been settled
upon by

~

majority of the convention.

A bitter debate ensued.

Clarence J. Brown, a Taftite, offered a compromise motion that
the convention turned down.
without a roll call vote.

Langlie's motion finally carried
The Eisenhower strategists thus

stymied a potential Taftite bandwagon before it had gotten out
of first gear.

The rest was anti-climactic.

wnen Eisenhower

received 595 votes on the first ballot, just nine short of
nomination, Senator Ed.ward Thye of Minnesota changed his state's
votes to Eisenhower.

But the convention had left deep politi-

cal wounds in its wake.

As Governor J. Bracken Lee of Utah,

a diehard Taftite, bitterly recalled a few years afterwards:
"I think actually, at the [1952] convention, if there hadn't
been dishonest manipulation of the vote, Eisenhower would
never have been nominated."

Later this fissure was partially

spliced together at the Morningside Heights Conference in New
York, when Eisenhower and Taft held a long discussion about
the upcoming election and Republican politics and philosophy.
Afterwards

T~ft

announced that the two agreed on domestic

policy and disagreed only on foreign policy.

They agreed, in
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short, on the need for an anti-New Deal domestic policy. 24
In November Eisenhower won handily.

His popular victory

was 33,936,252 to 27,314,992 for Stevenson; in the Electoral
College his margin was even more
votes) to 9 states (82 votes).

impressive-~39

states (442

Significantly, Eisenhower car-

ried Texas, Florida, and Virginia as well as several border
states.

This southern vote was all the more impressive than

Hoover's in 1928.

This time the G.O.P. had presented many more

candidates for state and local offices.

Also, a large number

of Northern Republicans had been enticed to move South by either
financial opportunities or retirement prospects and they naturally retained their Republican voting habits.

Certainly Tru-

man's civil rights policy also had convinced many native
southerners to shift their allegiance.
Besides electing their first President since 1928, the
Republicans also gained a slim margin in Congress.

In the

Senate the G.O.P. held a 49 to 47 edge and in the House a 221
to 214 margin.

While Eisenhower received 55.1 percent of the

popular vote, the Republican candidates for the federal legislature received only a li tt;le more than 50 percent. 2 5 Nevertheless,- Congress was not simply a tool to be used easily by
24Mayer, Republican Party, 489-91; Merlo J. Pusey, Eisenhower the President (New York, 1956), 20; Sherman Adams, Firsthand Re ort: 'l'he St or of the Eisenhower Administration (New
York~ 1961 , 16; J. Bracken Lee, "Eisenhower Adminis ration,"
transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted by Ed Edwin
(Columbia University, for Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History
Project, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas), 20;
Mowry, Urban.Nation, 239.
2 5Mayer, Republican Party, 494-95.
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the new President.

Robert Taft, still the leader of the Re-

publican legislators, was determined that Ike would live up
to his campaign promises on domestic affairs.

Moreover, the

Dixicrat-Republican coalition remained as tacit as ever.
While .they had serious differences over foreign policy,
.Taft and Eisenhower agreed in their views on conservation.
They were intransigently opposed to the New Deal initiatives,
such as the TVA.

Moreover, they felt the business community

should be allowed more freedom from governmental intervention
in developing the nation's natural resources.

The new admini-

stration's policy of "partnership" was as much a reflection of
TaftJs philosophy as it was of Eisenhower's.

Conservation was

one area where Taft and his followers would have no reason to
complain about Eisenhower's leadership.

CHAPTER II
PARTNERSHIP PROFILE
The

Ei~enhower

Administration's philosophy on natural

resources development--called "partnership"--reflected the
economic and social views of the Taft-Hoover wing of the
Party, as well as their bedfellows, the Dixicrats.

The core

of the partnership philosophy did not involve repealing the
New ·Deal recovery measures, but was an attempt to restore fiscal integrity to the federal budge.t, to cut runaway government
spending by reducing the growing bureaucracy, and to give incentives to the business community and other local enterprises. 1
Repeatedly Eisenhower and his appointees drove home their
belief in these first principles.

In his first State of the

Union message, the President sought to reassure his critics
that he had no intention of pulling the federal government
complet.ely out of the field of natural resources development.
"Soundly-planned projects already initiated should be carried
out," he said.

"New ones will be planned for the future."

But

he also· made plain his antipathy for the federal bureaucracy.
"The best natural resources program for America will not result
from exclusive dependence on Federal bureaucracy.

It will

1 For a brief' sketch of the background to partnership see
Raymond Moley, New Republican Onportunity (New York, 1962), 6061, and Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party (New
York, 1956).24
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involve a partnership of the states and local communities,
private citizens and the Federal Government, all working together.

This combined effort will advance the development of

the great river valleys of our nation and the power they can
generate. 112

Later, in a Message to the Congress Relative toa

Program Designed to Conserve and Improve the Nation's Resources, the President again stressed the central pillars on which
his conservation policy rested: "To do this within the framework of a sound fiscal policy and in the light of defense
needs will require the maximum cooperation among the states
and local communities, farmers, businessmen, and other private
citizens, and the Federal Government."3

Should the Federal

Government not reduce its expenditures, Treasury Secretary
George Humphreys warned, there would be !'the destruction of
all that we hold dear. 114

Eisenhower repeatedly invoked this

inspiration from a Republican predecessor, Abraham Lincoln, to
sum up what he conceived to be the proper role of the Federal
Government in conservation: "The legitimate object of Government is to do for a.community of people whatever they need to
have done but cannot do at all or cannot do so well.

In all

that the people can individually do so well for themselves
Government ought not to interfere."5

In other words, the

2 New York Times, Feb. 3, 1953, 15.
3Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Paners of the President,
1953 (Govt. Printing Office, 1960), 5~9.
4 Nathaniel R. Howard (ed.), The Basic Papers of George M.
Humphrey, 1953-57 (Cleveland, 1965), 46.
5speech ·at the opening of the Garrison Dam, North Dakota,
June 11, 1953, in Public Papers, 1953.
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Federal Government ought to minimize its role and allow local
communities and business initiatives to do as much as they
can--sooething they thought the New Deal had stifled.

Signi-

ficantly, to implements its desire for fiscal integrity the
Administration reduced expenditures for natural resources
development; as the gross national product increased 15 percent from fiscal years 1953 to 1956, federal spending for
natural resources rose only 2 percent. 6
The Republican and Democratic platforms in 1952 had accurately shown the wide differences between the partnership
and New Deal philosophies.

The Republican platform called

for legislation to better define the rights and privileges of
grazers and other cooperators and users, for the end of arbitrary bureaucracy, and for protection of the grazers by

independent judicial review board against administrative invasions of the grazers' rights and privileges.

The platform

came out foresquare on the issue of water policy: "We vigorously oppose the efforts of this [New Deal-Fair Deal] national
Administration, in California and elsewhere, to undermine state
control over water use, to acquire paramount water rights
without.just compensation, and to establish all-powerful Federal socialistic valley authorities."

On the controversial

issue of offshore oil the Republican platform miequivocably
championed restoration of this rich oil to the states.

The

Democrats, on the other hand, wrote a litany commending the

6seymour E. Harris, The Economics of the Political Par-

~ (New Yor~,

1962), 303-04.

r
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New Deal-Fair Deal conservation efforts.

In applauding the

success of their Soil Conservation Service, and the new agricUltural, forestry, and research progr8.I!ls, the Democrats
.flatly stated: "These programs have revolutionized Atlerican
agriculture and must be continued and expanded."

They also

pointed out that in 1935 only 10 percent of American farm
homes had electricity and that in 1952 it was 85 percent.
They further pledged to continue this effort and those like
·the TVA and other river basin projects.

Significantly, how-

ever, the Democrats fell silent on the volatile offshore oil
issue.?

Thus the Republicans were pledged to get the federal

government out of resources development insofar as it was consistent with national defense while the Democrats would continue to build on their past efforts.
The Administration's emphasis on states' rights and local
initiative produced an immediate appeal to many of the nation's
governors who had been seeking to regain some of the lost power
that, in their opinion, Washington had grabbed during the depression and war.

In early May 1953, the President met with

forty-four state and territorial governors to discuss various
problems facing the states.

One of the most important topics

of discussion was future participation of the states in natural
resources development.

The governors stressed their opposi-

tion to the "usurpation" of the states' prerogatives by·the
Federal Power Com.mission in the development of hydroelectric
?New York Times, July 11, 8; July 21~, 1952, 16-1?; Mayer,
Republican Party, 491.
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power and natural gas transmission lines.

They further de-

clared the TVA a success but opposed the adoption of similar
plans for the development of the Missouri and Columbia River
basins.

Generally they complained that agencies of the .Exec-

utive Branch inherently overrode established state policies
and disregarded the rights of the states.

Finally, the states'

leaders voiced a protest that had arisen only since the end
of the War.

They viewed the rapid extension of natural gas
lines as another instance of federal usurpation. 8 The Administration's ear was particularly receptive.to many of these
complaints.

For example, Arthur Larson, a member of the Ad-

ministration, fully articulated the need for "striking a new
federal-state balance."

Simply put: "If you have an Administra-

tion which lapses·comfortably into the habit of applying sweeping federal remedies for all ills, you may look for another
era of concentration of power in Washington and withering-away
of state governments--this time perhaps forever •••• "9

Conse-

quently, the Eisenhower philosophy of partnership was well
tailored to serve the protests against the federal government's
encroachment on the rights of the states.
The men Eisenhower appointed to his cabinet, subcabinet,
Federal Power Commission,

~nd

Atomic Power Commission fully

agreed with the President's general philosophy and Republican
platform.

It is not entirely an exaggeration to say that the

8 New York Times, May 10, 1953, IV, 9.
9Larson, A Republican Looks, 37-38.
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Eisenhower cabinet was composed of "nine millionaires and a
plumber," for admittedly, it was indeed a wealthy and conservative group. And the hand of Taft was felt everywhere. 10 Because he was better versed in foreign affairs than domestic
issues, Eisenhower leaned heavily on his cabinet.

Moreover,

considering his military background, it was only logical for
him to establish a chain of command by which he· delegated
broad areas of responsibility to his subordinates. 11 Consequently, the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture were decisive in carrying out the Administrative partnership policy.
The Department of Interior especially was a representative case of the Administration's orientation.

As perhaps the

most influential agent in the formation of a natural resources
policy, the interior department had become a center of great
notoriety during the New Deal, especially under the direction
of Harold Ickes.

Thus the man picked to fill this post would

have to be wholly in tune with the Administration's partnership
policy.

Traditionally one of the essential qualifications was

that the Secretary had to come from the West.

Since the

lOMoWry, Urban Nation, 240; Eric Goldman, The Crucial
Decade--And After, America, 1945-60 (New York, I96o), 24042.
11Mayer, Retublican Party, 495; Clarence Davis, "Eisenhower Administra ion," transcript of a tape recorded interview
conducted by Ed Edwin (Columbia University, for Dwight D.
Eisenhower Oral History Project, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library,
1968), 13. In his interview Davis noted: "But on domestic
issues, I.would feel that the President was a long ways from
being an expert on the national economy, labor, a lot of.
things that are prominent national issues, and therefore he
was governed pretty largely by the views of the Cabinet man
who had that particular field within his domain. That showed
up at many of these cabinet meetings."
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partnership philosophy stressed a bigger role for the states,
it was only fitting that Eisenhower searched for a governor
to fill the post.

Governor Arthur Langlie, who had played an

important role in Eisenhower's nomination victory, could have
had the job but decided otherwise since he had just been
elected to another four year term as governor.

Also it was

rumored that Governor Dan Thornton of Colorado might receive
the nod but Eisenhower discarded him; as one insider put it,
"they thought he would be a bull in a China shop."

Senator

Guy Cordon of Oregon declined the Secretaryship but recommended the governor of his state, Douglas McKay.

When Eisenhower
offered the position to the governor.it was accepted. 12
Douglas McKay was virtually unknown outside Oregon and

Republican circles.

Born in Portland in 1893, he worked his

way through Oregon State College as a janitor, and, in 191?,
received a Bachelor of Science degree in agriculture.

After

receiving his degree McKay became a successful automobile
salesman.

In 1933, he was elected mayor of Salem, Oregon.

Except for a brief tour in the Army during World War II, he
served as state senator from Marion County from 1935 to 1949.
In 1948 McKay was elected governor of the state and was reelected two years later. 1 3 In presidential politics Governor
12 Davis, OH, 5?; Adams, Firsthand, 62-66; Eisenhower, Mandate, 86-87; Raymond Moley, Newsweek (Nov. 17, 1952), 120. ~
~Department of Agriculture, Federal Power Commission, and
the Atomic Energy Commission will be dealt with in detail in
later chapters.
l3New Yo~k Times, nov. 12, 1952, 18; Senate, Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., Nomination
of Governor Dou las McKa to be Secretar of the Interior (January
3 , •

r
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McKay supported Thomas Dewey's nomination in 1948 and fully
supported .Eisenhower's drive for the nomination four years
hence.

On the eve of the forty-fourth governors' conference

in 1952, McKay and Governor Thornton launched an offensive
designed to convince the uncommitted colleagues that Taft
would weaken the Republican ticket in the Pacific and Mountain
states.
Texas.

McKay also became involved in the delegate fight over
Along with Governors Sherman Adams of New Hampshire

and Dewey of New York, McKay sent a telegram to the Republican
National Committee in Chicago urging the seating of the Eisenhower delegates from Texas.

They claimed it was "important to

the honor and integrity of the Republican Party that the Eisenhower delegation from Texas be seated at the national convention. ii

At the convention McKay played a leading role in ob-

taining West Coast delegates for Eisenhower; for example, he
attempted to woo his friend, Governor Earl Warren,into releasing the California delegation. 14
McKay's outspoken social and

e~onomic

views, in the opin-

ion of Sherman Adams, the President's political confidant, were
"probably more conservative than anyone else in the considerably conservative Eisenhower Cabinet. 111 5

In a statement rank-

ing only second to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson's, McKay,
shortly after· accepting the Interior appointment, made unequivocally clear his mission: "We're here in the saddle as an

14New York Times, June 30, 8; July 2, 16; July 9, 9;
Nov. 21, 1952, 1.
l5Adams, Firsthand, 236.
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administration representing business and industry. 1116

And his

views on states' rights, local initiative, and natural resources development were in perfect conformity with the thrust
of the partnership philosophy.

McKay made it perfectly clear,

for example, that he opposed the New Deal's rural electrification program because it damaged free enterprise.

He was admit-

tedly in complete agreement with the Republican platform plank
on public works and water resources. 1 7
The men serving under McKay were cut from the same cloth.
Before coming to Interior, Clarence Davis had represented the
electrical industry in western Nebraska.

He was first appoin-

ted Solicitor and two years later was promoted to Under Secretary of Interior.

Davis, who had been recommended by his

friend Senator Butler of Nebraska,,was familiar with the Bureau of Reclamation.

He opposed much that had gone on under

the Ickes and Oscar Chapman stewardships.

In his opinion:

We're at the point now ••• where the power in Washington can control elections, it can control economic
life, it can decree economic death, it can do this,
that and the other. And slowly, therefore, the pattern is set for a completely socialized America.18
Fred A. Aandahl, formerly a governor and congressman from
North Dakota, became Assistant Secretary of Interior.

As a

congressman he had voted five times out of seven against public
16Harris·, Economics of Political Parties, 11; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.t Kenned or Nixon: Does It Hake An Difference? (New
York, 1960;,
• Wilson ad said: What is good for General
Motors is good for the United States."
1 7senate Hearin:::s, Nomination of McKay, 4-6, 12, 17-18.
18 Davis OH, 3-4, 10, 11~ 61.
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power programs.

As a congressman from Montana, wesley D'Ewart

had been a leading advocate of turning public grazing lands
over to private interests.

After he was defeated for the Sen-

ate in 1954, D'Ewart was named Assistant Secretary of Interior
in charge of lands and reclamation. 1 9
McKay's appointment was greeted by mixed emotions.

Ray-

mond Moley, generally sympathetic to partnership and openly
hostile to Ickes and the Bureau of Reclamation, concluded that
McKay had already begun to attack the bureaucracy, Meley predicted that the New Deal "propaganda machine he inherited
will vanish.

He will economize."

The wall Street Journal

also gave him a favorable review: "McKay is a proponent.of
public power and of government reclamation projects--but with
a difference.

He wants the people of the states affected to

have voice, and he wants to let private utilities do the dam
building wherever they are able and willing.

One token of his

position: He had opposed the idea of creating any Columbia
River Authority, modeled on the TVA."

On the other hand, Berg-

man, writing for the New Republic, expressed serious reservations about the appointment.

It was his belief that McKay was

too business-minded and conservative.

He asked:

Will Douglas McKay--like Harold Ickes and Oscar Chapman before him--fight for the principie that public
power sh-0uld be used for the benefit of all the people,
not for the private-power companies? •• oWill McKay keep
them in the public domain where the government can
charge reasonable rates to the big and little stockmen alike? Will he protect our too rapidly dwindling
~WIS~

l9Harris, Econonics of Political Parties,
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.forests froo exploitation by lumber interests?
Needless to say he was quite sceptica1. 20
Eisenhower found little congressional opposition to the
confirmation of his high-level cabinet and commission appointments, but this was hardly the case with his bureaucratic
appointments.

One of the initial problems confronting the

new Secretary of Interior was the dismissal of bureaucrats
imbued with the philosophy of the New and Fair Deals.

To

make matters difficult, Truman had revised the civil service
rules to insure the retention of his appointments after he had
departed the White House.

After taking office, Eisenhower

ordered that all positions "of a confidential or policy-.
determining character" should be removed from the merit system.
FeW'-~bservers

could disagree, for instance, that the

direc~or

ship of the Bureau of Land Management was a policy-determining
position and therefore should not be in the category of classified service. 21 "The crux of the problem," Under Secretary
Ralph Tudor explained,
lies in the inability of the Secretary rof Interior]
to replace bureau heads and their assistants, regional
directors of various bureaus, attorneys and others to
whom, in an organization as large and diversified as
Interior, must be delegated the authority and responsibility to make policy. Virtually all of these of.fices are now occupied by persons fully protected
against removal or transfer by the administration of
Civil Se.rvice.
20Moley, "Take, But Don't Grab," Newsweek, 42 (May 11,
1953), 112; Bergman, New Republic (Dec. 1952).
21 Herman Miles Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the

Change in Administration," American Political Science Review,
48 (March, 1954) , 141-43.
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Consequently, Tudor "strongly urged that Civil Service b.e importuned to take a realistic look at requests for transfer of
policy-making positions to Schedule •c•. 1122 Clarence Davis
concurred, asking: " ••• but what do you do to make your ideas
effective in a big Department when the chiefs of the bureaus
••• are all owing allegiance to somebody besides you and have
very small regard for your notions about things? 112 3 McKay
.iwasted no time making known his feelings.

He told a meeting

of the Department's employees that they need not fear a big
shake-up, but he did warn there would be changes in top-level
posts; where "we Will put in some new people sympathetic with
the position of the Administration. 1124
There was little doubt that the Bureau of Reclamation
would be one of McKay's first targets.

As early as April, 1952,

one writer predicted that
if there is a G.O.P. victory at the polls next November, they vow that one of the first orders of business
will be separating the Interior Department from its
loudest and least repressible mouth [Michael Strauss,
Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation].25
Soon after his appointment, McKay confirmed that prediction
by announcing that Michael Strauss' dismissal would be high on
his list of priorities.

Taking this hint, Strauss declared

his intention to submit his resignation on the day Eisenhower
22Memo, ·sept. 16, 1953, Tudor to McKay, Tudor Papers, Box
1, Eisenhower Library.
2 3navis OH, 18-19.
24New York Times, Jan. 27, 1953, 15.
25
.
P. F. Healy, "Our Most Arrogant Bureaucrat," Saturday
Evening Post, 224 (April 19, 1952), 150.
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was sworn into office. 26

While getting rid of Strauss proved

easy, it was no simple trick finding a suitable successor.
Under Secretary Tudor first recomraended Lyman Wilbur,
chief engineer of the Morrison-Knudson Company, for the position.

Tudor considered him "quite capable" both as an engineer and administrator. 2 7 Nevertheless, McKay chose Marvin

Nichols, a pro-Eisenhower Democrat from Fort Worth, Texas.
Nichols had the full endorsement of both Texas senators, Lyndon Johnson and Price Daniel, plus Jack Porter, the state's
Republican National Committeeman. 28 The White House staff,
however, was sceptical of his past connection under the Truman
administration with a government-owned nickel mine and plant
at Niccaro, Cuba.

The Nichols nomination thus was held up

for over two months.

In a confidential memorandum to Charles

F. Willis, Jr., a Special Assistant to the President, Under
Secretary Tudor insisted there was "nothing in the records
available to us that would indicate that he [Marvin Nichols]
performed his assigned job in a manner other than entirely
proper and to the advantage of the United States Government. 112 9
Nevertheless, on June 27, 1953, Nichols withdrew his name, indicating that the White House Staff had opposed his appointment.
26 New York Times,. Dec'. 17, 1952, 24; Newsweek, 40 (Dec~
29 ' 19 52) ' 18..
27Memo, April 13, 1952, Tudor to McKay, Tudor Papers, Box
1, Eisenhower Library.
28 New York Times, April 23, 1953, 24.
2 9Memo, May 15, 1953, Tudor to Willis, Tudor Papers, Box
1, Eisenhower Libra~y.
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McKay accepted the withdrawal and on July 9 recoI:l.Dended Wilbur Dexheimer, who had served as a Lt. Colonel in the Corps
of Engineers, principally in China.

After the War Dexheimer

had been employed by Morrison-Knudsen for railroad, highway,
and port surveys in China.

\./hile at that company he had served

as Ralph Tudor's "principal assistant."

In 194?, Dexheimer

became the Assistant Chief Construction Engineer in the Bureau
of Reclamation's Denver office.3°

He was appointed, and fin-

ally, after seven months of wrangling between the White House
Staff and the interior department, there was now a Commissioner
of the Bureau of Reclamation.
McKay also sought to replace Albert Day as Director of
the Fish and Wildlife Service.

Tudor recorded in his diary

that Day was ;;a little different and over the years has become
a rather tyrannical bureaucrat. ,,-3l

Day had been a career biol-

ogist in government service for nearly thirty-five years and
had been Director for seven years.

In return for stepping

down as Director, McKay offered him another position with the
Service.

John L. Farley of Seattle, a community relations

director of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, was designated
30New York Times, July 14, 1953, 15; July 9, 1953, McKay
to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-E, Box 118, and Confidential
Letter, August 24, 1953, Tudor to Nichols, Tudor Papers, Box
1, Eisenhower Library; Phillip Sirotkin and Owen Stratton,
The Echo Park Controversy (Inter-University Case Program,

1959), 65.

3l"Notes Recorded While Under Secret;ary, Department of
Interior, March, 1953-Sept., 1954," Tudor Papers, Box 1, Entry
for April 26, 1953, Eisenhower Library.
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his successoro3 2

When Day charged that his removal came as a

result of "special interests," particularly the California
duck _hunters and salmon packers, several congressmen and professional conservationists agreed.

Senator Estes Kefauver

warned that McKay had "decided to use one of the principal
scientific and conservation agencies of the Federal Government
for political purposes."

Rachel Carson, author of the best-

seller, The Sea Around Us, viewed Day's ouster as "one ominous
threat to the cause of conservation and strongly suggests that
our national resources are to become political pawns."

Nature

Magazine and John B. Oakes of the New York Times added that
the ouster might discourage others from seeking careers as
government conservationists.

The Emergency Committee on Natur-

al Resources, an organization composed of thirty-two conserva-

.

tion groups, was especially distressed by the Day affair.

"We

believe," the Committee wrote Eisenhower shortly after the inauguration, "that such agencies ••• should be administered and
operated by professionally trained individuals selected under
the Civil Service System and not subject to replacement for
political reasons."

On

February 19, the Committee protested

the Day dismissal to McKay, explaining that the Service "has
done a good job in guarding this resource [wildlife], and in
placing the i·nterests of the resource above that of any group
which seeks it exploitation."

Although the Committee subse-

quently met with Eisenhower to discuss the matter of career

32 New York ·rimes, April 18, 1953, 22.

p
39
conservationists in federal employment, the specific subject
of Day's removal was not brought up.

At a press conference

the President defended the Day dismissal, as well as others,
saying that "if these people could not support those [Ad.ministration] policies and their positions, they had no other recourse but to resign, as he saw it."

Farley succeeded Day.33

Unlike Day, Marion Clawson, Director of the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM), did not accept his dismissal quietly.
Clawson had been Director since 1948 and a career official
since 1929.

The Administration considered him too indepen-

dent and, as one put it, "primarily a semi-socialist."

Clar-

ence Davis, for example, expressed this opinion:
Marion Clawson has the philosophic belief that all
land ought to be under the control of the government,
that they LBLMJ could manage it much better than the
private owners could manage it, and he was just totally out of touch with what we roughly call the free
enterprise, opportunity system that the Republican
Party by and large has stood for, and certainly McKay
has stood for.
In a twelve-page letter to McKay, Clawson, rather self-servingly, argued that his dismissal has "set back for twenty years
or more a sound program of conservation and management of
Federally owned lands and resources."

Further, he called

McKay's charges of "insubordination" false and asked to be
33navid ·cushman Coyle, Conservation: An American Stor~ of
Conflict and Accomnlishments (Rutgers University Press, 19 ?),
236; "Careers and ()onservation," Nature Ma~azine, 46 (June,
1953), 313; John B. Oakes, "Conservation; olitical Issue,"
New York Times, May 3, 1953, II, 28; Memo, April 15, 1~53,
McKay to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-4-F, Box 119, Eisenhower
Library; "Wildlife Chief Dismissed, Science News Letter, 63
(May 2, 1953), 279; New York Times, April 20, 20; April 21, 20;
April 24, 16-17; April 29, 17; June 9, 1953, 22.
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retained in office.

McKay, of course, did not complyo

"It is

evident," the Secretary replied, "that we would not be able to
work together in any harmony under the circumstances and therefore your removal will serve to promote the efficiency of the
Federal service."

A deal, however, was worked out by which

Clawson was offered a job in the Middle East.
an

Ed.ward Woozley,
Idaho State Land Commissioner, replaced him.34
Finally, McKay and Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah recom-

mended that Charles Forbes be replaced by Tom Lyons as Director of the Bureau of Mines.

John L. Lewis of the United Mine

Workers protested the Lyon appointment.

Like the others,

Forbes had been a forty-year career man and Director of the
Bureau since 1951.

But when Lyon testified he had no respect

for the mine safety program, protests erupted from Congress
and the White House had to withdraw the nominee from consideration.35

'

Besides installing its own men in key bureaucratic positions, the Administration also faced the difficult task of
reorganizing and trimming the bureaucracy.

One of Eisenhower's

major campaign themes, in fact, had been government inefficiency due to the runaway growth of bureaucracy; he had pledged
to cut the bureaucracy and thus government spending.
easier said t-han done, however.

It was

One of the departments that

. 34Davis OH, 18-21; New York Times, April 23, 20; April 22,
1953, 32; Somers, "Federal Bureaucracy," 144.
35New Yo.rk Times, April 26, 1953, IV, 2; Somers, "Federal
:.. .. Bureaucracy," 138-39; Adams, Firsthand, 77.
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had especially swelled in size during the New Deal had been
Interior.

Between 1932 and 1952 the staff of the Department

had almosttripled in size.

Such unchecked growth, the Admini-

stration contended," constituted an unmitigated danger to American liberty.3 6 Moreover, it was a fact that interagency conflicts often resulted in needlessly increased expenditures and
overlapping responsibilities.37

Past attempts to reorganize

the multitude of conservation agencies had met with failure.
The Corps of Engineers had been a special target.

Two commis-

sions were thus established by the Eisenhower administration
to study the problems of government reorganization.
The President's Advisory Commission on Government Organization, known as the Rockefeller Commission, was established
by Eisenhower at the end of November 1952, and was composed
of Nelson Rockefeller, its chairman, Milton Eisenhower, the
President's brother, and Arthur Fleming, Director of the Office
of Defense Mobilization.

The Commission submitted twenty-one
unpublished studies to the President.3 8 The Commission, seeking to reorganize the departmental functions of la.nd management
and water resources, recommended that land management of the

36 Moley, Reuublican Otportunit~, 64-68. In 1932, the
Department of Interior emp~oyed 20, 86 and in 1953 it was 59,369.
37For examples of these interagency conflicts, cf. Coyle,
Conservation, 139-41; Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York, 1966), 221-22, 244-45; Arthur Maas,
Huddy ~.Ja ters: The Army Engineers and the Ha ti on' s Rivers (Cambridge, 1951 ).
38 somers, "Federal Bureaucracy," 133.
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Federal Government be unified under a single head.

To do

this the Commission suggested that the Bureau of Land Management in the Department of Interior be transferred to the Department of Agriculture.39

Reflecting conclusions of earlier

studies, the Rockefeller Commission also advised that the
civil functions of the Corps of Engineers be transferred to
the Department of Interior. 40 Furthermore, the Secretary of
Interior should continue to exercise exclusive appointive power
over the Directors of the Bureau of Mines, Indian Affairs,
Reclamation and the Geological Survey.

"This recommendation,"

the Commission said, "is consistent with the principle of
strengthening the executive authority of the department heads."
The power planning functions and investigation of gas resources
should, the GoID.11lission felt, be transferred from the Federal
Power Commission to the Department of Interior.

The First

39President's Advisory Co:mnittee on Government Organization, Memorandum No. 9, March 12, 1953, Central Files, OF-103A, Eisenhower Library. McKay objected to this proposal. Instead, he felt the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture should be transferred to Intetior. He gave two reasons:
(1) that the Department of Interior should be a "Department of
Natural Resources," and (2) that land nanagement activities
are an element of the functions of such other bureaus of the
Department of Interior as the Indian Service, Bureau of Reclamation, the Fish and Wildlife Service, Geological Survey, and
the National Park Service. The Committee, on the other hand,
contended that "public lands management is not the major purpose of Bureaus such as the Indian Service, Geological Survey,
and the Natiqnal Park Service."
40 rbid., 5. The Co:mnittee correctly said: "Because the
Corps of"Eiigineers has projects in most Congressional districts,
and because of, the close relationship between the Corps and
Congress, the rabove] proposal will probably encounter'the
most determined opposition of any reorganization proposal under consideration." The Second Hoover Commission was equally
critical of the Corps. Cf. Commission on Or~anization of the
Executive Branch of the Government (June, 1955.),802-21. Percival C. Brundage, The Bureau of the Budget (New York, 1970), ""
170-71.•
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Hoover Commission (1949), established by President Truman to
study the Executive Branch, had recommended this as well.

The

Rockefeller Com.mission hoped this recommendation would "make
the functions more susceptible to executive direction and integration with the broader programs of the Executive Branch."
In the past the FPC, jealous of its prerogatives, had opposed
any such transfer. 41
The Republican Congress also established another comm.ission to investigate mainly power and water resources.

Former

President Herbert Hoover, the Commission's chairman, had been
openly hostile to the New Deal's water and power policies.

1953 Hoover outlined his general views.

In

"The first step toward

socialization," he contended,
was taken when the Federal Government undertook itself
to generate and distribute this electric power from
multiple-purpose dams. And now the Federal Government
has taken further socialistic leaps by building stream
and hydro plants solely for the generation of electric
power.
Hoover recommended that "a temporary Commission" be set up to
study a reorganization of the Federal Government's role in
water and power resources.

He became the head of that Commis-

sion and his views were strongly reflected in its report. 42

In effect the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the Second Hoover Commission)
gave a blanket endorsement to the Administration's partnership
41 Ibid., 4.
42 Herbert Hoover, "Socialization of Electric Power; There
Must Be Checks on Government as Well as Private Economic
Powers," Vital Speeches, 19,.No~ .3 (1952-53), 425.
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philosophy:
It is apparent from the foregoing summary and analysis
of the present status of Federal power authorities
that Government economy and efficiency can be effected
in the field of power by reducing expenditures·, abolishing activities not necessary to the efficie~t conduct of Government, and eliminating nonessential activities which are competitive with private enterprise.43
The Commission asserted that the preference clause,· one of the
bulwarks of the New Deal's power program, had accomplished
its goal and now privately owned utilities should be permitted
to purchase power generated at Federal projects. 44

In short,

the Commission warned that:
Presently the only areas in the country where serious
electric pm·:er shortages are anticipated in the future
are those where the Government's power activities have
become so dominant that the normal local non-Federal
utilities have not been in position to function as the
rest of the country.45
The Commission was thus opposed to projects like the TVA.
re~soned

It

that such "c,ompeti ti on by the Federal Government with

private enterprise in the power field is more extensive than
in any other single governmental field and has taken on many
aspects which are the negation of our fundruµental economic system. "46

The purpose of the Commission's analysis was to reduce

4 3c

· ·
· t ion
·
·
Branc h of
om.mission
on 0rganiza
of the 1:'..r
LAecut ive
the Government (June, 1955), 305.
44

commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Task Force Re)ort on Water Resources and Power
(Washington, D.C., June, 1955 , II, 3?6.
4 5rbid., 291-93. Cf. also Neil NacNeil and Harold W.
Metz, The'"lioover Re ort
What It Means to You As
Citizens and ·. . . axpayers New York, 1
, 1
•
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Metz and MacNeil, The Hoover Report, 132.
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the impact of the Federal Goverru:ient on private enterprise;
that is, to lessen the government's competition with private
utilities.

The Com.mission's recommendations regarding the

construction of steam plants and transmission lines, the sale
of power to preference customers and the fixing of rates to
be charged on Federal projects were all designed to meet this
objective. 4 ?
The Comr:i.ission's report was also sharply critical of the
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation.

It found

these two agencies were "not realizing in its sales prices of
power

eit~er

the fair value or the full economic cost of the

electric energy produced by it."

To remedy this situation,

the Commission concluded that "complete authority should be
lodged in the Federal Power Commission to see that rates for
all federally produced power conform at all times with the
established standard. 1148
Finally, the Commission recommended that local and state
agencies and organizations should undertake water resources
development except when it was needed to safeguard the national
interest or to accomplish some other national objective.

The

Federal Government should assume responsibility only when the
means are beyond the local and state bodies. 4 9
An integral part of the Administration's attempt to

4 7Hoover Commission, Task Force Report, I, 36.
48 commission on the Ex:ecutive Branch of the Government
(June, 1955), 309.
4 9Hoover Commission, Task Force Report, I, 36 •
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reorganize the Federal Government was decentralization.

Ac-

cording to this view the Federal Government's bureaucracy had
become too centralized under the New Deal and there was now a
need to decentralize the various agencies.
else can local initiatives take precedence?

After all, how
In fact, McKay

had recounted that when he took office in January 1952, he
"faced bureaucratic concentration of resource management responsibility approaching the dangerous point."

Under Secretary

Tudor found the same thing:
While the authorities and responsibilities of the
Assistant Secretaries are well defined, the bureaus
act to a large extent independent of the Secretaries.
Every opportunity should be taken to insure that the
bureaus do, in fact, answer to the secretaries.
McKay resolved to rectify this deteriorating situation.50
Two of the most independent bureaus, Reclamation and Land
Management, became special targets for decentralization.
The Bureau of Reclamation was one of the first bureaus to
undergo decentralization.

In August 1953, McKay set up a com-

mittee to study reorganization of the Department of Interior.
The Committee concluded that one of the major defects of the
Department was that too much time and money were concentrated
in Washington.

It therefore recommended that the Bureau of

Reclamation's Washington Office be reduced so that only
50McKay, Natural Resources of U.S. Reported to Local Control," The Oregonian, Oct. 18, 1954; Memo, May 6, 1953, Tudor
to McKay, Department of Interior, Special Office Files, no
box number, National Archives. Tudor also sent McKay two
other detailed memos on "Department Reorganization," and
"Staff Reorganization," in Tudor Papers, Box 1, Eisenhower
Library.
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essential staff and liaison functions would be performed there.
All responsibilities for technical analysis, review, and decision should be vested in the Denver office.

While this region-

al concept should be continued, it said, all district offices
should be discontinued.

The report's suggestions were approved

and made effective on October 28, 1953.

As part of this ef-

fort to streamline, the Bureau's staff was cut by 10 percent
in the first six months after McKay took office.

The new Com-

mission of the Bureau of Reclamation, Wilbur Dexheimer, explained the need for decentralization to the National Reclamation Association.
We [the Bureau of Reclamation] will be glad to assist,
of course, but the major responsibility--the initiative
--is yours, for you are the people who know best what
you want and why you want it. Rather than have the
Bureau act as salesman we ask you to be the sal~sman-
both locally and in Congress.51 .
While replacement of bureaucrats and studying how to reorganize the Executive Branch were important, the heart of the
Administration's partnership policy was presented in concrete
terms by the Bureau of the Budget (BOB).

Wielding the Admini-

stration's budget cleaver was Joseph M. Dodget, a Detroit
5l"Report on Reorganization of the Bureau of Reclamation,"
(mimeographed), Sept. 30, 1953, Department of Interior, Special Files, no box number, National Archives; in the same
source also see Memo, Aug. 26, 1953, Aandahl to Dexheimer, and
Speech, Adams-, Oct. 14, 1953, before the National Reclamation
Association, Reno, Nevada; New York Times, Oct. 29, 1953. For
background information on the centralization of the Bureau,
see Frederic Cleaveland, "Administrative Decentralization in
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation," Public Administration Review,
XIII (Winter, 1953), 17-29. The decentralization of the Bureau of Land I1.anagement is discussed in a later chapter.

48

banker, who became the first Director of the Bureau.

The New

neal's natural resources policy was immediately put on his
chopping block.

And it must be noted that when BOB spoke, it

did so for the President; simply put, no executive-initiated
legislation could escape coming under the Bureau's scrutiny.
In short, BOB, in dollar terms, set the tone for, if not the
actual policy to be followed by the cabinet departments.
Shortly after the November election Dodge was dispatched
to Washington to help prepare the budget for the coming fiscal year.

As part of this work he reviewed the previous ad-

ministration's land and water resources policy.

The Truman

policy was changed by the incoming Director through BOB Circular A-47.

The Circular set temporary economic standards to

be followed by the federal Agencies dealing with the "censervation, development and use of water and related land resources" until the President's Advisory Committee on Water Resources Policy could file its report.

Essentially the Circular

attempted to translate Eisenhower's partnership philosophy
into actual economic practice.

In other words, it attempted

to reduce the role of the Federal Government in resource management activities.

In an administratively confidential memo

to the President about a year after issuance of Circular A-47,
Dodge plainly revealed the Bureau's policy:
The objectives of a resource policy should be to provide pe1'.'manent solutions to clearly established needs,
developed and continued according to sound practices,
a minimum of Federal investment, including as much
local participation as possible in operation, control
and eventual ownership; and an adequate interest return,

49
with appropriate terms of repayment on reimbursable
projects.52
Following these guidelines, McKay issued a new power
policy statement for the Department of Interior.

Before it

was drawn up the. statement had been discussed in detail with
representatives of the White House, Corps of Engineers, Bureau of the Budget, Federal Power Commission, and the Cabinet.
Each of these agencies agreed with its general principles.
The new statement reversed the one established in 1946 by
President Truman.

The upshot: "The Department of Interior

will particularly emphasize those multipurpose projects with
hydroelectric developments which, because of size or complexity, are beyond the means of local, public or private enterprise."

But:

It is recognized that the primary responsibility for
supplying power needs of an area rests with the people
locally •••• The Department does not assume that it has
the exclusive right or responsibility for the construction of dams or generation, transmission and sale of
electric energy in any area, basin, or region.53

52A copy of the Bureau of the Budget Circular A-47, Decem-

ber 31, 1952, can be found in Central Files, OF-72-B, Eisenhower Library; Thomas L. Stokes, "Budget Bureau's Powers Grow,"
washington Star, May 3, 1955, in John S. Bragdon Staff Files,
Box 7, Eisenhower Library; Somers, "Federal Bureaucracy," 133;
"New Rules Will Cut U.S. Dam Building," Business Week (Dec.
25, 1954), 22; Percival F. Brundage, The Bureau of the Budget
(New York, 1970),
; Memo, Administratively Confidential,
November 23, 1953, Dodge to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF155, Box 825, Eisenhower Library.
53Tudor, "Notes on Power Policy Statement," July 30, 1953,
Tudor Papers, Box 1, Eisenhower Library; Confidential Letter,
July 31, 1953, Tudor to Senator Hugh ButJ_er, Tudor Papers, Box
l; Commission on the Organization of the .Executive Branch of
the Government (June, 1955), 1112-19, gives the Interior power
statenent under Eisenhower and Truman.
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The new power policy of the Interior Department received
a mixed reaction.

The National Reclamation Association passed

a resolution in 1953 endorsing the new power policy.

But the

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association objected, noting that the new policy "would make the preference clause mean-

ingless, would undermine all Federal power programs and ultimately would destroy the farmers' electrification program in
many areas. 11 .54
In defending itself, interior department representatives
explained they intended to follow the laws regarding preference rights.

But, as Fred Aandahl said, the Administration

was "deeply disturbed when ••• those who even at this early
stage are crusaders for a Federal power monopoly try to use
the Rural Electric Cooperatives and their associations to foster Federal monopoly."

Moreover, the Department stressed the

need for economy on the part of the Federal Government.

In

1954, McKay told the National Reclamation Association simply:
Frankly stated, the task is too vast, especially in
the present state of the budget, to be done by the
Federal Government alone. We cannot carry the tremendous defense expenditures of the moment and also at
the same time sponsor all of the projects for water
use and control which may be desirable.
Hence: "There is convincing evidence that local initiative, if
given the chance, is prepared to tackle local water problems
54November 17, 1953, Clyde H. Seybold to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-l-J-2, Box 10, Eisenhower Library; Clyde T. Ellis, A Giant·sten (New York, 1966), 121; Wesley D'Ewar~, "Eisenhower Adlllinistration Project," transcript of a tape recorded interview conducted by Ed Ed.win (Columbia University, for
Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History Project, Eisenhower Library,
Abilene,Kansas, 1967).
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vigorously and constructively."55
The Administration's new water and power policy was officially formulated by the President's Advisory Committee on
Water Resources Policy.

The Committee, established on May

26, 1954, was directed "to undertake a comprehensive review
looking toward modernization of Federal policies and programs
in the field of water resources."

It was composed of repre-

sentatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Health, Education and Welfare, Defense, Commerce, and Interior, and the
Bureau of the Budget.

At its meeting on October 20, 1954,

the Committee agreed that "the role of the Federal Government
should be in general that which has been expressed again and
again by the President and members of the Cabinet; i.e., the
basic partnership policy ••• "

The Committee's report, delivered

in December 1955, concluded that there was no national water
problem.

"Instead," it said,

there are nationwide problems relating to the use and
development of water resources which vary widely between different sections of the country and frequently
between local areas •••• A uniform national blueprint
for water resources development is neither practicable
or desirable.
55The representatives of the Department of Interior defended the new policy. Some of the speeches: Aandahl to NRECA,
Miami, Florida, Jan. 12, 1954; McKay, Address to the National
Reclamation Association, Oct., 1953, Reno, Nevada; Proceedings
of the T\"1enty-Second Annual Meeting, National Reclamation Association (washine;ton, D.C., 1953), 113-14; Senator Pat Mccarran before the NRA, Reno, Nevada, Oct. 1953; Dexheimer, speech
before the Association of Western State Engineers, Kansas City,
Kansas, Aug •. 26, 1954; McKay, speech before NRA, Portland,
Oregon, Nov. 8, 1954; McKay, speech before 344th meeting of
the National Industrial Conference Board, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
Nov. 19, 1953, in Elmer Bennett Papers, Boxes 10-11, Eisenhower Library.
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Thus, each area of the country ought "to be considered in the
light of its own present and anticipated problems."

To accom-

plish this objective the Committee recommended the establishment of strengthened water resources committees for coordinating state and federal resources activities.

In 1958, Con-

gress authorized these interagency committees.

The Committee

also recommended the establishment of an advisory Inter-Agency
Committee on Water Resources, to operate as a "medium for
coordination" for the Departments of Agriculture, Army, Health,
Education and Welfare, Interior and the Federal Power Commission.

In the Executive Office of the President there should

be established an office of Coordination of Water Resources.
Further, the Committee suggested that a Board of Review be
created within the Executive Office.

The members of this

Board would be completely separated from the Federal agencies
dealing with water policy and it should not be involved in
projects coming before it.

The Board would report to the
President through the Coordinator of Water Resources.56
By the end of its first year, the Eisenhower policy of

partnership had encountered the wrath of most conservationists.
The mutual suspicion between the two was no more evident than
56 Davis OH, 25-31; D'Ewart OH, 16-17; May 26, 1954, Eisenhower to McKay, in Public Papers of the PresidentnR 1954, 50910; :Memo, Nov. 2, 1954, McKay to Adams, "?regress eport-Cabinet Committee on Water Resources Policy," and Water Resources Policy, A Report by the President's Advisory CoI!lIDittee
on water Resources Policy (December 22, 1958), in Central
Files, OF-155-I, Box 840, Eisenhower Library; Irving K. Fox
and Isabel Picken, The Unstream-Downstream Controvers . in the
Arkansas-White-Red-Basin urvey
n er-Universi y ase Program, 1960), 1.
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in the preparation for the Mid-Century Conference on Resources
for the Future.

During the campaign of 1952 both contestants

agreed that a conference on natural resources should be held.
Not long after his inauguration Eisenhower agreed to the convening of such a conference and. instructed the appropriate
government ·agencies to cooperate.5?
The Mid-Century Conference was funded by the Ford Foundation and organized by Resources for the Future, Inc., an
independent organization dedicated to studying and evaluating
federal conservation policies.

One of Resources for the Fu-

ture's leading spokesmen was Horace M. Albright, a well-known
conservationist.

Since he was both a Republican and a business-

man, Albright was ably suited to act as a bridge between the
White House and the conserv-a.tionists.58
From the beginning, the White House was suspicious of the
organizers of the Conference.

The President's chief political

advisor, Sherman Adams, felt the staff and Board of Directors
of Resources for the Future was biased in favor of the New
Deal; he saw them as "idealists" and "planners."

Joseph

Dodge, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, took an equally
negative view.

"As far as the over-all objectives of the

5?Albright, OH, 813; Feb. 21, 1953, Albright to Eisenhower-, Central Files, OF-134-G, Eisenhower Library; March 6,
1953, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1953, 91-92; New York
Times, March?, 1953, 11; also·ci'. menos, undated, Hauge to
Arthur Burns (Council of Economic Advisors), McKay, Dodge,
Fleming, and the Director for Mutual Security, Central F.iles,
OF-134-G, Eisenhower Library.
58 nonalu Swain, Wilderness Defender, Horace M. Albright
and Conservation (University of Chicago, 1976), 293.

Conference go," he wrote Eisenhower, "I have my fingers crossed;
I still believe its emphasis will be to the left, New Dealish,
and Democratic, and that the forces really in control are not
friends of the Republican party."

He then suggested that in

his speech convening the Conference, Eisenhower ought to say
that the conservation movement is stagnant and "has not had
a new thought for fifty years."

After all, "The hard core

conservationists, to a great extent, belong to those groups
who think the government can do everything •••• "

To assuage

these feelings the Conference leadership agreed that no policy
suggestions would be made by the Conference.

Also the leader-

ship allowed the President to renege. on his commitment to hold
the Conference at the \./hite House.59
For the past year the conservationists had been openly
critical of the partnership policy.

The offshore oil, Hells

Canyon, mineral resources, Echo Park, grazing and atomic energy
controversies each elicited a torrent of criticism for the
Administration.

Observing this concern, Albright wrote Dr.

Gabriel Hauge, a presidential assistant, that the President's
speech to the Conference ought to "strongly" confirm the policies established by Theodore Roosevelt.

He warned that "a

general impression has spread over the country that this
59swain, Wilderness Defender, 297; Memo, undated, Dodge,
Central Files, OF-155, Box 825, Eisenhower Library; Albright
OH, 815-18; Memo, March 2, 1953, Hauge to Eisenhower, Central
Files, OF-134-G, Eisenhower Library. Hauge advised the President to write a positive letter to Albright endorsing the Conference: "In recommending this action, I want to say that Albright and company couldn't have .been nicer in letting us
get out of the White House Conference commitment which they
had on the basis of campaign correspondence."
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administration is somehow or other going to weaken the conservation policies that have been built up to control our renewable and non-renewable resources since the days of Theodore
Roosevelt."

This impression, he said, had been created by

the offshore oil issue, the D'Ewart grazing bill, the dismissal of certain civil service employees (e.g., Day and Clawson), and concern over Olympic National Park and Glacier View
Dam.

The President's speech, to his mind, was thus an oppor-

tunity for the Administration to reassure conservationists
that it understood and was sympathetic to. their problems. 60
The Mid-Century Conference, held in December 1953 at the
Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C., was attended by about
1,600 conservationists, business leaders, labor officials,

\

scientists and representatives of i'ederal, state and local
governments.
attended.

Practically all the important conservationists

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Asso-

ciation of Manufacturers, however, refused to endorse the Conference.

The Conference discussed a wide range of resource

topics.

Significantly, though,Eisenhower's opening remarks

were short and noncommital.

After telling the Conference he

was "delighted" to see such a meeting convened, the President
reminded them: "You are not going to waste your time taking
notes· and forming a lot of conclusions.

In other words, this

looks to me like a body that is really going to work on the
60swain, Wilderness Defender, 301-02·; Albright, "Notes

for !"ir. Gabriel Hauge, 11 November 27, 1953, Bryce Harlow Files,
Box 4, Eisenhower Library.
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subject."

And he was right.

The Conference did not spark

originality; rather, it became immersed in cliches about water,
minerals, land, trees, grazing, and wildlife resources.

Never-

theless, the Conference at least gave the need for conservation
some badly needed publicity and did assure the future of Resources for the Future.

The Administration's attitude toward

the Conference did not help allay the fears of conservation. t s ei. ther. 61
is

61 swain, Wilderness Defender, 299-301; Resources for the
Future, Mid-Century Conference \Washington, DoC., 1953); News
Release, Dec. 4, 1953, Central Files, OF-134-G, Box 684, Eisenhower Library; New York Times, ·nee. 3, 1953, l; Business Week
(Dec. 12, 1953), 188.

CHAPTER III
AN OPENING WEDGE:
THE.OFFSHORE OIL CONTROVERSY
Few natural resources have been more enveloped in controversy than oil.
the scandal of

The person of John D. Rockefeller, Sr., and
Teapot Dome serve as only two examples.

The

years following World War II certainly proved no exception.
Off the coasts of California, Texas, and Louisiana valuable
oil deposits lay ready for exploration.

In 1894, oil was

first discovered off the coast of California and in 1938,
the Standard Oil Co. and Pure Oil Co. jointly constructed a
/

successful oil well in the Gulf of Mexico.

This offshore oil

now became the central issue in a political, constitutional
and economic controversy that was not finally resolved until
Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president in 1952. 1
Since oil and natural gas were integral parts of the
economy, not only of the three coastal states but of the
entire Southwest as well, the question of ownership of the
1 This oil issue has often been mistakenly called "the
tidelands oil controversy." Actually the oil involved in this
controversy was not in the "tidelands." Rather it was located
under· the marginal sea off the coasts of California, Louisiana,
and Texas. Hence, the controversy was over what more accurately is the offshore oil.
In 1845, the Supreme Court, in Pollard's lesse v. Hogan,
declared that the tidelands and the bottoms of the inland
lakes and rivers were owned by the states and not the Federal
Government • . The tidelands, therefore, were not at issue hereo
Cf. J. Skelly Wright, "Jurisdiction in the Tidelands," Tulane
Law Review, 32 (Feb. 1958), 175-86.
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offshore oil properties exerted a pervdsive influence.

Oil

and natural gas were basic ingredients in the future industrial growth of the South and Southwest.

By 1956, 49 percent

of Texas, 47 percent of Louisiana, 45 percent of Oklahoma,
42 percent of wyoming, and 52 percent of Florida were leased
for oil exploration.

Large oil companies meant badly needed

managerial and labor skills, technology, new markets, and associated industries would soon flow into these regions.

Out

of oil and natural gas came the need for a chemical industry.
As early as 1929, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana
produced about 59 percent of the nation's oil and about 40
percent of its refining capacity.

Since oil was gradually re-

placing coal as the nation's most important energy resource,

"

the South and Southwest were especially receptive to the
states' rights pleas of California, Texas, and Louisiana.
And there was no doubt the prize was a big one.

Based upon

figures determined by the Geological Survey, Mastin G. White,
Solicitor of the Department of Interior, estimated that in
1952, the worth of the continental shelf beneath the marginal
sea adjacent to the coasts of California, Louisiana, and Texas
would have an aggregate value of $7,070,000,000 and that the
minimum royalty would be $883,750,000.
significant controversy. 2

This then was no in-

2Robert Engler, The Politics of Oil: Private Power and
Democratic Directions (University of Chicago Press, 1961),
~' 395; Tindall, Emergence of the New South, 91, 463; June 13,
1952, Mastin G. White, to Stuart French, Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Files, 1937-53, Box
3284, National Archives.
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The essential issue was Hhether these oil properties
should be owned by the Federal Government or the individual
coastal states.

The Federal Government claimed paramount

rights to the oil, while the states maintained_ they had rights
to the oil extending to their historic boundaries.

All three

states insisted they had at least a three-mile boundary; Texas, however, went further and laid claim to a ten and one-half
mile historic limit.

Finally, a hostility to the New Deal,

particularly the Department of Interior, always lurked beneath
the surface.

The drama was fully played out in the courts

and the political process.
The Roosevelt and Truman Administrations had strongly
urged retention
of the offshore oil deposits in the hands of
_,,.--·
the Federal Government for the twin purpose of conservation
and national defense.

Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes, an

irascible New Dealer, originally favored leasing the lands by
the states but around 1937 he reversed that position and now
advocated federal control of the lands.

It ought to be noted,

however, that the Department of Interior had a vested interest
of its own in this oil.

If Ickes harbored any reservations

the war only served to convince him of the correctness of his
new position.

"The war has impressed us with the necessity

for an ·augmented supply of natural resources," he wrote to
Roosevelt in 1943.

"In this conviction I draw your attention

to the importance of the Continental Shelf not only to the
defense of

ou~

coUn.try, but more particularly as a storehouse

of natural resources."

He, therefore, recommended that the
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Departments of Interior, Justice, and State, together with the
National Resources Planning Board, investigate how this recommendation could be implemented.

Before the end of the war

there was no doubt the offshore oil was extremely valuable.
Ickes' recommendation also aroused considerable criticism; in
fact, the lines for the confrontation were n<l'lclearly drawn.
The Association of Attorneys General, for example, took violent
exception:
There is and can be no middle ground. If Mr. Ickes
can seize one square foot of the tide or suomerged
lands in any state and maintain his seizure, it will
be the official duty of federal officers everywhere
to complete the conquest of all like areas in all the
states.
In other words, according to this view, the encroachment of
the bureaucracy of the federal government on the prerogatives
of the states that had gained power under the New Deal must
be stopped and the off-shore oil question was a good place to
lay down the gauntlet.3
In January, 1946, the offshore oil question struck politically sensitive nerves when President Truman decided to
nominate Edwin Pauley as Undersecretary of the Navy.

Pauley,

a prominent California oil mogul, had exerted important
3En.gler, Politics of Oil, 88; June 5, 1943, Ickes to Roosevelt, and Memo, Aug. Io, 1944, Lee to Harper; "Brief of Attorneys General in Support of Joint Resolutions Quieting Titles of States to Lands Beneath Tidewater and Navigable Waters,"
(1954)(their emphasis), in Department of Interior, Office of
the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3278,
National Archives. For an example of the political importance
of oil, in general, during depression days in Texas, see Senator Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, !1y Name' Is Tom
Connally (New York, 1954), 162-64.

61

influence in the Democratic party.

Between 1941 and

1945~

Pauley had served in various high level positions with the
Democratic National Committee.

He had been, in fact, one of

the "quartet of kingmakers" who, in 1944, had persuaded Roosevelt to dump Henry Wallace and take Harry Truman as his running mate.

Consequently, when Truman succeeded FDR, Pauley

was one of the men who stepped into the President's inner circle.

His fund-raising efforts as Treasurer of the Democratic

National Committee erased the Party's deficit.

What made

Pauley front page news, however, was his close connection with
the offshore oil issue.
Pauley certainly understood that.good politics and good
business mix well together.

Thus, since·he had been the head

of a modest-sized oil firm, the Petrol Corporation, Pauley
naturally took a keen interest in the offshore oil developments.

He strongly supported the claims of the states and

admitted having used his political influence to introduce
William W. Clay, the Assistant Attorney General of California
and one of the bulwarks behind the state-ownership forces, to
Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House, and to the chairmen of the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees that would dispose of
the oil issue.
Harold Ickes brought the issue to the fore when he publicly accused Pauley of attempting to bribe him with a large
contribution for the Democratic Party.

As part of the agree-

ment Ickes wa& supposed to request the Justice Department to
drop a federal suit pending against California, Texas, and
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other states concerning the offshore oil.

This allegation

was also substantiated by Abe Fortas, the Undersecretary of
Interior.

When Truman refused to withdraw Pauley's name,

Ickes resigned from the Cabinet.

At a press conference the

former Secretary of Interior dramatically placed all his
cards on the table: "I don't care to stay in an administration where I am expected to commit perjury for the sake of
the party."

The resignation had its intended effect, however.

To save the Ad.ministration any further embarrassment Pauley
reluctantly asked that his name be withdrawn and Truman complied with his request on March 18, 1946.

Now the offshore
oil issue was fully before the public's eye. 4
In order the settle the matter Ickes had persuaded the

U.S.

Atto~ney

Court.

General to bring the issue before the Supreme

In a suit brought against California the Court rendered

a close verdict in favor of the Federal Government.

Justice

Hugo Black, a consistent New Dealer, declared in the majority
opinion that the Federal Government possessed "paramount
rights" to the oil and other subsurface minerals in the offshore area.

He wrote: "Conceding that the state [of Califor-

nia] has been authorized to exercise local police power functions in the part of the marginal belt within its declared
boundaries, these do not detract from the Federal Government's
paramount rights in and power over this area."

In other words,

4 For details on the Pauley affair see Gerald Nash,-United
States Oil Polic
1890-1964. Business and Government in Twenie
Century America Universi y o ?i s urg
ess,
,
182-83; Cabell ?hillips, The Truman PresidencK. The Historh of
a Triumphant Succession (New York, 1966), 41- ?; Goldman, rucial Decade, 19; Engler, Politics of Oil, 341-48.
~
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the Federal Government must exert whatever power and dominion
are necessary to protect the country from dangers to its
national security and tranquility.

In cases involving Louisi-

ana and Texas the Court made similar judgments.5
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision left many
questions unanswered.

As the Solicitor of the Department of

Interior conceded to Texas Congressman Lindley Beckworth,
the matter of who should administer the offshore lands of the
continental shelf had not been resolved by the California
. .
6
d ecision.

Furthermore, the problem of how the proceeds from

the development of the oil and gas resources in the continental shelf should be used and distributed was not settled.
These were knotty problems that Congress would have to unravel.
Thus, while the Federal Government had won a significant victory in the California case, it was still possible for Congress
to give the oil to the states.
Important local organizations in California and Texas protested the decision of the Supreme Court and exhorted their
congressmen to push vigorously for passage of a bill transferring these lands to the states.

Two examples ought to suffice.

The Texas State Board of Education passed a resolution calling
upon "all of the officials of Texas, particularly our Senators
5united States v. California, 332 u.s., 19 (194?); United
States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); and United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. ?o? (1950). Cf. also Wright, "Jurisdiction,"
178-79.
6Mastin G. White to Rep._ Lindley Beckworth, Department
of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Files, 1937-53,
Box 3283, National Archives.
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and Congressmen to continue to exert their uncompromising efforts to procure the passage of an act of Congress removing
said cloud from our title."

The Harbor Island Causeway Com-

pany of California put it more bluntly: "We believe that the
recent Supreme Court decision re: Ownership of California
Tidelands, evidences a dangerous un-American trend toward a
confiscatory principle as regards ownership of property."?
Truman was nonetheless determined that control of the
offshore oil should remain within the purview of the Federal
Government.

And on two occasions he vetoe.d bills which would

have transferred these lands to the states.

In his first

veto the President explained that Congress should not deal
with the problem while the Supreme Court was still considering the case.

The second veto simply pleaded that the oil

was essential for the nation's defense.

In a speech to the

Americans for Democratic Action in 1952 Truman, with characteristic verve, summarized his reasons.

He painted a dark pie-

ture of oil lobbies pressuring "us to turn over to a handful
of states, where the_ powerful private oil interests hope to
exploit it to suit themselves."

He labelled the state owner-

ship idea "robbery in broad daylight--and on/a colossal scale."
This did not mean, however,, that the Administration had been
?Aug. 11, 194?, Texas State Board of Education resolution; Feb. 21, 1948, Harbor Island Causeway Company; among the
local protesting groups were Optimist, Rotary, and Kiwanis
clubs, VFWs, American Legion, Chambers of Commerce, local bar
associations and city councils; see Department of Interior,
Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53,
Boxes 3280-81, National Archives.
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unwilling to strike a compromise of sorts.

Senators Joseph

O'Manoney of Wyoming and Clinton Anderson of New Mexico
sought passage of a bill that would have given federal regulation to all oil and gas leases in the submerged lands prior
to December 1948, which were in good standing on June 5, 1950,
when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Texas
and Louisiana cases.

The Secretary of Interior would then

negotiate these leases.

In return, the states would receive

37>2 percent of the income derived from the portion of the

shelf situated within their historic boundaries.

Oscar Chap-

man, Secretary of Interior, later lamented, "I believe that
if the O'Mahoney-Anderson proposal had been passed by Congress,
it would have been signed by President Truman."

But this over-

ture was unacceptable to the states; they would bargain no
compromise. 8
The Administration was not without support •of its own.
Labor endorsed the federalist position.

For example, in the

midst of the heated campaign of 1948, the International Assaciation of Machinists intoned:
The [oil trust] conspirators of 1948 will eventually
be smoked, as were the Falls and Sinclairs of the
1920's ••• We must forestall another Teapot Dome ••••
You, Mr. President, have proven yourself a faithful
champion of the people's rights in the tidewater oil
resources ••••
Also, R. V. Bottomly, the Attorney General of Montana, had
8 Aug. 30, 1952, Chapman to Maverick, Secretary of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 193753, Box 3284, National Archives; Ernest Bartley, ~he Tidelands
Oil Controversy: A Legal n.nd Historical Analysis (University
of Texas l~ess, 1953), 227-28.
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previously sup:;:-orted the states but in 1947 he changed his
mindo

He now believedit "is apparent that the proponents of

this legislation [to give the offshore oil to the states] are
primarily the large [oil] companies ••• "9
While the principal participants in the controversy were
the states of California, Texas, and Louisiana, the State of
Washington jumped into the fray in 1952, an election year.
In late 1951, the Department of Interior learned that washing-

ton State was issuing oil and gas permits or leases on the submerged lands underlying the open waters of the Pacific Ocean.
Upon learning in February 1952, that the Union Oil Company of
California had oil leases in Washington, the Secretary of
Interior, Oscar Chapman, wrote Governor Langlie demanding that
the practice be halted.

Citing the doctrine of paramount

rights, Chapman maintained that the oil in question "is not
now and never has been owned by the State of Washington."
Langlie disagreed, insisting that Chapman had no right to
impose such an "edict" on his state.

"Your statement," he

wrote Chapman,
that such area is not now and never has been owned
by the State of Washington, attempts to secure for
the Federal Government certain rights and controls
which definitely lie within the scope of the powers
of Congress to determine. It is one more instance
of the usurpation of legislative powers by judicial
and administrative decree.
Langlie went on to make a case for Washington based on her

9Oct. 29, 1948, A. J. Hayes and Eric Peterson to Truman;
and Dec. 5, 1947, in Department of Interior, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, Boxes 3280-81, National Archives.
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historic boundaries, an argument similar to those of the three
coastal states.

Chapman again pointed out to the governor

that the historic boundary question already had been laid to
rest by the Supreme Court.

He further warned Langlie that

"Pending the enactment of legislation with respect to the
submerged lands of the continental shelf adjacent to the coast
of the United States, I am under a duty ••• to protect the interests of the United States in such lands by preventing the unauthorized removal from them of oil and gas or other minerals."
Senator Harry Cain (R-Wash.) countered that Chapman's logic
could be applied equally to the inland waterways.

The Secre-

tary of Interior vehemently denied this assertion.

"With re-

gard to the tidelands and the beds of navigable inland waters
situated within the boundaries of a State, it has been well
settled by decisions of the Supreme Court for more than a
hundred years that such lands belong to the State (or its
grantees~" Chapman wrote O'Mahoney in the middle of the Lang-

lie.controversy.

The secretary continued: "So far as I am

aware, no responsible official of the Federal Government has
expressed a contrary view at any time during the past hundred
years."

As we will see later, this particular aspect of the

controversy did not cease here.

In March, 1952, Chapman re-

quested that the Attorney General initiate "an appropriate
judicial proceeding" against the recalcitrant Langlie in order
that the controversy "may be resolved in the orderly, objective
manner provided for in the Constitution."

But the election of
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1952--not the courts--settled the issue.

10

By 1952, the offshore dilemma had reached a political
stalemate.

The Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the Fed-

eral Government but the claims of state ownership enjoyed overwhelming support in Congress.

Twice Congress had voted a

quitclaim for the states and twice Truman exercised a veto.
At any time a bill favoring the states could be passed but
there were serious doubts that the President's veto could be
overridden in the Senate.

Yet no bill advocating federal

control was ever passed out of a congressional committee.
Little hope existed that the issue would be finally resolved
until there was a change in the White. House's attitude. 11
In 1952, the two presidential candidates made their views
on the subject unequivocal.

Even before the two conventions

1 °Feb. 19, 1952, Fred Bush, Union Oil Company of California, to z. G. Snow, Oil and Gas Supervisor, Department of
Interior; Dec. 20, 1948, Sam Grinsfelder, Vice President,
Union Oil Company of California, to Otto A. Case; Feb. 12,
1952, Chapman to Langlie; March 7, 1952, Chapman to O'Mahoney;
March 20, 1952, Chapman to J. Howard McGrath, Attorney General;
in Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central
Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3284, National Archives. Senator Cain made his attack plain: "This doctrine of paramount
power which the Secretary of Interior asks to impose on the
sovereignty of the State of Washington violates the guaranties
provided by our Constitution which protect private property
and the riehts of States and unless this doctrine is stopped
by the Congress it can lead to the nationalization of the
natural resources of our Nation regardless of the State in
which they may be located. If the Federal Government, allegedly in the interest of national defense has this right of
paramount power over the submerged lands and resources of Washington, California, Texas, and Louisiana, it has the same
power over every farm, river, mine, and factory in every state
in the Nation." Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess.,
v. 98, part 2 (March 5, 1952), 1890-92.
11

Bartle~,

Tidelands Oil Controversy, 215, 229-30.
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the differences between the two parties was explicit.

All

three leading candidates for the Republican nomination, Taft,
Eisenhower, and Governor Warren of California, supported the
claims of the stat;es.

Among the Democrats, only Senator Rich-

ard Russell of Georgia, championed the rights of the states.
Stevenson, of course, fully supported Truman.
far from being partisan, however.

The issue was

In October, Senator Wayne

Morse, a Republican from Oregon, announced he would sit out
the campaign, saying it was "a sad thing that Eisenhower in
apparent ignorance of United States Supreme Court decisions
has been taken in by selfish interests who seek to steal tid&lands belonging to all the people of ·the.United States."
Morse later endorsed Stevenson.
Democrats much more than the

But the issue divided the

1?
Republicans.~~

The oil issue was especially volatile in Texas and Louisiana.

In November, 1951, Congressman J. Frank Wilson of Texas

told Chapman that a rumor was circulating to the effect that
the Interior Department intended to take over and operate the
offshore lands under the War Powers Act.

Wilson did not think

Chapman would seriously entertain doing such a thing but just
in .case he issued this warning: "I believe the consequences
of any such action will be more serious than is anticipated
by those who favor any such move."

And he was correct.

In

the 1952 election, Texas became a bitter political battlefield between those Democrats who remained loyal to the
- ..._

1 2Ne'W York Times, July 1, 14; July 11, 10; Oct. 14, 22;
Oct. 19, 1952, 1.
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national party and those who broke away over the oil issue.
Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senator Lyndon Johnson both supported
Stevenson, though they disagreed with his position on offshore
oil.

Johnson explained it this way: "I thoroughly disagree

with Governor Stevenson on his views regarding ownership of
the Texas tidelands; the fact that Governor Stevenson is wrong
on this issue does not automatically make General Eisenhower
right on all other issues." 14 The Democratic candidates for
governor and senator did not see it that way; they broke with
the national party.

Price Daniel, the Attorney General of

Texas and an outspoken leader for state ownership, was the
Democratic candidate for the Senate and he ran precisely on
this issue.

In a speech before the Fourth Annual Bankers'

Clinic of the First National Bank, Daniel warned against the
dangers of an overly centralized government.

He noted: "No

issue presents a better opportunity for Texans to act against
this type of government than in the tidelands controversy. 111 5
14New York Times, Aug. 29, 1952, 11.
l5"Three Papers Delivered at the Fourth Annual Bankers'
Clinic of First National Bank," Houston, Oct. 20-21, 1951, in
Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3283, National Archives. Indicative of how deep this political schism in Texas went, Senator
Tom Connally decided not to run for reelection. Both Daniel
and Shivers were, in the words of Connally, "bitterly antiTruman." He also records that there existed "detailed evidence
of enormous anti-Truman feeling in the state." He contended
that the Shivers-Daniel plan was to attack Truman and to close
in.on himself through guilt-by-association. "As an example of
how this [Shivers-Daniel strategy] would operate, the ShiversDaniel group were anti-Truman because the President vetoed the
Tidelands Bill." One of the reasons Connally decided, after
having served twenty-four years in the Senate, not to run for
reelection was because of the rigorous campaign that would be
required to defeat Daniel in the primary. Finally, Connally
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Governor Allan Shivers, running for re-election, echoed the
same sentiments.
The Republicans naturally looked to Texas and Louisiana
as possible soft spots in the Democratic underbelly.

In Aug-

ust, Jack Porter, the new Republican National Committeeman
from Texas, intimated the Republicans might put Shivers and
Daniel on their ticket in an effort to
and independent voters to Eisenhower.

attract Democratic
A few days later Shiv-

ers asked his fellow Texans to express their views on the
offshore oil controversy after he had just announced he could
not endorse Stevenson's views on the oil, civil rights, and
filibuster issues.

The same day Daniel called upon Texas Demo-

crats to "revolt" against the national ticket and all other
Democrats favoring federal control of offshore oil.

Subse-

quently, as Porter had thought they might, the Republicans of
Texas, for the first time in the state's history, placed fifteen Democrats, including Shivers and Daniel, on their ticket.
Then the stateownership advocates revolted.

When the Democra-

tic State Convention met in September it went through the normal motions of placing Stevenson and Senator John Sparkman at
the head of the ticket.

But, by an overwhelming voice vote,

the two thousand Democrats, declared their real sympathies for
Eisenhower and Nixon.

The importance of Shivers and Daniel

to the Eisenhower campaign was obvious.

Ben Guill, the Eisen-

put his finger on the reason why Stevenson lost Texas: '"A
final factor in the 1952 election was the dissatisfaction of
many southern Democrats. They were anti-Truman because of
the Tidelands Bill, his civil-rights program and because of
the long tenure of the party.in office." Connally, My Name
Is Tom Connally, 358-610
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hower campaign manager in Texas, wrote Sherman Adams on this
subject.

"I cannot overemphasize the necessity for these two

men [Shivers and Daniel] to get all the way on the soap box,"
he said.

"We are building a v.ery fine organization in Texas,

and the first one, I might add, in its history; but Sherman,
Shivers and Daniel are the 'Number One' factors in carrying
Texas for the Genera1. 1116
The oil issue was also a hot one in Louisiana.

Senator

Allen J. Ellender announced that he would vote for Stevenson
out of party loyalty but due to their disparate positions on
the oil issue he could not campaign for him.

Governor Robert

Kennon refused to support Stevenson; ·instead he openly campaigned for Ike.

Four Democratic electors from Louisiana
resigned rather than support Stevenson. 1 7
In October Eisenhower made a foray into Texas and Louisiana, hitting hard on the issue of offshore oil.

In New Orleans

Ike was introduced by Governor Kennon who branded the Democratic platform "un-American" and said it was the right of
every Louisiana Democrat to oppose Stevenson.

Eisenhower then

made a firm commitment: "Twice, by substantial majorities,
both houses of Congress have voted to recognize the traditional
concept of state ownership of these submerged areas.

Twice

these acts of Congress have been vetoed by the President.
would approve such acts of Congress."

I

In Houston, the following

l6New York Times, Aug. 24, 50; Aug. 26,. ?; Aug. 27, 17;
Sept. 10, 1952, 1, 22; Oct. 1, 1952, Personal and Confidential
Letter, Buill· to Adams, Sherman Adams Files, Box 36, Eisenhower
Library.
l?New York Times, Aue. 31, IV, 8; Aug. 27, 1952, l?.
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day, Eisenhower praised Shivers and Daniel for their stands
on the oil issue and then reiterated his commitment.

Later

Eisenhower telegramed Kennon and Shivers his thanks "for all
you did for me. 1118
The Republican strategy worked in November.
carried Texas and Florida.

Eisenhower

An official caucus of the Florida

House of Representatives had refused to endorse Stevenson and
Sparkman until they changed their ideas on offshore oil and
While Eisenhower did not win it in 1952, he
took Louisiana in 1956, along with Texas and Florida again. 1 9
the filibuster.

With the fox now in the coop, the Truman Administration
realized it must do something to save its chicken.

Chapman

and Truman discussed the problem on December 29, 1952, at
which time the President decided he "would like to consider
the feasibility of dealing with this problem through the establishment of a new naval petroleum reserve to include the submerged lands of the continental shelf."

Secretary Chapman and

the Attorney General agreed that such a proposed executive
order would be legal.

Four days before Eisenhower's inaugura-

tion Truman issued an executive order making the entire continental shelf around the United States and Alaska a naval
18 New York Times, Oct. 14, l; Oct. 15, 1952, 24; Eisenhower, Mandate, 205-06; oc·t. 18, 1952, Telegrams, Eisenhower
to Kennon and Eisenhower to Shivers, Sherman Adams Staff Files,
Box 36, Eisenhower Library.
. l9New York Times, Sept. 14, 1952, 74; Donald S. Strong,
"Further Reflections on Southern Politics," Journal of Politics, 33 (May. 1971), 24-LH.
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reserve.

Once again the President gave national defense as

his reason.

The President felt "it would be the height of

folly" .for the Federal Government to give the oil to the
states, and later have to repurchase "this same oil at stiff
prices for use by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force in the
defense of the Nation."

Thus the administration of these

lands was transferred from the Department of Interior to the
Department of Navy.

As might be expected, the order met con-

siderable criticism.

Representative Wingate Lucas of Texas

called Truman's action "another attempt on the part of the
Socialists in the administration to find some way whereby
they can perpetuate the injustice which the American people
clearly voted in the last election to correct."

Frank M.

Porter, president of the American Petroleum Institute and the
chief lobbying agent for the claims of the states, pronounced
it "unsound and without basis. 1120
Despite Eisenhower's campai5n assurances there was some
doubt whether he would give his full support for the states
when the oil issue came before Congress.

First of all, the

President had not included the issue in his State of the Union
message.

Also, there was some question whether he ought to

revoke Truman's executive order.

Gerald Morgan, an assistant

to the President, thought it would be a good idea to simply
rescind the order.

His reasoning: "I don't know how widespread

20 nec. 30, 1952, Chapman to Truman, Central Files, OF-134F, Box 681, ~senhower Library; Hearings, Senate, Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings on SJ 13, S. 294, s. 107, Amendment, SJ Res. 18 (FeO:-::March, 1953), 1230-31; New York Times, Jan. ?, 1; Jan. 17,
9; Jan. 24, 1953, 10.
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this feeling is, but since the President took such a definite
stand on the Tidelands issue, and because of his very stature,
he certainly could not be accused of depriving the United
States of a needed defense facility."

Nevertheless, the Ad-

ministration decided against revoking Truman's order.
nor

Gover-

Shivers telegrammed Eisenhower and Adams that he "had

been hopeful that you would revoke Truman's last action on
Tidelands and [would] leave the matter entirely to Congress."
He went on to note that he hoped the President would not
"foreclose full settlement of the issue including the continental shelf at this session of the Congress."

Adams explained

to the governor that the oil issue was not mentioned in the
State of the Union Message because the Administration felt
Congress ;'can and will deal adequately with the ·problem, so
that it was not deemed neces~ary that a Presidential order
transferring the reserves to the Navy need be revoked."

Since

the leadership of the newly elected Republican Congress was in
complete accord with Eisenhower's views on the subject there
was little real reason for anxiety.

Reflecting this view Sen-

ator Daniel said he was not worried the President had failed
to make a positive recommendation on the oil issue in his State
of the Union Message.

The President's views were well-known,

and, he said, "I am certain President Eisenhower will sign the
stateownership bill, which will be presented to him by Congress. 1121
21 Memo, Feb. 5, 1953, Gerald Morgan to General Pearson,
Morgan Papers, Box 9, Eisenhower Library; Telegrams, Jan. 28,
1953, Shivers to Adams, and Shivers to Eisenhower; Telegr~,
Feb. 2, 1953, Adams to Shivers, in Central Files, OF-1-134-F,
Box 681, Eisenhower Library. Cf. also, Telegram, Jan. 28,
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Concerning the matter of Truman's executive order, the
new Administration advanced the position that the order did
nothing more than merely "transfer to the Secretary of the Navy
authority over the [offshore] lands which had previously been
conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior •••• "

Herbert

Brownell, the Attorney General, told the Department of Defense
that the former Attorney General under Truman had approved the
order "on the understanding that it did not intend to, nor
did it in fact or in law, create a naval petroleum reserve
within the meaning of the statute."

In order to create a

naval petroleum reserve, Brownell opined, it was first necessary to have an act of Congress, som13thing Truman had neglected to get.

He based his judgment on the fact all previous

naval petroleum

reservas had been created by acts of Congrass.

Thus, he concluded, no naval petroleum reserve had been legally created by Truman's executive order.

Two opponents of

state ownership, Senators James Murray (D-Mont.) and Clinton
Anderson, disagreed, saying that "none of the lawyers who participated in the discussions ever expressed any doubt concerning the power of the President to set the lands aside for the
future use of the Navy under the designation of a Naval petroleum reserve. 1122
1953, Shivers to Eisenhower, Department of Interior, Office
of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3285,
National Archives; New York Times, Feb. 3, 1953, 15.
22Feb. 13, 1953, Brownell to Wilson; and for Brownell's
testimony, cf. Hearings, House of Representatives, Judiciary
Subcommittee .No. 1, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., HR 2948 and Similar
Bills to Promote the Ex loration Develo ment and Conserva~ion
of Certain Resources in the Submer ed Lands, ••• Fe .-March,
3 ,
1- ; or Anderson s an ·Iurray s rebuttal see New
York Times, Feb. 18, 1953, 19.

??
Reversing the opinions of their New Deal predecessors,
the Secretaries of Interior and Navy concurred with Brownell.
Secretary of Interior McKay explained, in effect, that the
needs of national defense could be fully met provided the
United States retained the oil beyond the traditional boundaries.

He frankly thought the logic of Truman's order was spe-

cious.

The Department of Navy fully agreed.

Rear Admiral

Ira H. Nunn, speaking for the Secretary of Navy and the Department of Defense, told the House Judiciary subcommittee
that the defense needs of the country would not suffer in the
least if the states were allowed to develop the oil. 2 3
The Senate was presented with four bills and an amendment
dealing with offshore oil.
states.

Two bills gave the lands to the

A bill sponsored by Senator Spessard Holland {D-Flor-

-

ida) and thirty-eight other senators sought to transfer the
oil located within the historic boundaries-to the states.
This bill was fully supported by the senators from the oil
and gas producing states.

Senator Daniel proposed a more ex-

treme measure, providing for "jurisdiction, use, and control
of the subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf lying outside of the original [historic] State boundaries."

The oppo-

sition presented two bills and an amendment of its own.

Sena-

tor Estes Kefauver (D-Tenn.) proposed that a nine-man commission be established "to assist in making a proper and equitable
settlement of the submerged lands problems."

Senator Clinton

2 3HR Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb~-March,
1953), 180-81, 211.
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Anderson's bill sought to leave authority for the oil within
the jurisdiction of the Federal Government.

Seventeen Demo-

crats and one Republican from the consumer states co-sponsored
this bill.

Finally, an amendment prepared by Senator Lister

Hill (D-Ala.) stipulated that funds accruing from the oil
exploration would be earmarked directly for education; the
oil would, however, remain under the watchful eye of the
Federal Governmento 24
While the Administration did not officially back any
particular bill there was no doubt it looked favorably upon
the Holland measure.

The Attorney General stirred up some

dust when he told the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee that the constitutional question involved in the
issue could be avoided if "the Federal Government would grant
to the

Sta~es

only such authority as required for the States

to administer and develop the natural resources" but not grant
them "a blanket quitclaim to the submerged lands within their
territorial boundaries."

This suggestion appeared to be a

dramatic shi.ft from the Administration's outspoken campaign
pronouncements.

Nevertheless, Brownell quickly insisted that

McKay and he were in perfect agreement on state ownership.
As usual there was no mistaking McKay's position: "I do believe that the national interest would be best served by restoring to the various States the coastal offshore lands to
the limits of the line marked by the historical boundaries of
24 The bills are reprinted in Senate Interior Committee,
SJ 13, (Feb.-l1arch, 1953), 9-11, 12-25; New York Times, March

~4,

1953, 33.
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the respective States." 2 5
The s.tate ownership advocates flatly rejected the Brownell formula and made it plain they would brook no compromise.
Representative Hale Boggs (D-La.) called the Brownell proposal "reprehensible."

Representative Sam Yorty (D-Calif.)

dismissed it by saying it would solve nothing; it "would
merely bring it [the oil issue] up in different form."

None-

theless, after a meeting with the President, Senator Daniel
and Governor Kennon reiterated their confidence that Eisenhower would honor his campaign pledge.

Senator Russell Long

(D-La.) also expressed confidence: "I have never had any
doubt that the President would sign bills of the kind Mr.
Truman vetoed.
hewer's."

That was Brownell's formula and not Eisen-

The following day Eisenhower again emphatically

came out for stateownership.

He

said that while the Attorney

General's job demanded that he investigate all legal questions,
he, as President, thought the states should receive their
land. 26
The quitclaim legislation received considerable attention
from outside lobbying groups.

These agents saw stateownership

as a beginning toward restoring control to the local communities, and therefore, away from the Federal Government and its
many-tentacled bureaucracy.

About a month after Eisenhower's

2 5senate Interior Committee, SJ 13 (Feb.-March, 1953),
926, 954-55t HR Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb.March, 1953;, 180-81, 218-20, 236ff.
26HR Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb.-March,
1953), 241-42; 144-1~5; New York Times, March 5, 15; March 6,

1953, 15.
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election the National Conference of Mayors went on record
favoring stateownership.

Predictably this was followed by a

similar resolution of the National Association of Attorneys
General.

Likewise, the United States Chamber of Commerce

"strongly" urged passage of stateownership legislation because:
"We firmly believe that the doctrine of paramount rights and
dominion, set forth in the Supreme Court's tidelands decision,
is a dangerous one that should be repudiated at once."

The

American Farm Bureau Federation supported the Holland bill
claiming "the general welfare will in the long run be most
effectively furthered by local control of resource development."
Invoking the same reasons, the American Bar Association, Pacifie Coast Association of Port Authorities, the Great Lakes
Harbor Association, the National Reclamation Association, and
Interstate Oil Compact also supported this legislation.

Of

course, the American Petroleum Institute lobbied vigorously
for the Holland bill. 2 7
The quitclaim legislation was opposed by former members
of the Truman Administration as well as groups that had traditionally supported the New and Fair Deals.

Former Secretary

of Interior, Oscar Chapman, in testifying against both the
Holland and Daniel bills, declared that "for years powerful
pressure groups have been attempting to raid various parts of
the public domain.

They are now redoubling their efforts be-

cause they see in the inexperience of the new administration
2 7New York Times, Dec. 4, 1953, 45· HR Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb.-March, 1953), 284; Senate Interior
Committee, SJ 13 (Feb.-March, 1953), 38, 315-19, 1049.
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an opportunity to put over some of their giveaway legislation."
Chapman added: "I am deeply concerned that if these [offshore
oil] measures are enacted they will establish the pattern for
the greatest giveaway program in the history of the world."
The former Solicitor General of the United States, Philip B.
Perlman, who had successfully argued the government's thesis
in the Texas and Louisiana cases, wrote Eisenhower that the
legal rights of the coastal states do not include the submerged lands of the sea.

"There is no valid. reason, legal or

moral," Perlman thought, "why the United States should make
a donation of all its valuable oil and other mineral rights
in the marginal sea to these States at the expense of the
other forty-five States."

Labor continued to back the advo-

cates of federal ownership.

The American Federation of Labor

and the Congress of Industrial OrganizationsSl.pported the Anderson bill and Hill amendment.

O. A. Knight, Vice President

of the C.I.O. and President of the Oil Workers International
Union, favored letting the Federal Government operate the offshore oil deposits while earmarking

62~

ment•s share from the oil for education.

percent of the GovernThe Americans for

Democratic Action supported the Hill amendment and opposed
the Holland and Daniel bills.

A couple of farm organizations

also saw dangers in stateownership.

The National Grange is-

sued this condemnation:
We are strongly convinced that if the Congress passes
Senate Joint Resolution 13 [the Holland billl it will
be a giveaway for selfish use of unpredictab!e and
valuable future resources that in reality belong to
all the people of the Nation, it will make a regrettable error that will greatly impair the future security of our nation.
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Angus McDonald of the National Farmers Union likewise opposed
the Holland and Daniel bills and supported the Hill amendment.
Finally, the Fisherman's Cooperative Association of San Diego,
California, saw a new objection to stateownership.

"If one

nation," it contended, "can unilaterally extend its sovereign
territory out to sea by as much as a quarter of a mile, then
there is no reason why it or any other nation cannot extend
its boundaries seaward by 200 miles, by 400 miles, or by such
distance it may desire."

Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachu-

setts, representing Ea.st Coast fishing interests, agreed with
this opinion. 28
Congress wasted no time taking up the issue.

Both houses

of Congress began hearings on the offshore bills within a few
weeks after the inauguration.

The House Judiciary subcommit-

tee took less than a month of testimony and the bill reported
out by the full Judiciary Committee provided that the offshore oil within historic boundaries would go to the states
and that the states should be allowed to continue severance
or production taxes, over and above royalties, on the area
beyond the historic boundaries.

This measure subsequently
passed the House by an overwhelming margin. 29 While the House
28 senate Interior CoID.Iilittee, SJ 13 (Feb.-March, 1953),
299-301, 466-80, 502-03, 484-85, 9'71+-...,-r:J, 1178; New York Times,
Feb. 24, 1, and Aug. 22, 1953, 7; March 6, 1953, Perlman to
Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-134-F, Box 681, Eisenhower Library.
29cf. HR Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb.-March,
1953); New York Times, March 25, 1953, 36; Con5ressional Record, 83rd Cong., lst sess., v. 99, part 2 (April 1, 1953),
~8.
The vote on the House bill was 285-108, with 38 not
voting; 188 Republicans and 97 Democrats voted for the measure; 89 Democrats, 1 Independent, and 18 Republicans voted
against it.
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dispensed with the issue in quick fashion, the supporters of
stateownership ran into a couple of stumbling blocks in the
Senate.
Senator Guy Cordon (R-Ore.), one of the co-sponsors of
the Holland bill, was designated to chair the proceedings of
the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Co:cmittee which would
handle the issue.

The Committee quickly rejected the Ander-

son bill and reported out the Holland bill.

While the state

ownership bill was pushed out of committee with dispatch, a
final vote by the Senate was stymied when opponents to the
Holland measure filibustered.

Senator Wayne Morse, for exam-

ple, distinguished himself by speaking against the bill for a
breathtaking twenty-two hours and twenty-six minutes.

Sena-

tors J. William Fulbright and Lister Hill were the only southerners to participate in this filibuster.

During the debate

a significant exchange of letters took place between the President and the opponents of the Holland bill.

In a

letter to

the President, twenty-four senators stated their opposition
to Senator Holland's measure, "the proposed legislation," as
they put it, "to give the three states at the expense of the
other forty-five the natural resources in oil and other minerals in the submerged lands of the marginal seas."

They re-

quested that the Administration officially state its position
on the issue of what the coastal states' boundaries were.

The

letter was viewed by the White House as an obvious political
maneuver.

Although Eisenhower signed the letter, it was sub-

stantially the work of Senator Taft and Attorney General Brownell.
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The President's reply broke a long standing policy of not
commenting on congressional controversies.

It re-stated the

President's views expressed during the campaign, noting that
his "position is the same today," and urging "prompt passage"
of the Holland bill.

To help the filibuster Eisenhower con-

tinued, "I hesitate to express an opinion on legislative procedure, but I am deeply concerned with the delay of the entire
Administration program in the Senate of the United States. 11 3°
A few days later a test vote was taken on the Hill amend-

ment.

Senator Hill had long fought for increased Federal aid

to education, particularly for the South.

As early as 1943,

Hill, along with other southern senators, had advocated increased Federal aid to education.

At this time he said it

!'must be an accepted principle of American Government that
wealth, income, and privileges should be taxed wherever found,
and the revenue spent for public service wherever needed."
Yet successive bills for Federal aid to education either nev&r
emerged_from the congressional committees or were never brought
to a floor vote.

Hill now saw another chance to secure pas-

sage of a federal aid to education bill.

This time he thought

the primary question "that should concern the Congress and the
American people is not how, to give the oil and gas away, but
·30New York Times, March 26, 1953, 28; Senate, 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess., Senate Report 133 (March 27, 1953); April 17, 1953,
letter to Eisenhower from twenty-three senators, and Memo,
April 23, 1953, Bernard Shanley to Brownell, in Central Files,
OF-134-F, Box 681, Eisenhower Library; April 24, 1953, Eisenhower to Anderson, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of ·
the Presidents of the United States, 1954 (Government Printing Office, 1960), 217-18.
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how to keep it and use it in the national interest.

This

national patrimony belongs to the people of the entire nation
and must be used for their benefit and the benefit of succeeding generations."

His proposal would have directed that the

money derived from the offshore oil be given to education.
Hill argued:
Witness the dilapidated condition of our schools,
all too many of which are dangerously overcrowded;
the alarming exodus of inadequately salaried teachers from the teaching profession into better-paying
pursuits; and, furthermore, the absolute necessity
of expanding our schools to meet the needs of the next
few years.
The advocates of stateownership dismissed this argument as a
"diversion measure growing out of the desperate effort" to
prevent the states from gaining what was rightfully theirs.
When a vote was taken the Hill amendment went down to defeat.
Thirty-eight Republicans and eighteen Democrats, mostly from
the South and Southwest, voted

aga~nst

the amendment while

one Independent, twenty-five Democrats and seven Republicans
'\Oted for it.

When the advocates of federal control could

muster only thrity-three votes the result was inevitable.
The opponents to federal control were obviously in solid
control of the situation.31
A few days after the !Iill amendment met defeat Majority

Leader Robert Taft threatened to keep the Senate in continuous
31 For the test of the Hill amendment Cf. Senate Interior
Committee, SJ 13 (Feb.-.March, 1953), 24-25; Tindall, Emergence
of The South, 495-97; Bartley, Tidelands Oil Controvers~, 22425; Lister Hill, "A Bonanza for Education," Harper's, 2 4, No.
1222 (March 1952), 28-31; Congressional RecordG 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess., v. 99, part 3 (April 27, 1953), 395 ; New York
Times, April 28, 1953.
·
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session until a vote was taken on the Holland bill.
nents to stateownership finally agreed to a vote.
the Senate voted 56 to 35 to approve the bill.

The oppo-

On May 5,

A conference

between the House and Senate settled on the less extreme Senate version.
into law.3 2

Shortly thereafter Eisenhower signed the bill

Not long afterward the Outer

Continental Shelf Act was

passed by Congress, and signed by the President.

The law

placed the area beyond the state limit under exclusive federal
jurisdiction.

The Secretary of Interior was authorized to

lease by competitive bidding these areas in lots not to exceed
5,?60 acres.

By 1958, 1,586,709 acres had been leased.

The

revenue from these leases produced almost three billion dollars in cash bonuses and the royalty on the leases are now
over one hundred million dollars annually.33
The.anxiety o:f the coastal states was not over yet, however.

The two laws passed by Congress were too ambiguous

concerning the exact boundaries separating the submerged lands
and the outer continental shelf.

Hence, in 1957, the United

States Solicitor General filed suit in the Supreme Court
against Texas and Louisiana to help clear up the matter.
This awkward procedure caused much anxiety particularly in

32 New York Times, April 29, l· May 6, l; May 14, 1953, l;
Congressional Record, 83rd Cong. ist Sess., v. 99, part 4
(May 5, 1953), 4488; Bartley, Tidelands Oil Controversi, 216-17,
223-24, 226-27; Public PaSers of the Presidents, 1953, 326-27;
Wright, "Jurisdiction, 11 I o.
33Nash, United States Oil Policy, 194; House of Representatives, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., Report 413 (May 12, 1953); Senate, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., Report 411 (June 15, 1953); New
York Times, July 31, 1953, 7; Marion Clawson, The Bureau of
Land Mana[ement (New York, 1971), 135-36; Wright, "Jurisdic~ion .. " 18 •
*
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Texas.

Jack Porter, the Republican National Chairman in, Texas,

complained that the Justice Department need not have included
Texas in the suit, although he did think the suit against Louisiana was justified "on account o.f the absurd claims they
were making."

Eisenhower attempted to allay these fears.

In

a letter to both Governor Shivers and Porter the President
reiterated his earlier pledges to the coastal states.

The

culp;r-it in this matter, he noted, was Congress: "I must say
it is regrettable that Congress did not .follow the Administration's recommendations .for making this [boundary question]
clear, but instead le.ft the law ambiguous so that the matter
had to be litigated."

The Presidential letter to Porter was

reprinted on the .front pages o.f various Texas newspapers.
Porter told Ike the "reaction [to his letter] throughout the
State [o.f Texas] has been most .favorable and I am certain the
people of Texas appreciate your attitude in this matter."

In

1960, the Supreme Court delivered a settlement amicable to
the coastal states.34
When Eisenhower signed the offshore oil bill he took the
occasion to point out: "As I have said many times, I deplore
and I will always resist .federal encroachment upon the rights
of the States."

The'President indeed hit upon the most en-

lightening point brought out by the offshore oil controversy.

34Nov. 18, 1957, Porter to Eisenhower; Dec. 4, 1957,

Eisenhower to Porter; May 21, 1958, Eisenhower to Shiv~rs;
Forth Worth Telegram, Dec. 6, 1957; Houston Chronicle, Dec.
6, 195?; Houston ?ost, Dec. ?, 1957, in Central Files, OF134-F, Box 681, Eisenhower Library; Engler, Politics of Oil,

94.
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Essentially the controversy was tied to the sensitive conflict between states' rights and the legitimate power of the
federal government.
As early as 1945, the Attorney General recognized how
perplexing this issue would be.

"It may be added," he ob-

served,
that there is strong feeling against the claim of the
United States within many important coastal states,
notably California, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Florida. There has likewise been strong feeling
in some interior states, though this may perhaps be
alleviated by the fact that the proposed suit will
make claim only to the lands below the marginal seas
and not to tidelands or land beneath inland waters.
In its brief against the State of California, the United
States made its position clear on the issue of inland waters.
"This suit," it said,
does not involve any bays, harbors, rivers or other
inland waters of California, nor does it involve the
so-called tidelands, namely those which are covered
and uncovered by the daily flux of the tides. It is
limited solely to that portion of the open sea embraced
within the three-mile belt, sometimes referred to as
the marginal sea.
These declarations to the contrary, the inland water states
still felt threatened.

This accounted for what Harold Ickes

called, "a unanimity of opinion" among the Attorneys General

ot the United States.

It was also a crucial ingredient in

the campaign of 1952.

In his New Orleans address Eisenhower

carefully noted: "I favor the recognition of clear legal title
to these lands in each of the forty-eight states."

In the

midst of the campaign Senator O'Mahoney, an opponent of state
ownership, warned Stevenson about this specific problem.

"The

passage of a quitclaim bill by Congress will lead inevitably
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to the demand for the cession to the Interior states of public
lands within their boundaries. 11 35
Since this general problem of states' rights touched on
inland water and mineral rights there was no neglecting these
important matters.

In November 1952, the National Reclamation

Association thought the oil issue was only symptomatic of a
much wider malady; it contended. the Federal Government's
position on the oil controversy constituted "a dangerous step
toward Federal control over all of the navigable waters of
the Nation and the resources lying under.the same."
Lakes states also expressed concern.

The Great

The legislature of the

State of Illinois passed a resolution similar to the National
Reclamation Association's.

Frank G. Millard, Attorney General

of riichigan, testified in favor of the Holland Bill in order
to secure "a reaffirmation of the proprietary rights in the
use and development and control of the lands and resources in
the Great Lakes area in which we are interested. 11 36
Likewise the issue of the relationship between the states
35Memo, April 19, 1945, Attorney General to the President,
in Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central
Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3278, National Archives; U.S.
Supreme Court, No. 12, Original, United States v. California,
Motion for Leave to File Complaint (Oct., 1945); Aug. ?, 1952,
O'Mahoney to Stevenson, Department of Interior, Office of the
Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3284, National Archives. It should be pointed out that O'Mahoney, in 1952,
submitted an amendment which would have specifically exempted
the inland waters from such offshore legislation. Bartley,
Tidelands Oil Controversy, 225.
36im Judiciary Subcommittee No~ l, HR 2948 (Feb.-March,
1953), 234-44, 338; Senate Interior Committee, SJ 13 (Feb.,~
March, 1953), 81, and for other comments along the same line,
245-46, 255-56, 1047-49.
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and mineral leases acquired new importance.

After all, oil

is mineral; what, then, of the minerals in the interior?
Secretary of Interior McKay did not feel there was any connection.

"I do not think," he told a congressional commit-

tee,
the States have any right to that Cfederal inland
mineral resources] because ordinarily when you acquire
land, unless it is stated in the title, you are entitled to the land and subsoil and air above. Most
of the States now, when they are selling land, reserve
the mineral rights. If it is Federal land, I do not
know why the States should come along and demand the
minerals underneath."
Senator George.Malone of Nevada disagreed with his fellow
Republican's estimate.

In questioning Brownell on the off-

shore oil question, Malone explained his position: "My question is: If the Congress of the United States is now going
to take a hand and transfer mineral rights to a few states,
there seems to be no reason why the mineral rights should
not just be transferred to all the States."
and Arthur

v.

Senators Malone

Watkins of Utah sought, in committee, to attach

an amendment to the offshore oil bill which would have given
each state all revenues from the subsoil mineral resources
of the public lands within their boundaries.

The Senate In-

terior Committee narrowly turned down this amendment to the
Rolland bill.3?

It was not surprising, then, for the Western

and Great Lakes states to vote in great numbers for the Holland
. 3?HR Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb.-March,
1953), 191; Senate Interior Committee, SJ 13, (Feb.-March,
1953), 928ff;· Senator Hunt of Syoming introduced a bill similar to the Watkins-Malone measure. Cf. Senate Interior Committee, SJ 13 (Feb.-March, 1953), 875-83.
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bill.

This controversy poignantly demonstrated that the

issue of states' rights, upon which the Administration based
its partnership policy, was politically and economically sensitive not only in the South but in other areas of the country as well.
It was precisely because of these implications for other
natural resources that many independent conservation-minded
people, New Deal liberals, and professional conservation organizations strongly protested the stateownership legislation.
As William Blair of the New York Times remarked:
There has been increasing speculation that once the
states gained control of the seaward oil resources
they would turn their attention to the mountains and
the forests, major targets of some industrial interests because of the tremendous reserves of timber,
minerals, water and water power~ and grazing rights.
The Americans for Democratic Action charged that politicians
were "already planning legislation to give away the western
grazing lands, and the off-shore oil 'give-away' can set off
a chain reaction which will strip the .American people of all
their natural resources."

Similarly, Commonweal warned: "The

offshore oil battle therefore is of the widest public concern.
It must be followed up by stands against similar legislation
and administrative raids on vital national resources--there
would be reason enough to resist them solely in the interests
of national defense."

After all, if McKay could reverse the

Department of Interior's posture on offshore oil, he could do
likewise in other critical areas as well.

Thus, for conser-

vationists and New Deal liberals alike, the gnawing question
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was whether the offshore oil legislation was merely an aberration or the opening wedge to a menacing pattern.3 8

38 New York Times, May 3, 1953, IV, ?; American for Demo-

cratic Action, "The Offshore Oil Controvesy--What It Means to
the American People" (March 25, 1953), in Paul Douglas Papers,
Box 411, Chicago Historical Society; "Raid on the Public Domain," Commonweal, 58 (May 1, 1953), ·aa.

CHAPTER IV
THE NATURAL GAS IMBROGLIO
Natural gas is a by-product of oil and, like that resource,
it has had an equally volcanic history, particularly in the
nineteen forties and fifties.

As in the offshore oil contro-

versy, the dispute over regulation of the producers of natural gas involved two presidential vetos, a significant congre&sional battle, a major scandal, and a greatly debated Supreme
Court decision.

But, wilike the offshore oil controversy,

this issue revolved around what limits,·· if any, should be
placed on the Federal Power Commission's authority to regulate
the natural gas industry.

This added an ingredient to an al-

ready complicated political and constitutional recipe.
The dispute over regulation of the natural gas industry
evolved from a confluence of interconnected circumstances.
During the nineteen thirties the natural gas industry had
begun to expand, and as a result, Congress passed the Natural
Gas Act of 1938.

Though designed to supplement state regula-

tion it granted regulatory authority to the Federal Power Commission.

The FPC seemingly possessed the power to regulate

the transportation and sale of natural gas for resale.

Also,

the Commission was empowered to determine prices for gas involved in interstate commerce.
enforcer of

~he

Act.

The FPC thus became the prime

While the Act seemed explicit enough in
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theory, there soon developed great difficulty in enforcing it.
In short, the language of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 was too
ambiguous.

Specifically, ·section l(b) of the Act· provided

that the FPC's jurisdiction should apply "to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in
interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate
public consumption ••• and to natural gas companies engaged in
such transportation or sale."

This sentence appeared suffi-

ciently precise, but the very next words so qualified its
meaning that the entire section was rendered open to practically any interpretation.

It continued: " ••• but the FPC's jur-

isdiction shall not apply to any other transportation or sale
of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or
to the facilities used for such distribution or to the producing or gathering of natural gas. 11

As a result of this vague

wording, the focal point of the dispute was whether the Federal Power Commission's authority extended exclusively to
the distributors and not to the independent producers.

To

complicate matters more, the Commission itself was hopelessly
divided over the matter.

Eventually the Supreme Court had to
deliver a highly controversial interpretation. 1
With a rapidly increasing demand for natural gas at the
end of the Second World War, the problem became more acute.
Natural gas was particularly essential because it was one of
1 Nash, United States Oil Policfi, 214-15; Edith T. Carper,
Lobbyin~ and.the Natural Gas Bill ( niversity of Alabama
Press, he Inter-University Case Program, 1962), 170.
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the most accessible and least exploited forms of energy, and
thus could be used easily to meet the requirements of the
country's rapidly growing population.

Between 1945 and 1950,

the search for energy substitutes was also encouraged by fuel
oil shortages.

Furthermore, improved technology, especially

in pipelines, meant that natural gas was no cheaper and could
be distributed at the national level.

All of this was reflec-

ted in the statistical increase in natural gas consumption.
The total production of natural gas in the United States was
increased from 2,660.2 billion cubic feet in 1940 to 9,405.4
billion cubic feet in 1955.

Between 1930 and 1960 residential

and industrial consumption rose more.than tenfold.

As the de-

mand for natural gas increased consumers clamored for more
vigorous regulation of the field prices of the producers.

Of

course, the producers fought such regulation just as strenuously.

Thus the increased demand for natural gas forced the poli-

tical and judicial process to clarify the ambiguity of the
Natural Gas Act of 1938. 2
Like the offshore oil controversy, the natural gas battle
exerted an important influence on the economy of the Southern
and Southwestern, as well as the Far Western and Mountain
states.

Eighty-four percent of the gas reserves of the United

States were located in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Kansas, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Arkansas.
example.

Texas served as a typical

While the importance of agriculture to the state's

2 Nash, United States Oil Policy, 209-10; Carper, Lobbyin5, ?.
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economy dwindled, Texas' natural gas industry expanded rapidly.

Situated in the Houston-Beaumont-Port Arthur area, it

developed a petrochemical industry.

In fact, Texas became

the nation's leading producer of natural gas •. By the end of
the fifties the natural gas industry in Texas increased over
one-half billion dollars.

Expansion of the natural gas and

oil industry insured lucrative defense contracts for California and Texas.

By 1960, only California and New York exceeded

Texas in defense contract allocations.

Natural gas was indeed

a vital resource to these states.3
The Federal Power Commission unsuccessfully sought to
settle the issue.

In August, 1947, the Commission unanimously

issued Order No. 139, the intention of which was to end any
uncertainty that existed in the minds of natural gas producers.
~

Order told the independent producers and gatherers of

natural gas that they could "sell at arm's length and deliver
such [natural] gas to interstate pipelines ••• without apprehension that in so doing they may become subject to assertions
of jurisdiction by the Federal Power Commission under the
Natural Gas Act."

Since this ruling was not binding on future

commissions, the leaders of the gas industry continued to push
for legislation. 4
Because of new consumer and industrial demands for natural gas and the FPC's exhaustive study of the natural gas
3Harold Vatter, The United States Economy in the 1950's
(Norton & Co •. , 1963, New York), 186-8?; Carper, Lobbying, 1.
4 Nash, United States Oil Po!icy, 217-18.
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industry, the Commission split evenly in 1948 over the issue.
Commissioners Harrington Wimberley and Nelson Lee Smith opted
for a strict interpretation of Section l(b) of the Natural
Gas Act.

They urged Congress to enact a bill which would

specifically exempt intrastate gas producers from FPC jurisdiction and lay down policy guidelines for rate-making and
control of wholesale sales.

Commissioners Leland Olds and

Thomas Buchanan had joined in the unanimous decision on Order
1~9

but now reversed their opinion.

They did not think any

amend.merits to the Natural Gas Act were needed; indeed, they
wanted the FPC • s authority over the industry increased·.

It

was their conviction that if federal. controls were not

tightened the supply of natural gas would soon be depleted.
Olds, in particular, had incurred the wrath of the gas industry because he was an uncompromising champion of strengthening authority for the Federal Power Commission.

With the FPC

evenly split no resolution could be made through the Commission.5
In 1949, Leland Olds did not stand well with the oil and
natural gas industry and its congressional representatives.
When Truman nominated him to a third term on the Federal Power
Commission, the entire issue came to a head.

Olds was a native

of Rochester, New York, a graduate of Amherst College, and a ·
veteran of World War I.

His economic orientation was left of

5Nash, United States Oil Poli~, 218-19; Carper, Lobbting,
6. There wa~ one vacancy on the F which accounted for t e
even split. The FPC is a five-man commission.
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center, and after the First World War, he had written for
Labor Leader, a leftist paper.

Olds later became head of the

New York State Power Authority and, in 1939, Roosevelt appointed him to the Federal Power Commission, where he soon
became known as one of the more militant advocates of strict
government regulation of private utility rate-making.

Leland

Olds was unquestionably a faithful New Dealer. 6
Besides running afoul of the natural gas industry, Olds
had incurred the wrath of Harold Ickes, who thought the commissioner had advised Roosevelt against appointing him chairman of the new Federal Water-Power Commission.

Ickes took

revenge by permitting Abe Fortas, the Undersecretary of Tnterior, to supply a friend, Senator Lyndon Johnson, with damaging
information about Olds.
particular appeal.

For- Johnson the Olds affair held a

In 1948, he had barely won a seat in the

Senate and Texas was quickly becoming a conservative state.
To ensure re-election and to gain admittance into the Senate
hierarchy, Johnson realized it would be necessary to ingratiate himself with the Senate's conservative elders and the oil
and natural gas industry back home.

This he proceeded to do.

The fact that Olds had attempted to mobilize media opposition
to a bill_.which. would have struck down t.he FPC' s authority..

...

over the independent producers of natural gas did not enhance
his popularity either.?
6 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The
Exercise of Power (New York, 1966), 45.
?Evans a~d Novak, Lyndon Johnson, 46-49.

.
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The Olds nomination was sent to a Senate Interstate and
Foreign Commerce subcommittee chaired by Johnson.

The members

of the subcommittee were bitterly hostile to him.

During the

nomination hearings, Olds' chief questioners, Senators Kerr
and Johnson and Representative Lyle of Texas, did not examine
the nominee's qualifications for serving on the Com.mission so
much as his leftist activities in the decade after the First
World War.

Lyle, in fact, was determined to demonstrate his

"firm desire for ridding the Federal Power Commission of anyone he deemed a Communist sympathizer.

In September the sub-

committee voted unanimously against Olds.

Despite political

pressure from the White House, the full Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce voted overwhelmingly against
Olds' nomination.

Truman, however, refused to withdraw the

nomination, and in October, the Senate voted 53 to 15 against
Olds.

The Commission was now stymied with two for and two

against strict regulation of the indivi4ual producers.

A suc-

cessful Olds nomination would have tilted the FPC in favor of
regulation. 8
In 1949J Oklahoma Senators Kerr and Elbert Thomas introduced a bill which would have exempted individual producers
of natural gas from Section l(b).

Senators Johnson and Rus-

sell Long of Louisiana vigorously supported the bill.

The

Kerr bill was similar to one passed by the House the previous
' .8 Nash, United States Oil Polic~, 6. In 1949 Truma'n had
appointed a commissioner who had si ed with Olds and Buchanan.
The Olds nomination was thus crucial to the FPC's regulatory
powers over the independent ~roducers of natural gas.
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session but not acted upon by the Senate.

The bill received

staunch opposition from the representatives of the large
consumer states.

Senators Paul Douglas of Illinois and Wayne

Morse of Oregon led the fight against the bill.

Once again,

however, the Federal Power Commission reversed itself.

Though

in 194? all of the commissioners had favored legislation exempting local gas producers from Commission jurisdiction, three
ot the commissioners, including Olds, now openly opposed the
bill.

Congress passed the Kerr measure and Truman, following

the advice of a majority of the FPO, vetoed the bill.

Tru-

man' a veto reflected consumer opposition to the measure.

He

pointed out that unlike coal and oil, the "consumer of natural
gas cannot move easily from one producer to another in search
of lower prices.n

In other words, if the independent produc-

ers of natural gas went unregulated it would result in higher
prices for the consumer.

As in the offshore oil controversy,

a Truman veto caused a political stalemate and the issue was
laid before the Supreme Court.9
The Supreme Court made a ruling in 1954, which, for the
time being, settled the question in favor of FPC regulation
of the independent producers.

In 1951, a case involving the

Phillips Petroleum Company, the nation's largest independent
producer of natural gas, came before the Federal Power Commission.

In a four to one opinion, the Commission ruled that

Phillips was exempt from Section l(b) of the Natural Gas Act.
9Nash, United states Oil Policy, 218-23.
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Since the Phillips Company was a giant in the industry consumer interests could not let the Commission's ruling go unchallenged.

Several consumer representatives filed petitions

for review in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia.

The consumer participants urging

the Circuit Court to reverse the RPC ruling were the State ot
Wisconsin, Wayne County, Michigan, and the cities of Kansas
City (Missouri), Detroit, and Milwaukee.
consumers of Phillips gas.

ot the consumers.

All of them were

The Circuit Court ruled in favor

This decision was appealed to the Supreme

Court which, on June ?, 1954, upheld the lower court's decision.

Ironically, the Supreme Court had interpreted the law

more.broadly than the Com.mission itself had desired.
rate, the

Phillip~

At any

decision temporarily solved the problem.

Beyond question, the Federal Power Commission now possessed
the authority to regulate the field prices of independent producers of natural gas. 10
The decision fell heavily on the Federal Power Commission and the oil and natural gas industry.

Since it is prac-

tically impossible to separate oil and gas production, the
oil companies were particularly hit hard by the Phillips decision.

They contended that oil would likely be next.

Also,

the gas producers feared that credit for gas production would
be more difficult to secure due to the financial insecurity
that would undoubtedly sweep the industry.

Moreover, the

lOEngler, Politics of Oil, ll?-31;. Nash, United States
Oil Policy, 233-34; Carper, Lobbying, 6-7.
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Phillips decision greatly increased the work load of the Federal Power Commission.

The Commission now assumed, in addi-

tion to its other burdens, the regulation of about 40,000 gas
producers.

To remedy this situation the natural gas industry

and the Eisenhower-appointed Federal Power Commission went to

Congress .for legislation that would reverse the Phillips decision.11
Until this point Eisenhower had remained remarkably silent.

But the Phillips decision changed that.

A week after

the Supreme Court announced its decision, Senator Johnson o.f
.

.

-

Texas recommended that a commission be set up to "study carefully" the problems of the natural gas industry and to make
recommendations "for appropriate legislation."

While Bureau

of the Budget Director Rowland Hughes suggested that the problems be forwarded to a commission already in existence, the
Administration decided instead to create a new commission to
investigate this and other energy resource issues.

On July

30, 1954, the White House announced the establishment o.f a
Cabinet Committee on Energy Supplies and Resources Policy.
The Secretaries of the Departments o.f State, Treasury, Defense,
Justice, Interior, Commerce, and Labor composed the Committea.
Arthur Fleming, Director of the Office o.f Defense Mobilization,
was designated its chairman.

The Committee was charged with

the responsibility o.f undertaking "a study to evaluate all
11 Nash, United States Oil Policy, 233-34; "Natural Gas,"
Business Week, 1367 (Nov. 12, 1955), 106; "Gas Headaches, ..
'.Susiness tJeelC, 1267 (Dec. 12, 1953), 132·-34.
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factors pertaining to the continual development of energy supplies and resources and fuels in the United States, with the
aim of strengthening the national defense, providing orderly
industrial growth, and assuring supplies for our expanding
national economy and for any future emergency."

The report

of the Committee, issued in early 1955, recommended the exemption of independent producers from FPC regulation.

The report

was correctly interpreted by Business Week as "Eisenhower's
invitation to Congress" to repeal the Phillips decision.
Consumer interests greeted the report with stinging criticism.
Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin rejected the report outof-hand.

Unless the natural gas industry were subjected to

Federal regulation, he declared, "the respective consuming
states like my own would be virtually helpless in trying to
establish reasonable prices by the time the over-priced gas
were to come into the respective state boundaries."

In a

letter to Arthur Fleming, Senator Paul Douglas objected to
the composition of the Committee.

He argued that it had been

weighted in favor of the oil and gas industry and thus was
antipathetic to consumer interests.

Fleming replied by argu-

ing that the "positions of these [oil and gas] industries
are widely divergent in character."

There was not, he con-

cluded, a single bloc of oil and gas representatives.
las remained unconvinced.

Doug-

"And while you refer to the diver-

gent views of the coal industry and the oil and gas industry
on many issues," he said, "they have long seen eye to eye on
the precise legislative issue I mentioned--the question of
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exempting from reasonable regulation the sales in interstate
commerce of nontransporting as producers. 012
In 1955, a bill conforming to the recommendations of the
Presidential Advisory Committee on Energy Supplies was introduced into Congress by Senator J. William :Fulbright and Representative Oren Harris, both Democrats from Arkansas.

Under

the proposed bill, the Federal Power Commission's jurisdiction over field process would have been severely curtailed.
The Commission would regulate the producers in such a way as
to allow for a "reasonable market price" and a "fair gathering charge in those cases where such price is determined before but not after gathering is completed."

In this sense,

the Fulbright-Harris proposal differed from the Kerr bill
which would have simply exempted the producers from all regulation.

While the President would most likely sign such a

bill, many pundits speculated he would not "lift a finger to
help get it passed."

This assessment was partially true, for

the Administration let Congressional leaders handle the matter
almost exclusively. 1 3
12June 14, 1954, Johnson to Eisenhower; March ?, 1955,
Central Files, OF-134-G, Box ?25, Eisenhower Library; "Report
of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Energy Supplies and
Resources Policy," Central Files, OF-134-G, Box 684, Eisenhower Library; "Two Lines Drawn," Business Week (I1arch 5, 1955),
32; Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2nd-Sess. (Feb. 3, 1956),
19?1-?2.
l3House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 partsi Natural Gas
Act (Exemption of Producers) (1955)i 2-3, 16-1? hereafter
re£erred to as House Hearings, 1955 ; "Federal Control of
Natural Gas: The Battle Warms Up," Business Week, 1324 (Jan.
15, 1955), 80; Nash, United States Oil Policy, 235.
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Opposition to the bill arose from organized labor, gas
utility companies, municipal organizations, and the coal interests.

The labor and mayor groups concentrated their lob-

bying efforts on behalf of their consumer constituency.

Repre-

sentative Clement J. Zablocki of Wisconsin summarized their
arguments:
If the cost of the gas brought into our State through
that rnatural gas] pipeline increases, the consumers
have Tittle alternative but to pay the higher price.
They cannot go to another supplier, and they cannot
change to another fuel--such as coal, oil, or electricity--without losing their investment in gas-burning equipment.
The United Auto Workers had waged a strong fight

against the

Kerr Bill and now it protested the Fulbright-Harris measure.
The UAW charged that the "reasonable market price" provision
was just a gimmick.

If passed, the Fulbright-Harris bill

would thus be "a 30 billion windfall to big oil and na·tural
gas producers ••• "

Joseph W. Childs of the CIO contended that

competition within the industry sent prices up, not down as
the producers sought to prove.

He concluded: "If this is the

kind of protection we get from competition in the sale of
natural gas to pipelines, we've had enough."

The National

Farmers Union also believed that the nature of the industry
required regulation, not total free enterprise.

The Union

foresaw a dangerous precedent being set by the FulbrightHarris bill: " ••• and finally if the authority of the Federal
Power Commission is

wea..~ened

and destroyed in regard to regu-

lation of natl,lral gas prices, it is probable that authority
to regulate electric power wholesale rates for resale will be
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weakened and destroyed." 14
These consumer interests took their case directly to the
\Jhite House.

Led by Senator Wiley a delegation of municipal

and state associations met with Eisenhower on March 18, 1955,
to urge him to oppose the Fulbright-Harris bill, but when the
President proved unsympathetic, consumer opposition to the
bill was mobilized by mayors of cities from around. the country.

On April 6, 1955, Mayors Joseph S. Clark, Jr. of Phila-

delphia, Robert Wagner of New York, and David Lawrence of
Pittsburgh sent telegrams to a hundred mayors of cities with
populations over 100,000 people.

In early February the three

mayors met with a half dozen senators, including Douglas of
Illinois and Lehman and Ives of New York, to arrange strategy
for the difficult fight ahead.

In protesting the bill, Mayor

Clark set forth what the mayors conceived as the central issue:
And the real issue raised by this legislation which
we oppose is whether a group of producers, the fulcrum of whose power rests in the hands of the large
oil companies in this country would be permitted to
determine the price of a commodity passing in interstate commerce and affected by the public interest,
unilaterally and without policing in the consumer
interest by a regulatory body: the Federal Power Commission.
Nevertheless, the efforts of organized labor and mayors attracted little public attention. 1 5
14tJAW, "Facts About the Big Gas Gouge of 1956," (Mimeographed, Washington, D.C.); UAW, "1956 Legislative Program-adopted by--UAW International .Ex:ecutive Board" (mimeographed,
Jan. 11, 1956); Angus McDonald, "National Farmers Union Power
and Resources Memorandum No. 2" (mimeographed, Jan. 6, 1956);
National Famers Union, "Washington Newsletter," v. 3, no. 3
(.Jan. 20, 1956), 4, in Paul Douglas Papers, Box 38?, Chicago
Historical Society; House Hearings, 1955, 295, 1178-?9.
l5New York Times, March 19, 8; April ?, 1955, 3?; Feb. 2,

10?
The gas industry was not unified on the bill.

The gas

utilities opposed the escalator clause and since the Fulbright-Harris bill did not eliminate it, they too fought the
bill's passage.

At a meeting in October 1955, the gas utili-

ties organized the Council of Local Gas Companies, a group
designed to work closely with the opposition congressmen.
The Council's leader was John Heyke, the President of Brooklyn Union Gas Company.

Approximately sixty companies from

twenty states made up the Council.

The Council protested the

Fulbright-Harris claiming it would exempt producers from regulation while the local gas companies would still be tied to
escalator clauses.

"Many of these escalator clauses," the

Council remonstrated, "are unfair and vicious in their operation, since the uncontrolled action of third parties can bring
about the increase in price without any regard to the necessities of the producer who is selling the gas."

Heyke reiterated

to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce that
"The operation of these [escalator] clauses has in recent years
resulted in unjustified price increases for producers which
bear no reasonable relationship at all to producer costs, risks,
required incentives, or general economic conditions."

Randall

LeBoeuf' of Consolidated Edison Co. of New York agreed: "No
regulatory process can function if these [escalator]
clauses change rates without the exercise of any judgment on
1956, 14; House Hearings, 1955, 1380-84; March 9, 1955, Alexander to Bernard M. Shanley, Central Files, OF-140-A, Box 725,
Eisephower Library; Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
v. 101, part 9 (July 28, 1955), 1181-82.

108

the part of the regulatory body."

The independent Natural Gas

Association of America echoed the same sentiments.

The gas

utilities agreed that rate increases did not derive from any
necessary hike in producers' expenses or even in the value of
natural gas; rather, they felt "artificial extraneous circumstances" accounted for the rate increases.

If the escalator

clause remained operative while the producers went unregulated,
gas prices would jump, making it exceedingly more difficult
for gas utilities to compete with coal as an economical energy
resource. 16
The coal states of West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania,
and Ohio were equally opposed to the .Fulbright-Harris bill.
The United Mine Workers championed gas conservation, something
the union hoped would stem the competitive impact of natural
gas on coal.

The National Coal Association put the real rea-

son succinctly: "It is important to make it clear to the Congress that coal has lost substantial markets to such unregulated natural gas competition, and most such losses can be
attributed to the price flexibility of natural gas which is
possible because of the exemption [of natural gas from FPC
regulation]."

Accordingly, Representative Harley Staggers of

West Virginia introduced a bill to help protect the coal industry from the "unfair'' competition of natural gas.

Repre-

sentative James Van Zandt of Pennsylvania advocated federal
16council of Local Gas Companies, "Th~ Natural Gas Issue
Before Congre.~rn 11 (Pamphlet), in PauLDouglas Papers, Box 387;
House Hearings, 1955, 395-97, 675-82, 803-04; Carper, Lobbying, 32-34.
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regulation of the natural gas industry in order to preserve
jobs.

"As a representative of a congressional district whose

economy depends upon coal and railroads," he said, "this unfair competition from natural gas has thrown thousands of
coal miners, railroad workers, and other employees in related
industries out of jobs. 01 7
The Fulbright-Harris bill gathered support from several
important sources.

It received the overwhelming endorsement

of the Eisenhower-appointed Federal Power Com.mission.

This

time the Commission was not as badly divided as on previous
occasions.

Commissioner Buchanan met a fate similar to Olds'.

Truman renominated him to the FPC but the Senate subcommittee
which investigated his nomination voted nine to four against
him.

Nevertheless, Truman kept Buchanan on the Commission

through a recess appointment.

The appointment of a new Chair-

man of the FPC concerned the advocates of federal regulation
of natural gas.

For example, Senator Wiley urged that in

selecting a new Chairman "every consideration be given to
selecting an individual who will hold views" sympathetic to
the construction of the Saint Lawrence Seaway and "to protecting the rights of consumers especially in so crucial an
area of utility regulation ,as natural gas rates."

But Eisen-

hower promptly withdrew Buchanan's name for Senate consideration and replaced him with Jerome Kuykendall, a member of the
Washington State Public Utility Commission.

While a lawyer in

l?Nash, United States Oil Policy, 228; House Hearings,

1955, 299, 1099, 1891-94.
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private practice, Kuykendall had numbered Trans-Northwest
Gas, Inc., and the Western Gas Co. among his clients.

Despite

some opposition to his appointment, Kuykendall was confirmed
and made Chairman of the Commission.

Likewise, when the term

of Harrington Wimberley expired in 1953, Seaborn Digby, an
Eisenhower Democrat from Louisiana, was appointed to the Commission.

From 1948 to 1952, Digby had sat on the industry-

dominated Conservation Commission of Louisiana and had been
a member of the Legal Committee of the Interstate Oil Compact
since 1948.

Seemingly, Digby was a good political appointment.

After investigating him, Kuykendall reported to Charles Willis,
Jr., a special assistant to the President, that "All the informants indicated that Mr. Digby was not an outstanding political figure although quite well known in Louisiana politics.
Apparently all political factions in Louisiana like and respect Mr. Digby. 11

Similarly, James F. McKillips, Jr., an

assistant to the Chairman of the Republican National Committee,
recommended him: "It is my understanding this would be a popular appointment in Louisiana."

The·Digby appointment did not

meet with unqualified enthusiasm from all quarters, however.
Senator Charles Tobey of New Hampshire, the new Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, felt
the Federal Power Commission was biased in favor of the gas
producing states.

"Let us look at the picture realistically,"

he wrote Sherman Adams.
Democrat, is

~ppointed

"If Mr. Digby, a gas producer-state
to the Commission, who is the counter-

vailing representative of the northern gas consumer on the

111
other side?"

For various reasons Tobey did not believe Com-

missioner Draper. was "an adequate countervailing influence in
favor or the consumer."

But Tobey singled out Commissioner

Nelson Lee Smith for his most severe criticism.
Smith~

He thought

also from New Hampshire, should have been the consumer

countervailing force on the FPC but, instead, he "has consistently depended for his political support on Texas gas interests."

Consequently, he suggested that Smith be replaced when
..

his term expired on the Commission.

Tobey wanted him trans-

ferred to the Interstate Commerce Commission and his successor
to represent the consumer states.

Specifically, Tobey wanted

the new commissioner to come from New England.

In a separate

communication to Adaw,s, Tobey also outlined the political value
or appointing a consumer representative to the FPO.

"If we

are going to put champions of higher gas prices in the field
on the [Federal Power] Commission," he pointedly concluded,
"we have got to take care of this consumer problem on the Power
Commission."

When his appointment expired in June, 1955,

Commissioner Smith was succeeded by William R. Connole of Connecticut, a consumer-oriented commissioner.

Unfortunately

this appointment did not come until after the Commission, with
only one dissenting vote, had endorsed the Fulbright-Harris
bill. 18
18Engler, Politics of Oil, 325-26; Nash, United States
Oil Polic~, 232; Feb. 24, 1953, Wiley to Eisenhower; Memo,
June 4, 1 53, Kuykendall to Willis; May 19, 1953, McKillips
to willis; July 6, 1953, Tobey to Adams; (Tobey also sent
another letter to Adams on the same day); Feb. 2, 1955, Nelson Lee Smith· to Eisenhower; April 3, 1953, in Central Files,
OF-18, Box 193, Eisenhower Library.
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The chief advocates of the Fulbright-Harris bill were
.Arthur- Fleming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization
and Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Energy
Resources, the Federal Power Commission, and the American
Petroleum Institute, which represented the independent producers.

After Wiley's consumer group visited with Eisenhower

in

1955, Fleming adamantly defended his Committee's

Ma~ch

recommendation.

"All of these [consumer] arguments bear upon

the likelihood of unreasonable price increases," he observed.
They ignore the availability of the antitrust laws to
deter and break up combinations of companies for the
purpose of increasing prices in interstate commerce.
They ignore or belittle the basic advantage of unregulated commodity prices in a free market and the national policy against Government interference with
private enterprise.
Jerome Kuykendall, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission,
also endorsed the Fulbright-Harris bill.

He marshalled six

reasons why independent producers should not be regulated by
the FPC.

First, natural gas is a resource, like coal and oil,

and they are not regulated.

Therefore: "If one of these fuels

is to be subjected to regulation, they all should be."

Sec-

ond, since natural gas is not a public utility, the laws of
competition--not regulation--ought to be allowed full play.
"We [the FPC]," Kuykendall said, "are of the opinion that the
gas producing industry does not have the characteristics of
public utilities which must and should be monopolies, and is
the type of industry in which competition or any unfair compe- ...:, t_i ti on., _if any, should and can be dealt with by proper appli-

cation of our antitrust laws."

Third, such a law would eliminate
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the cloud of financial uncertainty presently hanging over the
industry.

Fourth, since the supply of domestic natural gas

might diminish because regulation would destroy incentive
for gas exploration, some industries in the North and Midwest might find themselves compelled to move to the natural
gas producing states unless this bill is enacted.

Otherwise

this trend could have a devastating effect on the economy of
the Northern and Midwestern states.

Fifth, "the fixing of

rates of producers for gas sold in interstate commerce for
resale will inevitably conflict with the recognized power of
the States to regulate producers for purposes of conservation."
Finally: "Ye [the FPC] believe that a sound fuel policy is
essential to a robust and expanding internal economy and to
the successi'ul development of the national defense. 11

Commis-

sioner Draper, who accepted the arguments of the consumer
advocates, was the lone dissenter from the Commission's official views.

"This seller's market situation," Draper main-

tained, "is aggravated by the fact that, generally speaking,
neither the distributing companies nor the consumers are in a
position to bargain directly with the producers who are the
ultimate suppliers of natural gas." 1 9
The American Petroleum Institute (API) was delegated the
job of bringing the producers' case before the Federal Government and the general public.

After the Circuit Court handed

19Memo, March 31, 1955, Arthur S. Fleming to Hauge, Central Files, OF-140-A, Box 725, Eisenhower Library; House Hearings, 1955, 12-15; Congressional Record, .84th Cong., 2d Sess.,
v.
' part
, (Jan. 17, 1956), 64s-;-?64-66.

down its decision in the Phillips case, the API established
two ad hoc committees designed to encourage remedial legislation.

The General Gas Committee became the API lobbying

agent and the Natural Gas and Oil Resources Committee was
organized to educate the public about the problems plaguing
the industry due to the Phillips decision.

Dr. John Boat-

wright, chief economist for Standard Oil of Indiana, directed
the research activities of the General Gas Committee.

Testi-

fying before the House and Senate Commerce Committees, Boatwright contended that while the natural gas market was widening, the supply of natural gas might be greatly diminished in
the future because there will be no incentive to explore for
the resource.

He cited one case in particular and concluded:

"Regulation, as practiced, did stifle exploratory efforts to
discover new [natural gas] resources."

This was just one of

the many arguments employed to persuade congressmen to the
merits of the Fulbright-Harris bill.

Business Week displayed

the same reasoning: "Government control [of the natural gas
industry] would only impose unnecessary restraints and would

run counter to the sound principle that government should not
attempt to do what private industry can do better. 1120
The opponents of federal regulation also obtained support
from influential organizations outside the industry.
20

.

The

Carper, Lobbying, 8, 12; Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., lst Sess., Natural
Gas Act (1955) 4 120-227 [hereafter referred to as Senate Hearings, 19551; "Industry Can Do It Better," Business Week, 132?
(Feb. 5, 1~55), 144.
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American Cattlemen's Association viewed federal regulation of
the natural gas industry as a dangerous precedent.

If the

Federal Government could regulate this resource, it reasoned,
then someday it might decide to regulate all American industires, including livestock.

Better to stop the government

now before it gets out of hand.
agreed wholeheartedly.

The American Farm Bureau

The National Wool Growers Association

loudly protested the implications of the Phillips decision.
The Association felt that a statenent redefining the powers
of the Federal Power Commission would also "clearly and firmly
state that neither that agency nor any other of the Federal
Government shall have the power to encroach upon the prerogatives and long-established practices of the respective States
nor upon the intrinsic and inalienable rights of individual
citizens, nor to fix prices in any competitive busin-ess. 1121
Despite its well-chartered course, the Fulbright-Harris
bill did not find an altogether clear road ahead.

The House

Commerce Committee reported out the bill without any changes.
After a motion for recommittal was narrowly defeated, the bill
passed by only six votes.

The proponents of the bill now re-

doubled their efforts for the expected fight in the Senate.
Not everyone, however, interpreted the narrow victory in the
House as a danger sign for the gas producers.

Noting little

public response to the bill, Commonweal thought the "chances
of defeating the measure would be greatly enhanced if somehow
21 The opinions of these organizations.can be found in
House Hearings; ·1955,.523-25; Senate Hearings, 1955, 1453.
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the consuming public would be induced to take part .. "

And the

Case scandal did· ~exactly that. 22
Unexpectedly, in the midst of the debate on the FulbrightHarris bill, Senator Case, a conservative Republican from
South Dakota, informed his colleagues of his intention to vote
""1against the pending measure.

He revealed that a 1

yer had

contributed twenty-five hundred dollar bills to his re-election campaign.

He did not charge, however, that the money was

a bribe; after all, he was already going to vote for the bill
anyway.

But because of the size of the contribution and the

relative anonymity of the donor, Case simply could not vote
for the measure.

"The point at which I object, ••• ," the Sena-

tor explained, "is that of doing something so valuable to
those interested in natural gas that they advance huge sums
of money as a down payment so to speak, on the profits they
expect to harvest."

Obviously piqued by Case's disclosure,

Senator Fulbright, the sponsor of the bill, badgered Case to
divulge the name of the individual who had given the money to
his campaign.

Fulbright sharply drew his point:

••• To come in here and use this example of malfeasance
of alleged supporters of the bill without any knowledge
of who they are and whom they represent leaves us in
a very peculiar position. There is necessarily suspicion around with references to any Senator who supports
the bill, because the Senator from South Dakota himself
has changed his position because of the offer of a bribe-22House of Representatives, 84th Cong., lst Sess., Report
N. 992 (June 28, 1955); Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess., v. 101, part 9 (July 28, 1955), 11921-30; "Threat to the
Consumers," Commonweal, 62 (Aug. 12, 1955), 461. The House
vote was nonpartisan as in the offshore oil case. 86 Democrats
and 123 Republicans voted for the bill and 136 Democrats and 67
Republicans opposed it. Generally speaking, the votes could be
broken down according to consumer/producer state interest.
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A couple of days later Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and
Minority Leader William Knowland introduced a joint resolution to establish a committee to investigate Case's disclosure.
The investigative committee, headed by Walter F. George
of Georgia, was composed of senior members of the Senate.
The Committee found there had been no attempted bribery but
did determine "galloping irresponsibility" on the part of
the donor.

George's committee suggested that a thorough study

of the Federal Lobbying Act, Federal Corrupt Practices Act,
and the election laws should be undertaken.

A Federal Grand

Jury was not as lenient with the donor, however.

The defen-

dants pleaded guilty to violating the Federal Lobbying Act
and received fines.
the entire incident.

Ironically, there had been no need for
Fulbright's bill would have passed the

Senate easily.

The scandal now cast a long shadow over the
political atmosphere. 2 3
When the Senate Commerce Committee reported out the producers' bill, the Council of Local Gas Companies, quickly surmising that the Fulbright forces had the necessary votes,
wisely decided to attempt to modify the bill through amendment.

The floor managers of the bill adopted a strategy of

23For a fuller explanation of the intricacies and ramifications of the Case scandal see Engler, Politics of Oil, 40814; Carper, LobbyinF, 36-39. Congressional Record, 84th Con~,
2d Sess., v. 102, part 2 (Feb. 3, 1956), 1963-64, 1996; ~tng.
Rec., Ibid., Feb. 6, 1956, 2009-10; Senate, Select Cammi. ee
for Contribution Investigation, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Report
1?24 (April ?, 1956); "Gas Bill Lobby's Tangled Trails: An
Inept Neff's Path Can Now Be Mapped," Life, 40 (I-larch 26,
1956), 32-33; New York Times, Dec. 15,--r9)6, 1.
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opposing all such amendments.

Senator John Pastore of Rhode

Island proposed that a provision be inserted in the bill
stipulating that the FPC ought to take into consideration the
interests of the consumer as well as a reasonable market price.
Fulbright answered that the Federal Power Commission was already commanded by law to consider the consumers' interests
by testing "the reasonableness of the provisions of the contract as they relate to existing and future prices."

Senator

Douglas• amendment would have freed "the small producers of
natural gas from all regulation," and would have retained
"regulation :for the approximately 200 large producers."

Had

Douglas• amendment been accepted the .bill would have been re·turned to the House, where it no longer enjoyed majority support.

Both the Pastore and Douglas amendments were d,efeated.

The pressure put on the senators was great.

For example, Sena-

tors Pat McNamara (D-Mich.) and George Aiken (R-Vt.) declared
they had never experienced such pressure.

On the same day

Johnson and Knowland introduced their resolution to investigate the Case episode, the Senate voted 53 to 38 for the bill.
The

strategy had worked.
on the White House. 24
no-am~nd.ment

All eyes now focussed

Although the President had not publicly committed himself to the bill, it was generally agreed he would sign it.
24
..
.
Carper, Lobbying, 34; Congressional Record, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess., v. 102, part 2 (Feb. 6, 1956), 2064-6?, 2074-75, 2096;
New York Times, Jan. 18, 24; Feb. l, 12; Feb. 7, 1956, l; "The
President's V~to," Commonweal, 63 (March 2, 1956), 560. The
vote was: 30 Republic~ns and 23 Democrats for; 14 Republicans
and 24 Democrats opposed.
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Oren Harris urged Eisenhower to sign it.

"I sincerely hope,

Mr. President," he· wrote, "that you will not be persuaded by
the propaganda, the distortion of the facts and the unfortunate event of the Senator Case matter."

Representative Char-

les Halleck (R-Ill.) agreed that the Case affair "should certainly not be permitted to cloud the issue."

But 1956 was a

political year, and Eisenhower vetoed the measure.

In the

veto message Eisenhower said: "I believe I would not be discharging my own duty were I to approve this legislation before
the activities in question have been fully investigated by the
Congress and the Department of Justice."

Nevertheless, Eisen-

hower noted that he agreed with the principle of the bill.
Commonweal complimented the President on his action.

"Defeat

of the measure," .it said, "is; therefore, a sort of political
muscle resulting from the President's determination to defend
'the integrity of governmental processes.'"
of Newsweek was not so admiring.

Henry Hazlitt

"President Eisenhower's

veto of the natural-gas bill was confused, irrelevant, and
political blunder," he inveighed.

"It cannot be defended
logically'· constitutionally, or economically. u 2 5
Shortly after the veto the White House quietly sent out

word to Southwestern oilmen that the Administration would
2

~eb. 13, 1956, Harris to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF140-C, Box 726, Eisenhower Library; Personal and Confidential,
Feb. 13, 1956, Hallack to Adams, Persons, Morgan, Gerald Morgan Papers, Box 20, Eisenhower Library; House Document 342,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 20, 1956); "The President's Veto,"
Commentary, 63 (March 2, 1956), 560; Henry Hazlitt, "That Gas
~ill Veto," Newsweek., 47 (March 12, 1956), 88; "For Gas, Freedom--With Strings, 11 Business Week, 1380 (Feb. 11, 1956), 34.

120

support a gas bill protecting the consumer and reconciling
the difference between producers and distributors.

In his

Budget Message of January 195?, Eisenhower told Congress that
"legislation freeing gas producers from public utility-type
regulation is essential."

To facilitate matters, Gerald Mor-

gan, a White House aide, asked the Chairman of the FPC to
draft a bill conforming to the requirements of the President's
veto message, and harmonizing the interests of the producers,
distributors, and pipelines.

When Kuykendall discovered he

could not do it unaided, the FPC chairman conferred with Randall LeBoeuf, who had been-a leading spokesman for the utility
distributors opposing the Fulbright-Harris bill, William Tarver,
a former member of the FPC staff and presently employed with
a pipeline company, and David
producers.

T~

Sea~ls,

who had supported the

When critics later charged that consumers were

not represented at these secret meetings, Kuykendall defended
himself: "I got 3 extremely able men from those 3 segments of
the industry (producer, pipeline, distributor), and I believe
that among those the consumer interests were adequately represented."

When the head of the Brooklyn Union Gas Company

asked him to step out of the picture because a separate indus-

try group aiming at the same objectives had been previously
formed, Kuykendall complied with his wishes.

In the next ses-

sion of Congress, Representative Oren Harris introduced a new
bill, outlawing the escalator clause and stipulating that producers had to. prove their rates were reasonable if the F.PC or
a third party challenged them.

The Federal Power Commission
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and all three segments of the industry supported this revised
bill.

This time LeBoeuf testified in favor of the legislation.

\lb.ile the bill was reported out of committee it never reached
a vote.

Once again the Administration decided the time had

not come for such a law.

A bill of this type never did pass
under Eisenhower's presidency. 26
The natural gas controversy involved all aspects of the
American political and judicial system.

But for the sake of

a scandal, the Natural Gas Act would have been amended in
1956.

The offshore oil and natural gas controversies followed

much the same routes.

In one case the Supreme Court was over-

turned by Congress; in the other the.high court's decision
stood only because a scandal made it politically impropitious
for the President to sign the Fulbright-Harris bill.

But the

natural gas controversy highlighted some new questions.

Kuy-

kendall had worked with representatives of the industry to
write a bill which would have diminished the regulatory powers of his own commission.

Many observers seriously questioned

whether his activities had been in keeping with the statutory
independence of such commissions from outside entanglement and
interference.

When he came up for renomination, Kuykendall

2611 No Gas Relief," Business Week, 1401 (July 7, 1956),
31; "Gas Frets over FPC, 11 Business Week, 1438 (March 23, 1957),
48; House of Representatives, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Report
No. 83?; House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., (1957), 2 parts,
Natural Ga:s Act Regulation of Producers' Prices), 101, 126-30,
;
ongress e s New Na ura
as 1 ,
usiness Week, 1442
(April 20, 1957), 46. Seals had testified in favor of the
Fulbright-Harris bill; cf. Senate Hearings, 1955, 69-71.
Engler, Politics of Oil, 326-29, 415-16.
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had to answer this among other questions.

Meanwhile, a new

competitive energy resource, atomic energy, also demanded
legislative and executive attention.

"

-

CHAPrER V
LEWIS STRAUSS, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE JCAE
When America emerged from the Second World War the newest
form of energy, atomic power, occupied a unique position
among the country's resources.

Because of its military impor-

tance atomic energy became the exclusive monopoly of the Federal Government.

This monopoly meant the application of

nuclear energy to peaceful domestic purposes was regulated
to secondary importance.

By 1953, however, industry was de-

manding access to this new power resource.
of a new industry awaited.

The development

While its impact upon the Ameri-

can. economy during the fifties was negligible, the potential
economic importance of atomic energy for industrial use was
obvious.

But as the Federal Government loosened its grip,

several policymaking problems developed.

During the fifties,

the political mechanism by which domestic nuclear energy
would be regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the
Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), and
the Yhite House took definite shape. 1
The Atomic Energy Commission stood out among other agencies in the maze of federal bureaucracy.

Most of the AEC's

1 Philip Mullenbach, Civilian Nuclear Power: Economic Uses
and Policy Formation (The Twentieth Century Fund, New York,
1963), 4; Harold Vatter, The U.S. Economy in the 1950's (Norton & Co., New York, 1963), lO-ll.
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business was shrouded in secrecy and devoted almost entirely
to military phases of atomic energy.

As long as the atom re-

mained a monopoly of the Federal Government the AEC did not
have or need a political constituency; in a sense, the Commission was above politics.

But once the Federal Government

consented to release the atom for peaceful domestic purposes
the AEC found itself cut adrift in the midst of a political
thunderstorm. 2
The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy was
also in the eye of that storm.

Among congressional commit-

tees, the JCAE, established in 1946, enjoyed special benefits.

The JCAE, for example, was the only joint committee

granted legislative authority; the other nine joint committees served only investigative, study, or housekeeping
chores.

Besides its legislative functions, the JCAE also

Fur-

exercised the customary investigative and study duties.

thermore, the joint committee, by its nature, had singular
legislative powers.

Ordinarily, if unacceptable legislation

were reported out by a committee in one branch of Congress,
the parallel committee in the other house could amend it.
Such was not the case with the JCAE.

Once the Joint Committee

reported out a bill, all avenues, short of amending it on the
floor of Congress or actually defeating the bill,

we~e

closed.

2 Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government of the
Atom: The Inte~ration of Powers (New York,-r9b3), 75-76; H. L.
Nieburg, "The 'isenhower AEC and Congress: A Study in Executive-Legislative Relations," Midwest Journal of Political Sci~ (May, 1962), vol. VI, No. 2, 115~48.
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Nevertheless, one important limitation was placed on the Joint
Committee's legislative authority.

Until 1954, the Committee

was not empowered to authorize the construction or acquisition
of new atomic facilities.

The JCAE thus worked closely with

the House and Senate appropriations committees.

It is easy

to understand why the JCAE jealously guarded its legislative
prerogatives and independence.3
Since the committee was prestigious, congressmen naturally sought membership on it.

An examination of the member-

ship of the Joint Committee reveals, however, that electoral
constituency interest often played a large role.

The loca-

tions of the original atomic installations were determined
solely by technical requirements, not constituency interests.
But a.s these installations became integrated with the economies
of the states and regions where they were located, congressmen from these areas naturally gravitated to the JCAE.

An

AEC laboratory or plant could mean large government contracts
and jobs, a political as well as an economic inducement.

This

is not to say that all states possessing AEC facilities obtained representation on the committee.

Among those in the

fifties best reflecting this constituency concern, however,
were Senators Clinton Anderson (Los Alamos and Sandia), Henry
Jackson (Hanford), Albert Gore (Oak Ridge), and Representatives3Rosenthal and ·Green, Government of the Atom, 26, 12?;
Morgan Thomas, in collaboration with Robert M. Northrup,
Atomic En.er~ and Congress (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan
l?ress, 1956 , 17-20. Since the JCAE worked with important
secret in.formation it was highly unlikely any JCAE-sponsored
bill would be defeated. The chances for amending legislation
were poor.
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Chet Holifield and Craig Hosmer (Lawrence Radiation Laboratory
and Stanford linear acceleration), and Melvin Price (Argonne).
Throughout the fifties these congressmen fought tenaciously
to preserve and occasionally to expand the JCAE's jurisdiction over the AEC. 4
Since the AEC had no political constituency and the JCAE
closely identified with Commission activities, the Joint Committee became the AEC's public apologist.

Whenever the AEC

underwent public criticism, members of the JCAE defended it.
Realizing the significance of this marriage Gordon Dean, the
first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, nurtured a
close relationship between the Commission and the Joint Committee.

According to Section 15(b) of the McMahon Act, the

basic atomic energy law, the Commission. was ordered to "keep
the joint committee [JCAE] fully and currently informed with
respect to the Commission's activities."

For the most part

the AEC complied with this provision as, indeed, the JCAE
took its responsibility seriously.

In fact, the Committee

came to regard itself as a full policymaking partner, and
not just as a "watchdog" over the AEC.

"Fundamental policy,

though normally originating within the [Atomic Energy] Commission tends to be made with the advice and consent of the
congressional committee [JCAE]," Senator Henry M. Jackson, a
4 Harold Orlans, Contractin5 for Atoms. A Stud~ of Public
Policy Issues Posed by the Atomic Energy Commission s Contractin for Research Develo ment and Mana erial Services (The
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1
, l
, 164;
Rosenthal and Green, Government of the Atom, 35.
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member of the JCAE explained.

"And in the case of certain

vital policy decisions, the urging from the Committee has
played so powerful a role that it can be said the Committee
made the decisions, with the advise and consent of the executive branch."

From 1946 until 1953, the JCAE and AEC lived

in a harmonious relationship.

But between 1953 and 1958, the

years when Lewis Strauss reigned over the Commission, the JCAE
vigorously resisted the tendency toward executive domination
of the AEC.

The Joint Committee simply opposed any divorce.

'While the turf over which the battle took place appeared to
be the public versus private power issue, the real struggle
concerned which branch of the government, the JCAE or the
'White House, would predominate over AEC activities.5
The executive-legislative struggle arose largely out of
the ambiguous nature of the McMahon Act (1946).

The Joint

Congressional Committee, as.we have seen, enjoyed unique
status and independence in Congress, thus jealously guarding
its responsibilities and prerogatives.

But the relationship

of the Executive to the Atomic Energy Commission was less explicit.

The Act made the AEC relatively independent of the

'White House.

The Commissioners and the General Manager of

the AEC were appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate.

Once appointed, however, a commissioner

5Morgan Thomas, Atomic Ener~, ch. V ("Defense of Agency
and Program"), 118-40; Orlans, l ; Henry Jackson, "Congress
and the Atom," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (November, 1953), v. 290, 76-81; Nieburg, "The Eisenhower AEC a:11d Congress," 115.
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could be dismissed by the President only for reasons specified
by the McMahon Act.

Thus, the Commission was intended to

exercise a degree of autonomy.

The nub of the problem was

that while the McMahon Act directed the President to oversee
the Commission's work relating to fissionable materials and
atomic weapons, the mechanism by which this should be done
was not made plain.
branch to devise. 6

Rather it was left to the executive

When Lewis Strauss became Chairman of the AEC in 1953,
he stepped into a crossfire between the White House and the
JCAE.

As a member of the Taft-Hoover wing of the Republican

Party, Strauss was unpopular with many Democrats from the
start.

He and Taft had begun their public careers together

when Herbert Hoover, the £uture president, headed the Food
Administration during World War·r.

As each pursued his own

career, the three men remained close friends over the years.
When Taft sought the presidential nomination in 1952, both
Strauss and Hoover supported him.

Born and educated in Char-

leston, West Virginia, Strauss rose to prominence in business
circles as a partner in the finance firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Co.

In 1946, Truman offered him a position on the newly created
AEC, a position he accepted after consulting with Taft.

After

the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949, the
loss of the American atomic monopoly was a cause of concern
6 Morgan Thomas, Atomic Energy, 12-13. Also, it ought to
be pointed out that the Presi4ent appointed all the members
of the General Ad~isory Committee of the AEC.
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for many.

Consequently, Strauss, along with Gordon Dean,

recommended the United States undertake construction of the
hydrogen bomb.

Truman accepted their controversial advice.

Strauss later resigned from the Commission and returned to
business.

'When Eisenhower took over, he named Strauss his

executive assistant for consultation on atomic energy matters,
and not long afterwards, nominated him chairman of the AEC.
As Chairman of the AEC Strauss occupied a politically sensitive position.

He was head of a relatively independent Oem-

mission with firm ties to an influential congressional committee; on the other hand, Eisenhower made him a member of
the National Security Council and a Special Advisor to the
President.

Inexorably, a political tug-of-war between the

JCAE and the w"hite House resulted.

The fact that the Demo-

crats controlled the JCAE after 1955 only exacerbated these
tensions.?
By Eisenhower's inauguration, industry had already
mounted pressure for relaxation of the federal monopoly on
atomic patents and source material.

Until 1950 the AEC had

been involved in only one nonmilitary project and that had
been discontinued.

Later the Monsanto Chemical and Dow

Chemical-Detroit Edison industrial groups introduced proposals
?Nieburg,"The Eisenhower AEC and Congress," 122, 129;
Harold Wolfe, Herbert Hoover: Public Servant and Leadershi
of the Loyal Opposition "New Yor ,
,
; Lewis
Strauss, Men and Decisions (New York, 1962), 213, 332,-ch. II;
New York Times, June 24, I; June 25, 26; June 28, 36; March 8,
1953, l; Duncan Norton-Taylor, "The Controversial Mr. Strauss,"
Fortune, 51 (January, 1955), 164-66; Anne w. Manks, "Washington Notes," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, IX (April, 1953),
84.
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for industrial participation in domestic development of the
atom for electire power.

Finally, in 1951, the Atomic Energy

Commission initiated the Industrial Participation Program,
by permitting the AEC's reactor program to be studied by
businesses concerned with the atom.
dies resulted.

Two rounds of such stu-

The National Security Resources Board recom-

mended, in December 1952, that the McMahon Act be revised to
allow for participation of private interests in the development of atomic energy.

"Direct the Atomic Energy Commission,

in consultation with the Department of the Interior and the
Federal Power Commission, as well as other interested agencies," it advised, "to draft for submission to the Congress
an amendment to the [McMahon] act specifying the conditions-including patent rights, availability of fissionable materials and allocation of costs as between industrial power and
weapons--under which private interests could operate commercially to benefit from their atomic power research, development and production."

The President's Advisory Committee on
Government Organization made a similar suggestion. 8
Eisenhower heeded this advice and, in February 1954,

forwarded a special message to Congress recommending amend- ·
ments to the McMahon Act.

Aside from certain foreign policy

changes, the President felt the time had now come for "broadened participation in the development of peacetime uses of
8ttorgan Thomas, Atomic En.er51, 142; New York Time~, December 23, 1952; President's Advisory Committee on Government
Organization, April 11, 1953, draft of Memorandum No. 17,
Eisenhower Library, Central Files, OF-103.
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energy in the United States."

l\ . , • \ ' " '

, 1

"But," he added, "in

undertaking, the enterprise, ini tia ti ve and competitive

'•a

of individuals and groups within our free economy are

,, , ..~ \"t. t,

.,..t<iit,lttd to assure the greatest efficiency and progress at the
~.._,~t

cost to the public."

.~l•wise,

The. Atomic Energy Commission,

sent two draft bills to Congress.

The Chairman of

Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Represen-

~!~

w.

:.t.~ive
~i!ls

Sterling Cole (R-NY) refused to even consider thes.e

because they arrogated too much authority to the PresiEven though a Republican, Cole was not about to let

!.~=.t.

-::.:.e !Jhite House usurp any of the JCAE's power.
:~le

:a.!l

Consequently,

and Senator Bourke Hickenlooper. of Iowa, the Vice Chairof the Committee, drafted their own bill.

The intention

1: the Cole-Hickenlooper bill was to preserve the authority
:! the JCAE while achieving the Administration's basic objec"!!. Tes. 9

The Cole-Hickenlooper bill had three main provisions.
,..... !'at, the AEC would be authorized to release information to
allies of the United States for the design and develop-

-:·~
~~;.t

ot defense plans and training of personnel, although

.~:~rmation

regarding the design or manufacture of weapons

.,..,. ... 1d not be made available.
•4'

Secondly, the AEC also would

'1llowed to give data to its Allies regarding "industrial

"tt" other applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes."
9Public Papers of the Presidents, 1954, 260-69; Strauss,
nnd Decisions, 313; Rosenthal and Green, Government of the
' <:.::it 13-14, 124-25; New York Times, .April 16, 1954, 1.
:~·i.
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Fissionable materials for industrial use could be released.
Finally, the bill aimed at creating "a great new industry in
atomic energy" by permitting and encouraging private industry
to own and operate atomic reactors and power plants under
regulation by the Atomic Energy Commission. 10
Generally, the bill met with the approval of industry
but not with the constituent groups of the New Deal coalition.

The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association

complained that the bill would legalize a return to the days
of Samuel Insull and the "power trusts."

In effect, the Cole-

,

Hickenlooper bill, the NRECA asserted, would create new utility holding companies, an evil the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act of 1935 had attempted to destroy.

Agreeing with

the NRECA, the·c.I.O envisioned the bill making "inevitable
the creation of a giant monopoly in the production of atomic
power •••• "

In other words, the opponents of the bill feared

that if industry owned its source material and had exclusive
patents they would monopolize the domestic use of atomic energy.

Trumpeting the virtues of free enterprise, industry, of

course, was especially eager for passage of the Cole-Hickenlooper bill.
Inc.~

E. H. Dixon, President of Middle South Utilities,

and an influential member of the Edison Electric Insti-

tute, contended that if "the superior position of the United
States" in atomic energy were to be maintained, it would have
to be done "in terms of industrial capacity and industrial
10ttorgan Thomas, Atomic Energz, 149-153·
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development."

"In this respect," he went on, "the present

[McMahon] act operates in reverse; complete Government monopoly tends to inhibit industrial participation, the very
level upon which our superiority has been demonstrated in
other fields and can be maintained with respect to the atom."

4

The United States Chamber of Commerce felt that relaxation
of the government's monopoly would encourage development of
"the science of atomic power."

Furthermore, Walker Gisler,

President of the Detroit Edison Co., thought the bill should
permit private enterprise to build and operate atomic energy
plants, to acquire, own and dispose of fissionable and source
materials, to sell and distribute end products and by-products produced in an atomic energy facility, to obtain licenses from the AEC for such work, and to have the normal patent
and trade-secret protection subject, of course, to full disclosure to the Commission for its own use and military purposes.

The industrialists had one added advantage; they re-

ceived the support of the Atomic Energy Commission. 11
The Commission unanimously endorsed the Cole-F..ickenlooper
bill, noting it "would carry out the basic objectives of the
President's message in this area."

The AEC, in fact, encour-

aged development of atomic energy by industry.

Reflecting the

arguments of industry, the Commission told the JCAE: "Putting
this resource to work, through continued Government development
11

u.s. Congress, Joint Congressional Committee
Energy, S.
2 and H.R. 8862 To Amend the Atomic Ener
of 1946,
rd Congress, d Sess.
,
Parts,
313, 360, 495-96, [hereafter cited as JCAE (1954).]

'
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where necessary, and through private industry, to strengthen
the economy--to create power for industry and homes, open up
jobs, create new sources of revenue--will most quickly and
securely achieve and spread its benefits. 1112
Before atomic energy could be opened to industry it was
first necessary to iron out certain technical and political
problems.

Specifically, questions involving ownership of

patents and source material, preference to public power groups,
and the "principal officer" clause had to be answered.

The

Cole-Hickenlooper bill would have provided for normal patent
practices.

Those who agreed with this provision envisaged

such patent rights

encour~ging

technology and science.

In

industry to develop atomic

order'~o

permit a reasonably wide

d:i.ssemination of' the knowledge now accumulated in the field,n
the American Bar Association and the Atomic Energy Commission
sounded a compromising note by suggesting that a transitional
period of five years would be preferable to instituting the
traditional patent laws right away.

Alfred Iddles, President

of the Babcock & Wilcox Co., which manufactured steam-generating units, said that a transition period would be amenable
to him.

Nevertheless, there was no doubt he preferred the

traditional patent provisions.

" ••• It happens," he said,

"that all of my competitors are already in the business, and
if I can beat them out in doing the next job in competition
better, and get a patent on it, I ought to be able to do so."
12

~-'

.

563, 575, 615.
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E. H. Dixon noted that patents had played almost no direct
part in the electric power industry for many decades and that
"it is believed that patents will play a small part, if any,
within the electric power industry itself in the atomic age,
since the industry is one in which profits are limited, and
the patent incentives would necessarily be relatively unimportant."

The American Public Power Association took exception

to this reasoning.

The Association felt the patent provision

in the Cole-Hickenlooper bill was "so obviously designed to

serve individual private interests at the expense of the general welfare as to require their total rejection ••• "

The

National Farmers Union suggested that all atomic patents
should be "nonexclusive" (i.e., available to the entire industry), and the AEC should be empowered to set reasonable
royalty fees.

The National Rural Electric Cooperative Asso-

ciation predicted that electricity rates would increase if
exclusive patents were granted.

"I predict," Clyde T. Ellis

of the NRECA inveighed, "that if Congress yields to the demands of the monopolistic power companies and permits the
granting of exclusive patents ••• the adverse reaction will be
voiced at every farm breakfast table and in every rural ballot
box in the United States." 1 3
The question of ownership of fissionable materials went
straight to the heart of the problem.

The industrialists be-

lieved industry should be allowed to own its own source
l3Ibid., 61, 179, 356, 318-19, 597-99, 648-49; Clyde T.
Ellis, ACIT'ant Step (New York, 1966), 135.
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materials, while opponents fought to have the materials leased
to industry by the Federal Government.

E. H. Dixon cited four

cogent reasons why industry ought to possess the source material.

First, if it leases the material the government woulci

then be in private business "in a very important manner."
Second, the expense for the government would be great.

"Re-

gardless of the needs of the [Federal] Government for special
material and regardless of the status of its finances, it
would have a continuing obligation to spend enormous sums of
money in fulfillment of such a program," Dixon pointed out.
Third, the present system "might tend to discourage the investment of private capital in the industry."

Finally, industry

could conceivably find itself in a dangerous political position.

To wit: a situation could arise in which "a hostile

administration might use the lease device adversely against a
business or businesses for reasons having nothing to do with
the special problems surrounding special material and its
use."

Walker Cisler _pointed out that "with private ownership

the rights of private investors would be more adequately protected."

The National Association of Manufactures and the

.American Bar Association fully concurred with Cisler and Dixon.

The American Public Power Association disagreed, urging

"that controls of fissionable materials contained in the 1946
[McMaho~J

act be not released until adequate knowledge is

available with respect to the production of electric e:b.ergy.li 14

14Ibid., 370, 78, 461, 59, 176-7?.

-
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The line was most clearly drawn on the issue of preference.

The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association

and the National Farmers Union demanded that a clause insuring preference for public bodies be inserted in the bill.
The NREGA wanted the government to build atomic reactors for
the generation of electric power and to market that power
under the preference laws.

"Safeguarding the interest of the

public in the public domain and in the development of publicpower sites," the National Farmers Union added, "goes back
almost to the beginning of our history as· a nation."

Leland

Olds, a former public power advocate on the RPG, also testified in favor of a preference clause.

Walker Gisler, however,

was adamantly opposed to any preferential treatment for public or private bodies.

"I believe that there should be no

preference," he said pointedly.

"I believe it should take

its rightful place in the economic order and that there
[should] be no special preference for the distribution of
atomic generated power as compared to the conventional."
When Representative Holifield asked him if he advocated "a
different system than is now contained in the Federal Power
Act," Cisler responded: "Yes, I believe that is not a fair
situation that now exists.·"

Hence the Gole-Hickenlooper bill

was generally viewed on all sides as an attack on the principle of preference. 1 5
While the issues of ownership of source materials; and
l5Ibid., 82-83, 354-55; Ellis, Giant Step, 135; New York
Times, May 20, 1954, l?.
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patent and preference rights were, by and large, topics that
had filled the air hanging over the public versus private
power dilemma since the Reclamation Act of 1902, the debate
about the "principal officer" clause of the C.ole-Hickenlooper
bill brought a new dimension to the atomic energy controversy.
For the first time the Commission was in open disagreement
over an internal organizational matter.

According to the bili

the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission would henceforth
be designated the principal officer of the Commission.

While

the AEC, in its policy statement to the JCAE, took no official stand on this issue, individual members did.

With re-

gard to regulatory commissions, the First Hoover Commission,
in 194?, had recommended "that all administrative responsibilities be vested in the chairman of the commission."

While

this recommendation had not applied directly to the AEC, Chairman Strauss told the JCAE that the Hoover Commission suggestion,

nonetheless, was applicable to his Commission's manager-

ial problems.

By streamlining its lines of authority, Strauss

believed, the AEC's work would be performed more efficiently.
In responding to a question from Representative Holifield,
Strauss said he approved of the clause because it would be
"an improvement on the existing lack of any delineation of
the duties and responsibilities of the Chairman."

Commissioner

Joseph Campbell, also an Eisenhower appointee, sided with
Strauss.

Commissioners Eugene Zuckert, Thomas E. Murray, and

Henry Dewolf .Smyth, all Truman appointees., however, took exception to this clause.

Because Strauss was both a Presidential
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advisor and chairman of the AEC, they believed such a provision would, in fact, reduce the Commission to presidential
subservience.

"To me, the fact that the Chairman does have a

dual capacity," Zuckert emphasized, "makes it all the more
imperative that every step possible be taken to preserve and
promote for the long run the substance of the Commission concept for the direction of the responsibilities entrusted to
it."

~he

Democratic members of the JCAE obviously agreed

with these three commissioners.

Representative Holifield was

?determined to have this clause deleted from the bill while in
committee and, if it was not, he would fight it on the floor
of the House.

Eventually, the Committee compromised and

changed the designation from "principal officer" to "official
spokesman."

Nonetheless, this dispute was only the first
leak in the dike. 1 6
Once the hearings ended, Representatives Holifield and
Price submitted a resolution in the House.

Describing the

proposed changes in the Atomic Energy law as "premature and
ill-advised, .. they cautioned against any action that would
"entail huge Government subsidies to private firms or restrict
the participation, through patent devices or otherwise, to a
small segment of industry."

The Joint Committee, neverthe-

less, unanimously reported the bill out.

16The Commission on the Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Re ulatory Commissions: A Re ort to
the Con"-'.ress (Narch, 1949), 5- ; J.CAE 1 54 , 8 - , 3 ,
5,
So6, 79~; New York Times, June 5, 1954, l; Rosenthal and Green,
Government of the Atom, 14?; Thomas, Atomic Ener~, 16?-?4;
Warren Unna, "Dissension in the AEC," Atlantic,9 (May, 195?),

39.

_~,~..,·-

140
Public power advocates mobilized support in an effort to
defeat the bill in the House and Senate.

In July 1954, a

group of consumer, labor and farm organization leaders accidently met while individually attempting to secure Senate
opposition to the Cole-Hickenlooper bill.

The group, com-

posed of Alex Radin of the American Public Power Association,
Dr. Clay Cochran, a research economist for the National Rural
Electric Cooperative Association, George Taylor, director
of the National Hells Canyon Association, Angus McDonald of
the National Farmers Union, and Donald Montgomery of the UAW,
decided to find a senator willing to lead the fight against
the bill.

After approaching Senator· Warren Magnuson, who was

"willing to go along" if they could "round up a few more,"
they finally landed on Senator Lister Hill of Alabama.

Hill

bluntly told them that the public power senators would do all
they could but there were not enough of them.
get the word out to the people," he counseled.

"You've got to
"Tell then'. if

we don't get their support, this bill is going through. 11

The

group did its best; the Dixon-Yates scandal, however, directed
more public attention to the issues than any concerted effort
could possibly ever have. 1?

l?con~ressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., v. 99
(July 29,954), 10427-28; New York Times, July l, 1954, 13;
Ellis, A Giant Step, 13?-38; Thomas, Atomic Ener~, 148; Barrow Lyons, Tomorrow's Birthri ht: A Political an Economic .
Intertretation o Our a ura
esources New or ,
,
33o-3. For the Cole-Hickenlooper hill cf. "Proposed Atomic
Energy Act Amendments," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 10
(June, 1954), 227, 240. The original five public power groups
organized the Electric Consumers Information Committee to
bring new farm and labor organizations into the fight. The
Public Affairs Institute did the research for the Committee.
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The Tennessee Valley Authority had stood out in the minds
o:t opponents of public power as a glaring example of "creep-

ing socialism."

While few seriously entertained the thought

of destroying the TVA, many were nevertheless determined that
Authority expansion must be halted.

The Eisenhower partner-

ship policy was particularly suited to that end.
The new Administration's hostility to the TVA was clearly
demonstrated publicly and privately.

In a speech at Mem-

phis, Tennessee, in October 1952, Eisenhower credited the
Tennessee Valley Authority with making a substantial contribution to the life of the Valley.

Nevertheless, he did not

think it should be looked upon "as a. single pattern for such
development in other regions."

Rather, he envisioned a

Federal Government "devoted to the principle of decentralized
government and to the principle of states' rights, as well as
to full development of our resources."

This was, as it turned

out, a subtle hint to the Valley; no further expansion of the
TVA would be permitted.

At a cabinet meeting in July 1953,

Eisenhower exclaimed, "By God, if ever we could do it, before
we leave here, I'd like to see us sell the whole thing [the
TVA], but I suppose we can't go that far."

The President

again reiterated his opinion of such valley authorities when
he dedicated the McNary Dam in September 1954.

Lewis Strauss

and Joseph Dodge, Director of the Btireau of the Budget, shared
Eisenhower's convictions on this subject.
poses

Gabrie~

For cosmetic pur-

Hauge,. a White House aide, advised the Presi-

dent to use some term other than "creeping socialism" to
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describe the TVA.

But Hauge st:-essed that he took "no exception to the ideas expressed" by the phrase. 18

By the end of the Second World War the power requirements
of the Tennessee Valley had increased considerably •. Besides
business and municipal needs, the Valley now had huge atomic
energy and military installations requiring large amounts of
power.

After an initial defeat by a Republican congress, the

Democratic congress in 1949 voted a new plant for the area and
an attempt in 1952 to cut TVA appropriations was repelled.
These difficult days, however, were only barb ingers of what was
to come .when a Republican president and congress assumed power
in 1953. 19

By 1952 the Authority was aware that it would shortly be
unable to supply the needs of its domestic customers due to
overriding defense obligations.

The West Memphis, Arkansas,

area had the most severe problem.

Consequently, the TVA pro-

posed building a plant in Fulton, Tennessee, an area close
enough to supply West Memphis.

The funds for the plant were

requested in the Truman budget of 1952.

Naturally, the request

was opposed by private utilities located in the Fulton area,
particularly the Middle Southern Utilities Company, a holding
18Aaron Wildavsky, Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics
(New Haven, 1962), 17; Eisenhower, speeches in Memphis and
Knoxville, Tennessee, October 15, 1952, Central Files, OF-108E, Box 503, Eisenhower Library; New York Times, October 16,
1952, l; September 23, 1954; Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of
Power (New York, 1963), 152; JCAE (1954), 1035; Sherman Adams,
Pirsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration
tNew York, 1961), 312; Memo, Hauge to Eisenhower, June 22,
1953, Hauge Papers, Box 1, Eisenhower Library.
l9Wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 3-5, 10-15.
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company with
system.

su~sidiaries

on the Western border of the TVA

Edgar H. Dixon, president of Middle Southern, ex-

pressed fear that the TVA would now expand into his company's
domain.

This fear was compounded by the fact that while net

income and common stock dividends rose significantly over a
period of three decades the percentage of power supplied by
private power had decreased from 93.5 to 75.5 percent.

When

he assumed office, Eisenhower decided to postpone action on
the Truman request for TVA funds until the Bureau of the Budget could study the problem.

Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-

Ky) and seven Democratic senators from TVA states, urged the

President not to cut the TVA budget.

Nevertheless, in March

1953, the budget conscious Administration deleted the :FUlton
plant and made other significant cuts in the Authority's bud·;get.

Both Joseph Dodge and Lewis

Strauss felt the Atomic

Energy Commission ought to find a private utility to supply
its Paducah, Kentucky, installation.

In this way, the TVA

could have the additional power it had been supplying that
installation freed for other purposes.

After all, should

this plan fail, the Administration could always request a
supplemental appropriation for the Fulton steam plant.

As

finally worked out, the plan called for the AEC to purchase
·power from a private utility and then to release an equivalent
amount of power to the TVA for the West Memphis area.

Since

the idea initially had been his anyway, Gordon Clapp, Chairman of the TVA Board, agreed to go along with this plan.

On

December 24,-1953, Rowland Hughes of the Bureau of the Budget

1{~4-

told Strauss to begin negotiations with the private utilities. 20
Economically Clapp's plan was particularly alluring to
an Ad.ministration opposed to any increase in the TVA budget.
In addition, TVA's defense and domestic power needs would
also be met.

Politically the plan was equally appealing.

Since Clapp had suggested it originally, the TVA could hardly
protest the scheme.

But the plan contained certain pitfalls

into which the Administration could easily fall if it did not
carefully watch its step.

First, the Administration was now

committed to a specific course of action and could not wait
until new appointments to the TVA Board fell due.

Second, the

White House was in a tricky position: either it contracted
with a private utility or it would have to request a supplemental appropriation for the Fulton plant.

Finally, the bar-

gain warned the private utilities that failure to reach a contract with the Atomic Energy Commission would result in forcing the Administration to support new steam plant funds for
the TVA. 21
In the meantime, the Bureau of the Budget decided to

make "a commercial financial appraisal of [the] TVA."

The

Bureau secured the services of Adolphe H. Wenzell, a vice
2

~Wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 4-5, 16-1?, 20-21, 33-3?; David
A. Frier, Conflict of Interest in the Eisenhower Administration
(Iowa State University Press, 1969), 56; Telephone Memo, Senator Cooper, RB to Stephens, April 30, 1953; letter, Lister
Hill to Eisenhower, April 2, 1953; Hill, Kefauver, Clements,
Eastland, Sparkman, Gore, and Stennis to Eisenhower, May 12,
1953, Central Files, OF-50, Box 234, Eisenhower Library.
21 vildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 4?-48.
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president and director of First Boston Corporation, one of
the nation's largest underwriters of private utility securities.

Wenzell's admitted predisposition against the TVA was

clear in his report.

He recommended four alternatives, three

of which he rejected because they would have caused the breakup of the TVA system and thus the loss of economies important
to the region.

Instead he favored selling the TVA to a new

private corporation.

This way the Authority's power system

would be part of a tax-producing corporation, while the navigation and flood control activities would remain with the
Authority. 22
In 1954, after some initial difficulties, the Middle
Southern Utilities Co. and the Southern Company, a utility
holding company with subsidiaries on the southwestern border
of TVA, made a combined proposal to the AEC.

The two heads

of the companies, Edgar Dixon of Middle Southern and Eugene
A. Yates of Southern, proposed to supply 600,000 kilowatts of
power to the AEC at $200 per kilowatt of capacity •. It was
understood this energy would replace a same amount supplied
by the TVA.

The AEC, however, would be required to reimburse

the two companies "for all taxes of every kind or character."
This contract for replacement power was not unusua1. 2 3
But one of the pitfalls now became apparent.

In March

1954, the TVA and AEC agreed to undertake a joint study of
22 wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 22-28; Memo, Dodge to Adams,
May 11, 1953, Central Files, OF-50, Box 234, Eisenhower Libray.
2 3wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 32, 37-38, 52-55, 59; Frier,
56.
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the Dixon-Yates proposal for the Bureau of the Budget.

The

TVA discovered in this analysis that a private utility would
supply the power to the Authority by way of a contract with
the Atomic Energy Commission.

The TVA could see no reason

why the Commission should act as its agent when the Authority
itself could just as easily negotiate the contract.

In

other words, the TVA now viewed the AEC as simply a front
private power interests.

~or

And the Authority was not wrong.

At the insistence of the Administration, in April

DL~on-

Yates withdrew their first proposal and submitted a new one.
The revised estimates were lower than the previous proposal.
The private power companies and the Administration definitely
wanted to be sure the Authority could not make political capital out of faulty figures in the private utility proposal.
'While the contract received the approval of the Federal Power
Commission and the Army Corps of Engineers, an impasse resulted between the TVA and the Administration. 24
The Tennessee Valley Authority was run by a three-man
Board of Directors.

If the Administration wished to secure a

favorable majority on the Board it either would have to remove two of the commissioners for cause or wait until their
terms expired.

When the Administration came to power it

24wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 72, 77-78, 161-68. The FPC
voted 4-1 for the contract. The majority were Eisenhower
appointees; the dissenting vote came from Calude Draper. Cf.
U.S. Congress, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, 83rd Congress, 2d Sess., Exercise of Statutorb Requirements of Section 164 Atomic Ener
Act of 1954
tilit Contract Between Atomic Ener
Comoission and Hississi l. Va
Genera ing Co~pany 1
,
,
er cite
JCAE, Sec. 164 hearings (1954)•]
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considered dismissing two of the TVA commissioners.

Gordon

Clapp, the vigorous Director of the TVA, was especially a
thorn in the Administration's side because he was an opponent
of the new partnership policy and an astute def ender of the
TVA.

One White House aide asked the Justice Department if

members of the TVA "could be removed from office other than
for cause?"

In the midst of the controversy over the reduced

TVA budget, Sherman Adams sent two significant memos to Dodge.
In one he laconically noted: "If we could ef'f'ect-·some changes
[in the status of the TVA commissioners];.it might be a most
appropriate solution to their TVA expansion program."

On

another occasion, Adams put it bluntly: "Is there any way
within the law for us to dispense with their [the TVA commissioners'] services?"

This was not a frivolous question since

there was a precedent for dismissing a commissioner for cause.
In 1938, Franklin Roosevelt had f'ired Arthur Morgan f'rom the
TVA Board for "contumacy.''

Ironically, Morgan now came to the

defense of Clapp's stewardship.

Yb.en Clapp's term expired

Dodge suggested the Administration look for a man who, among
other things, was "in complete sympathy with the objectives
of the administration ••• "

The White House first thought of

Harry Carbuagh, a successful Chattanooga businessman, who had
the support of the Secretary of the Treasury.

Senator Cooper

opposed Carbaugh on the grounds it "would give the Democrats
in the Congress the chance to dramatize the issue of public
power versus private power when there is no necessity for
such a debate."

l

Preferring·to complete his present work,
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s.

D. Sturgis, Jr., Major General, Chief of the Corps of En-

gineers, asked that his name be withdrawn from consideration.
The Administration finally settled on General Herbert Vogel,
a member of the Corps of Engineers.

From June 1952 to Aug-

ust 1954, Vogel had been chairman of the Arkansas-White-RedBasin Interagency

Committee_~nd

the Division Engineer of the

Southwestern Division of the Corps in Dallas, Texas.

During

his confirmation hearing, Vogel testified, under vigorous
examination by Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee, that he could
"obviously, positively" support the TVA act.

At the sugges-

tion of Senator Cooper, Vogel's confirmation was delayed until after action had been taken on the controversial ColeHickenlooper bill.

In August 1954, the Senate finally con-

firmed Vogel by voice vote.

But the w'hi·te House still faced

an intransigent TVA Board.

The terms of the remaining dissi-

dent commissioners, Harry Curtis and Raymond Paty, would not
expire until 195? and 1960, respectively.

Although the Ad-

ministration need only have removed one member to obtain a
favorable majority, Eisenhower decided against taking a chance
of inflaming an already explosive situation.

But the TVA-

Administration impasse was only part of' the problem.

The

White House was also experiencing serious difficulties with
the AEC. 2 5
2 5wildavsky, Dixon-Yates; Gordon Clapp's ideas on partnership and the TVA can be found in his The TVA: An Approach
to the Development of a Region (University of Chicago Press,
1955), 71-73, 124-25; Memo, undated, Willis to J. Rankin Lee,
Department of Justice; Memo, Adams to Do·dge, May 13, 1953;
Personal Memo, Adams to Dodge, May 20, 1953; Morgan to Eisenhower, March 1, 1954; Memo, Dodge to Adams, January 26, 1954;
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The Administration had chosen the AEC as the agent to
supply the power to the Authority.
pliable enough.

The Commission had seemed

Lewis Strauss was divided between his loyalty

to the White House and his fellow commissioners, but could
be counted on to do the Administration's bidding.

Joseph

Campbell, an Eisenhower appointee, would go along with Strauss.
Commissioners Henry Smyth and Eugene Zuckert probably would
oppose the project.

The balance on the Commission hung with

Thomas Murray, ostensibly an advocate of free enterprise.
In many ways Murray and Strauss bore remarkable resemblances.
Both were wealthy and came from business backgrounds; they
believed in free enterprise.
Dixon-Yates contract.

Nevertheless Murray opposed the

He simply did not believe the AEC

should become needlessly involved in a political controversy
that would "seriously" impair "the nonpolitical character" of
the Commission.

The dissident commissioners reserved their

most stinging criticism for Strauss personally.

Until Janu-

ary 1954, Strauss had been the only member of the AEC aware

ot the potential contract.
negotiations accidently.

The other members discovered the
After a reporter for the Memphis

Willis to Adams, March 18, 1954; Cooper to Adams, April 3,
1954; Cooper to Adams, March 22, 1954; Cooper to Eisenhower,
March 22, 1954; Sturgis to Adams, May 25, 1954; memo, Willis
to Adams, July 16, 1954; in Central Files, OF-50, Box 234,
Eisenhower Library. Irving K. Fox and Isabel Picken, The
U stream-Downstream Controvers in the Arkansas-White-Itea
Basins Survey Inter-Universi~y Case Program,
, 11;
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Public Works, 83rd Cong.,
2d Session, Nomination of Herbert D. Vogel (Aug. 9-10, 1954),
14; Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2d Session, v. 100, Part
11 (August 11, 1954), 13987-988; New York Times, August 11,
1954.
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Press Scimitar inquired about the existence of such a contract, it was discovered that indeed negotiations were going
on.

Until this point the conflict within the Atomic Energy

Commission over the principal officer clause had only been
brewing; now it reached the boiling point.

Before the JCAE

Murray openly accused Strauss of purposely hiding information
about the contract from his fellow commissioners.

"I call

your attention to the fact I am a member of the Atomic Energy
Commission with full authority, full access to all information," he pointedly reminded Strauss, "and I call your attention to the fact that you, as Chairman of this Commission,
took it upon yourself to start considering changing the power
contracts that were in existence by the TVA without consulting with your associates."

In- a letter to the new Director

of the Bureau of the Budget, Rowland Hughes, Commissioners
Smyth and Zuckert expressed dissatisfaction that the contract
"involves the AEC in a matter remote from its responsibilities."

Smyth later resigned from the Commission but not be-

fore helping create a majority opposed to the Dixon-Yates contract.

Consequently, the Administration found itself in th·e

embarrassing position of confronting two Agencies, the TVA
and AEC, with majorities opposed to the contract.

Moreover,

the Administration could not gracefully back out of the contract, for if it did the business community would question
the sincerity of its new partnership program.
tle other

re~ourse,

Left with lit-

in June 1954, Eisenhower ordered the

Atomic Energy Commission to negotiate a contract with Middle
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South Utilities, Inc., and the Southern Company for a steam
plant to be built at West Memphis, Arkansas.

The contract

dispute now became an integrated part of the general debate
over the Cole-Hickenlooper bili. 26
The Cole-Hickenlooper bill and the Dixon-Yates contract
were fully debated by Congress.

Those opposing the contract

charged it was a governmental "give-away" to big business.
Senator Kefauver reflected the thinking of this group. He
•
contended
the people of the Tennessee Valley had every right
to be suspicious of

Y~tes'

intentions, since Yates had been

one of the original opponents of creation of the Tennessee
Valley Authority.

Harking back to the experience of the

1920s, Kefauver also foresaw that if the contract were approved
the privo.ta utilities would again ba in a position to dictate
"their own terms to municipalities and rural electric cooperatives, who have been showing the country how the electric
business can be and should be conducted."

If the TVA were

destroyed--as Kefauver thought the Dixon-Yates contract would,
in effect, do--an increase in electricity bills would ensue.
Finally, the senator saw wider implications than just for the
26Mullenbach, Civilian Nuclear Power, 149; Wildavsky,
Dixon-Yates, 41-42, 81-82, 89; JCAE, Sec. 164, hearings (1954),
283, 280, 292; JCAE hearings (1954), 958. Smyth resigned in
November, 1954. He.had been the lone member of the AEC to
side with Dr. Robert J. Oppenheimer. The Dixon-Yates and
principal officer controversies were also involved. Cf.
"Smyth Resigns from AEC, Libby New Commissioner," Science
News Letter, 66 (September 25, 1954), 200; Duncan HortonTaylor~ 111; "AEC Security Decision," 66 (July 10, 1954),
Science News Letter, 19-21. Smyth continued to criticize
the Eisenhow.er atomic energy program; cf. Smyth, "Nuclear
Power and Foreign Policy, 11 Foreign Affairs, vol. 35, No. 1
(October, 1956), 1-16.
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TVA states.

Should the White House succeed in its drive

against the TVA, the fight for public power in the Pacific
Northwest would also be severely damaged. 27 For this latter
reason the National Hells Canyon Association, and the Democratic and Independent (Senator Wayne Morse) congressional
delegations from the Pacific Northwest chimed in with the
chorus opposing the Cole-Hickenlooper bill and the Dixon-Yates
contract.
The Cole-Hickenlooper bill faced some opposition in the
House, but, by and large, the bill emerged intact.

An amend-

ment reversing the President's order putting private power
facilities in the Tennessee Valley lost.

The bill and the

contract were approved by a 231 to 154 vote.

The most serious

threat to defeating the bill and the contract was ln the
Senate. 28

In the Senate two amendments dealing with the Dixon-Yates
contract were presented.

Senator Clinton Anderson's amend-

ment attempted to prevent the Atomic Energy Commission from
contracting for private power to supply the TVA.

The amend-

ment prohibited replacement-power contracts and also would
have required the AEC to submit any proposed contract to the
Joint Congressional Committee on Atooic Energy for thirty
days.

If the JCAE did not approve the contract, the commit-

tee could ask Congress to invalidate it.

Republican Senator

27Estes Kefauver, "\..Jhat's Wrong with Dixon-Yates," Atlantic, 195 (January, 1955), 66-69.
28 New York Times, July 24, 1954, l; Congressional Record,
83rd Cong., -2d Sess., v. 100, Part 9 (July 2 , 1954), 12025.
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John Sherman Cooper defended the Anderson amendment.

"Con-

gress," he pointed out, "created the agency [TVA] and if any
basic alterations in its nature are to be made, they should
be made directly by the legislative action and by the direction of executive agencies of the Government."

An Administra-

tion amendment sponsored by Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan sought to approve the Dixon-Yates contract outright.
In essence, Ferguson's amendment approved of replacement contracts and of the AEC negotiating power contracts with public
utilities.

Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina suggested the

Ferguson amendment be modified to provide that the DixonYates contract be submitted to the JCAE for thirty days for
its inspection.

The JCAE, however, would not have the author-

ity to reject the contract.
by Ferguson.

This modification was accepted

The Ferguson-Ervin amendment thus received the

crucial southern support of the senators from Arkansas, Louisiana, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia.

Representa-

tive of their thinking, John L. McClellan of Arkansas asked,
"Are we to continue to pour out millions and millions of
collars in this [TVA] area to build it beyond its natural
potentials while the rest of the country suffers and waits?
Are we to show that favoritism?"

Evidently the Senate agreed,

for the Anderson amendment was defeated and the FergusonErvin amendment won a decisive victory.

The Dixon-Yates contract had now leaped another difficult hurdle. 29
2

1954),

9con~ressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (July 14,

165 -92, 10590; Cong. Rec., Ibid., July 20, 1954,
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The public power advocates mustered enough strength to
filibuster the Cole-Hickenlooper bill and, together with
southerners opposed to "gag rules," to override an a·!;tempt
at cloture.

The Senate approved an amendment by Senator Al-

bert Gore prohibiting the AEC from paying truces on the private power contracts it negotiated.

But the crucial amend-

ment, presented by Senator :Edwin Johnson of Colorado, authorized the AEC to produce electric power either in its own
facilities or through other Federal agencies with a preference to non-profit distributors.

The amendment narrowly

passed and a fight to retain it was
Senate conference.

e~ected

in the House-

After a thirteen-day filibuster the Sen-

ate, by a 57 to 28 vote, finally passed the Cole-Hickenlooper
-01.l
·-1 • 30

The public power advocates· were still unsatisfied.
After a House-Senate conference approved a final bill, the
public power representatives on the conference, Anderson,
Johnson (Colorado), and Holifield, refused to sign the final
report, objecting strenuously to Representative Cole's provision concerning patents.

The conference deleted the Senate

version which would have increased the compulsory licensing
1101?-19; Con~. Rec., ibid., July 19, 1954, 10834; Cong· Rec.,
ibid., July 2 , 1954, Ir22'1; JCAE hearings (1954), Iol -11.

30con~essional Record, 83rd Congress, 2d Sess., v. 100,
part 9 (Ju~ 26, 1954), 11942, 11981, 1198?; Cong. Rec., ibid.,
July 22, 1954, 11388; Co~. Rec., ibid., July 27, 1954, l~;
Ellis, A Giant Step, 139 l; New Y~Times, July 27, 1954,
14; July 28, 1954, 13.
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period to ten years, and inserted Cole's provision which removed all Government control over patents.

Thus, the private

utilities would be subject to the normal exclusive patent
rights for seventeen years.

Albert Gore and Lister Hill

promised a determined fight against this amendment on the
floor of the Senate.

Gore declared, "It would open the doors

of the patent office to a small group of companies that have
a monopoly on the know-how and also have a monopoly on the
employment of the people with the know-how."
amendment had been watered down as well.

The Johnson

The public power

advocates were not about to sit idly by and let all this pass
unnoticed.
report.

By a voice vote ·the House approved the conference

The Senate did not, however.

Senator Johnson (Color-

ado) criticized the report for including the words "insofar as
possible" concerning the AEC's duty toward preference customers.

Senators Gore, Anderson, Hubert Humphrey, and Guy Gil-

lette also objected to this language and suggested the bill
be returned to conference.

By a six-vote margin, the Senate

sent the bill back to conference with instructions for its
conferees to work for compulsory licensing of peacetime
atomic patents and preference for public bodies and rural
electric cooperatives.

When the new conference report con-

formed to these wishes, the Senate passed the bill.

Despite

grave misgivings Representative Cole ruefully urged pas.sage
of the revised conference report.

Concerning the patent pro-

vision Cole said he hoped Congress would "repeal this highly
distasteful,- highly un-American provision" in the next session
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of Congress.
bill.

By voice vote the House once again passed the

While the public power advocates had not gotten all

they wanted, they nevertheless had won a victory of sorts.
On August 30, 1954, Eisenhower signed the bill into law.31
The political implications of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 were potentially great.

In foreign policy the authority

of the President was substantially increased.

In domestic

nuclear policy the President's victory on the Ferguson-Ervin
amendment upheld his legal authority over the Atomic Energy
Commission.

A majority of AEC had opposed the Dixon-Yates con-

tract; yet, at Strauss' request, the President had successfully ordered the Commission to negotiate the contract

anywa~

The McMahon Act had left undefined the extent of Executive
control over the AEC but the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and
the Dixon-Yates controversy seemingly clarified some of the
confusion.

'While Presidential authority increased, the power

of the Joint Congressional Committee did not diminish.

In

Section 202 o! the Act, the JCAE reasserted its authority
over the AEC.

"The [Atomic Energy] Commission," the Section

read, "shall keep the Joint Committee fully and currently
informed with respect to all of the Commission's activities."
Consequently, the Committee retained and even increased its
31 New York Times, August 7, 1954; August 14, 1954, l;
August 17, 1954, l; Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2d
Sess. (August 9, 1954), v. lOO, part Io, 1387; Con~. Rec.,
ibid., August 13, 1954, part 11, 14350, 14351, 143 ?, 14364;
~· Rec., ibid., August 16, 1954, 14606; Cong. Rec., ibid.,
August 17, l~ 14873, 14867-14873; Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch (June, 1955), 1120-1121; Public
Papers of the· Pr·esidents, 1954, 776-77.
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supervisory authority over all the activities of the AEC.
Later, when Strauss was nominated in 1959 to be Secretary of
Commerce, Senator Anderson claimed this section of the Act
"was directly aimed at Mr. Strauss who had already in 1954
violated the law in carrying out his obligations."

Moreover,

with public power conscious Democrats in the majority on the
Joint Committee after the elections of 1954, this provision
became the cudgel with which they beat the Administration and
Strauss.

Now that industry would be entering the field of

atomic energy, the JCAE was commanded to hold hearings the
first sixty days of each session of Congress to obtain information on the "development, growth, and state of the atomic
energy industry. 11 32
The Atomic Energy Commission, however, had been changed
by the Act.

The AEC no longer enjoyed a monopolistic posi-

tion in the field of atomic energy.
a regulatory commission.

Also, the AEC now became

But the Act, at best,

32 Thomas, Atomic Energy, 153-58; James L. Morrisson,

"Federal Support of Domestic Atomic Power Development--The
Policy Issue," Vanderbilt Law Review, 12 (December, 1958),
197-99; 68 Stat. at L. 955 (PUblic Law 703, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess., Atomic Energy Act, 1954), in Madeline W. Lasee (compiler), Le islative Rister of the Atomic En.er
Act of 19 4
Public Law
rd Con ress , I U. • A omic Energy Commission, Was ing on, D.C.,
); U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings on the
Nomination of Lewis L. Strauss to be Secretary of Commerce,
86th Congress, 1st sess. (1959), 5d9; Rosenthal and Green,
Government of the Atom, 94; Nieburg, "The Eisenhower AEC and
Congress, 0 130, The 1946 Act did not include the word "all";
the 1954 Act added it. (My emphasis.) It might be pointed out
that the Act settled the question of the chiarmanship of the
JCAE. Sectiqn 203 provided that the Chairmanship should
alternate between the House and Senate and that the Chairman
should be chosen by the members of the house from which he
comes. The vice chairman should be chosen from the other
house and chosen by its members.
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gave the Commission only a nebulous guideline of its new
responsibilities.

Its added duties included licensing of

private production and utilization facilities, source and byproduct materials, and the use of special nuclear materials.
The Commission had to establish standards and regulations for
the industrial development of atomic energy.

One things was

was unambiguous, however; as one former AEC commissioner has
written, the Atomic Energy Commission could no longer claim
to be above politics.

For the Commission was now, for better

or worse, knee-deep in the politics of partnership.33
With passage of the Cole-Hickenlooper bill, the publicpower drama was far from played out.

In October 1954, the

Attorney General ruled that the Dixon-Yates contract was valid

under the recently passed Atomic Energy Act.

The following

month the Dixon-Yates controversy exerted a major influence
on the elections of 1954.

The controversy may well have con-

tributed to the defeat of Senator John Sherman Cooper in Kentucky and to the senatorial victory of Richard L. Neuberger
in Oregon.

The Democrats regained control of both houses of

Congress.

And that meant Senator Clinton Anderson, the arch-

foe of Strauss, would become chairman of the Joint Committee.34
The Administration now moved quickly.

Shortly after

the elections, the JCAE, still Republican dominated, voted
along straight party lines to waive the stipulation in the
33Mullenbach, Civilian Nuclear Power, 147; Thomas, Atomic
Energy, 151-52.

34wilda~sky, Dixon-Yates, 132-33; Frier, Eisenhower Administration, 65-66.
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new law requiring that all atomic energy contracts must lay
before the JCAE for thirty days unless a majority of the
committee rules otherwise.

In voting to waive the contract,

the Republican majority unequivocally characterized expansion
of the TVA as "rank, unrestrained, unadulterated socialism."
The Democratic minority, of course, saw it differently.

"The

proper business of the Atomic Energy Commission," they said,
"is and must continue to be, atomic energy--not negotiating
con"Gracts for electric power for municipalities."

In Febru-

ary 1955, the Securities Exchange Commission voted four to one
to approve the Dixon-Yates contract.
senter, was a Democratic commissioner.

Paul Rowen, the lone disBy the beginning of

1955, the Administration could count a solid majority on the
Atomic Energy Commission.

Dr. John von Neuman, a noted mathe-

matician, had taken the place of Zuckert and Dr. Willard Libby,
a chemist from the University of Chicago, succeeded Smyth.
Murray was the only Truman appointee left.

While serving an

interim appointment on the AEC Libby had endorsed the DixonYates contract.

At his confirmation hearing Libby admitted

that his endorsement had been based on "cursory and inadequate
study and the great faith I have in the competence and good
intentions of my colleagues."

This prompted Senator Kefauver

to vow not to support Libby's confirmation until the DixonYates business was settled.

Besides, there did not appear to

be majority sentiment in the Senate favoring repeal of-the
contract.

All the obstacles to completing the contract seemed
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finally removed.35
The contract appeared to be well on its way toward final
completion when it was disclosed that a possible conflict of
interest was involved in the government's dealings •. The financial agents for the Dixon-Yates contract were the First
Boston Corporation and Lehman Brothers.

Thinking the publi-

city accruing from the venture would be good for the firm's
image, First Boston had not accepted a fee for its services.
Earlier in the TVA-AEC controversy, the Bureau of the Budget
had employed Adolphe Wenzell of First Boston to conduct an
independent evaluation of the TVA, which, it turned out, was
a condemnation of the Authority.

Since the Administration

had told no one, least of all Congress, of Wenzell's involvement a great impropriety, at best, appeared obvious.

On Feb-

ruary 18, 1955, Senator Lister Hill, one of the prime opponents of the contract, openly and directly attacked the Administration.

He charged that the Administration had "delib-

erately" hidden the facts of the Dixon-Yates contract from
the Congress.

Specifically: "There exists persuasive evi-

dence that this man [Wenzell] participated in conferences and
meetings on the Dixon-Yates matter, which were held in the
35Frier, Eisenhower Administration, 65-66; Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Reuort on the November 13,
1
Waiver Action b~ the Joint Commlttee on Atomic Eiler ,
Cong., st Sess. 1
,
-1 ; wildavsky, Dixon-Ya es,
137-38, 156-57, 223; Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (October,
1954), 334 (September 1954), (November 1954), 367; U.S. Congress, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (Senate
Section), 84th Congress, 1st Sess., Confirmation of AEC Commissioners, june 1953 to March 1955 (1955),. 22.
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Budget Bureau at the very time when the First Boston company
was making arrangements for financing the Dixon-Yates plant."
In the meantime a New York financial and economic consultant,
Walter Von Trescow, proposed an alternate plan.

In January

1955, by a straight party vote, the Democratic-controlled JCAE,
recommended that the Administration cancel the Dixon-Yates
contract.

After a few months of charges and countercharges,
on July 11, the Ad.ministration terminated the contract.3 6

While termination of the Dixon-Yates contract ended the more
spectacular phase of the atomic energy controversy, a new,
more quiet yet subtle struggle took place afterwards.

The

Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, controlled
by the Democrats, asserted itself.
The Democrats on the Joint Committee decided to face the
Administration head-on concerning the public power issue.

In

1956, Senator Gore and Representative Holifield introduced a
bill directing the Atomic Energy Commission to expend $400
million for the construction of demonstration power plants.
In essence, the Gore-Holifield bill represented a revolt on
the part of the JCAE; the committee was now initiating legislation which, if passed, would blunt the pro-business bias
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

The Democrats on the com-

mittee believed the Administration was proceeding too slowly
in developing a domestic atomic energy program.

While the

36 wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 188-96, 206, 218-19, 223-4?,

264; Con~res$ional Record, 84th ·cong., 1st Sess. (1955),
part 2, 714; New York Times, January 29, 1955, 1.
·
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Joint Committee was unanimous in its opinions on defense,
·.international affairs, and congressional authority over the
AEC, it was divided, along party lines, on the public versus
private power issue.

In short, the Republicans opposed the

bill while the Democrats favored it.3?
The utility industry, the Atomic Energy Commission,
and the coal interests rallied in opposition to the GoreHolifield measure.

The representative of the Edison Electric

Institute saw the bill as a danger to American free enterprise.
"We must not· defeat the very objectives we are trying to
achieve in that cold war by abandoning our principles of free
enterprise along the way," the Insti_tute warned the Joint Committee.

bill.

Four of the five members of the AEC also opposed the

Strauss emphasized the bill would negate the free

enterprise provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

But

the Commission found most distasteful a stipulation directing,
rather than simply authorizing, the AEC to fulfill the
3?At least one Democratic member of the JCAE has made it
plain that the majority members of the JCAE saw the Gore-Hol~
field bill as a means of reasserting the committee's power
over the AEC. Cf. Melvin Price,"Atomic Energy in Congress,"
Bulletin . of Atomic Scientists, XII (December, 1956). Rosenthal and Green, Government of the Atom, 12, 120, 60-61; Morrisson, "Federal--Support, 11 212; Mullenbach, Civilian Nuclear
Power, 10-11; Nieburg, "Eisenhower AEC and Congress," 134-35.
The proponents of the bill did not always picture the controversy as a public versus private power issue. Senators Gore
and Kefauver, for example, saw it as a matter of government
responsibility toward industry. Kefauver noted this: "I
gained the impression from reading the debate in the House of
Representatives that the issue was presented as one of public
versus private development. But, is it not a fact that, looking forward, private development will be along the line of experimentation before private industry will be willing to accept responsibility of such a large program? Gore answered
in the affirmative. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.,
v. 102, part 11 (July 26, 1956), 14724.
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objectives of the bill.

An altercation between Senators Pa.s-

tore and Anderson and Chairman Strauss illustrated how divergent their attitudes were:

Mr. Strauss.

Senator Pastore, do you feel that you
cannot rely on the Atomic Energy Commission's good
f'aith to carry out this policy which you have so eloquently described, but that we have to be directed to
do it?
Senator Pastore. I will tell you very frankly, I
would leave the 'direct' out, if you gentlemen would
say that you believe this ought to be done, but you
keep saying that we are doing enough, and we don't
think we are doing enough, and we don.• t think that
we ought to do any more.
Mr. Strauss. Do you think for a moment if you passed
this bill and the Congress passed the bill, that we
would go at it half-heartedly?
Chairman Anderson. You have testified that you don't
think anything needs to be done.
Senator Pastore. I don't think that you would build
the reactors.
Chairman Anderson. We have a record full of it.
Commissioner Murray agreed with Pastore and Anderson.

"More-

over, in my judgment," he warned Senator Anderson, "it would
be a tragic mistake to fail to give the Commission a definite
directive to carry out the domestic program."

Finally, as

in the natural gas controversy, the coal interests feared
that government-sponsored atomic energy would become a substitute energy resource.

Representative John Saylor (R-Penn.)

emphasized "that the Federal Government does not belong in
private business and that we cannot afford to become involved
in any more spurious blueprints produced on socialistic drawingboards."

The coal interests maintained, based upon figures

supplied by the Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological Survey, that the nation's coal reserves were sufficient to supply the country's energy requirements for at least the next
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couple centuries.

Significantly, the United Mine Workers
persuaded seven Democrats to vote against the bill.38
With Senate Republicans abstaining, the Joint Committee
unanimously reported out a compromise bill.

_The compromise

version provided that $400 million would be authorized for
an unspecified number of demonstration atomic plants to be
built by the Atomic Energy Commission.

The plants, however,

were to be built only at AEC sites and the electric energy
produced would be employed by the Commission.

As in the.

original bill, the "authorized and directed" provision remained.

Senator Anderson explained the compromise strategy

intended to avoid a floor fight over the bill.
the real intention, it failed.

If this were

The Gore-Holifield bill

passed the Senate, with only three Republicans supporting it.
But the onslaught of opposition came in the House.

Even though

Representative Cole won several amendments severely watering
it down, the House voted to recommit the bill.

The narrow

margin between victory and defeat had been supplied by the
seven Democrats from coal producing states.39

38 strauss, Men and Decisions, 319; David F. Cavers, "Atom-

ic Power: The Quest for a Program," The George Washim1:ton Law
Review, 27 (April, 1959), 464-65; U.S. Congress, Join"E Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Civilian Atomic Power Acceleration Pro am (June 28, 1956), 4-6,
,
; rice,
; osen a and Green, Government
of the Atom, 16-17; Con~ressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.,
v. 102, Part 10 (July 2 , 1956), 945-4?, 14262, 14251; New
York Times, July 30, 1956, 8

39u.s. Congress, Senate, 84th Congress, 2d Sess., Senate
Report 2390 (June 29, 1956), (House Report No. 2622, July 5,
1956, was identical to Senate Report 2390.); Congressional
Quarterlt Almanac (1956), 542-46; Rosenthal and ~reen, Government of he Atom, 152-53; 134-35; Price, "Atomic Energy in
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In 195?, to avoid another fight, the AEC announced a new
round of the power-demonstration-reactor program.
did not wash, however.

This ploy

What the Joint Committee had failed

to gain when Gore-Holifield was defeated, it now won via the
congressional appropriations process.

According to Section

261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, appropriations for construction of new "facilities" had to be first authorized by
Congress.

The powerful chairman of the House Appropriations

Committee attacked this budgetary system in 195? and threatened to freeze all AEC appropriations until the JCAE examined
the Commission's program.

The JCAE immediately did this; it

recommended increased budget powers.for itself.

Congress

granted the Joint Committee complete "project-by-project"
authorization powers over the Commission's budget requests.
Further, the Authorization Act of 1958 required the Atomic
Energy Commission to lay any tentative contractual agreement
before the JCAE for forty-five days while Congress was in
session.

While this Act did not empower the co:m!Ilittee to

stop completion of any contract, the JCAE now possessed full
investigative powers over such contracts.

The chances for

another Dixon-Yates contract were thus considerably lessened.
Strauss, in the end, was forced by circumstances beyond his
control to agree to this new appropriations procedure.

Secre-

tary of State John Foster Dulles ·worked with the Democratic
members of the Joint Committee to obtain their approval -of
Congress," 3?4-?5; Con~ressional Record, 84th Cong.? ~d Sess.,
v. 102, part 9 (July 1 , 1956), 12469; Cong. Rec., ibid.,
part 10 (July 24, 1956), 14288.
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the Participation Act of the International Atomic Energy
Agency.

In return for their cooperation, Strauss lost the

crucial support of the Administration in 1957-58 for the
fight against the JCAE.

In the end the Joint Committee established firm control over the. AEC. 40
The JCAE was determined to maintain its influence after
Strauss left.

Whenever a nominee for the AEC appeared before

the Joint CoIIlI:littee, it extracted a promise from the candidate that he would keep the Committee fully informed of all
the Commission's activities.

Senator Anderson and Represen-

tative Holifield, for example, pointedly gave John McCone,
Strauss' successor, some advice about the thin line between
his future role as a presidential advisor and his responsibilitias to Congress.

" ••• So I am not going to advise you

not to wear both hats," Anderson warned, "but I suggest to
you that you will be happier if you do not."

Apparently

McCone accepted their advice because peace prevailed between
the AEC and JCAE under his stewardship. 41
Between 1955 and 1958 the Joint Congressional Committee
wrested from the White House a great deal of power over the
40Morrisson, "Federal Support," 218-19, 221; Orlans,
Contracting for Atoms, 165-69; Nieburg, "The Eisenhower AEC
and Congress," 134-36; Rosenthal and Green, Government of
the Atom, 16-17.
41 clinton Anderson and James T. Ramey, "Congress and Research: Experience in Atomic Research and Development," Annals of the American Academ of Political and Social Sci:e!ices,
January,
,
; Nie urg,
; Or ans,
; • S.
Congress, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy,
(Senate Section), 85th Cong.; 2d Sess., Nomination of John A.
McCone to Be a Member of the Atomic Energy Commission (July

2, 1958), 25-2?.
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Atomic Energy Commission.

The JCAE has been equally resource-

ful in defending its actions during these years.

In 1959,

David F. Cavers criticized the JCAE for taking over the functions of the White House.

"Apparently convinced that the

AEC was failing the nation because of its dependence on teamwork with industry, the Democratic leadership in the Committee has been encroaching persistently on the domain that normally is reserved to the executive," he observed.

Both Rep-

resentative Melvin Price and Senator Anderson defended the
Committee.

Congress intended, they insisted, that the JCAE

should exercise an active policymaking function and not play
a passive role.

The Gore-Holifield bill was, in their judg-

ment, one instance

.~f

the Committee rightfully undertaking

its policymaking prerogative.

Results, they further pointed

out, demonstrate the JCAE's role to have been beneficial.
"Suffice it to say," Anderson wrote in 1961, "that there has
been no criticism of the fact that the United States now has
additional and better nuclear weapons, more raw materials
and fissionable materials, a growing nuclear Navy, and an
expanding research and development program for the peacetime
atom, all of which have been urged by the Joint Committee and
supported by the Congress. 1142 The victory of the Democraticcontroled Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy simply served notice that the Administration's partnership policy
would find rough treading in the turbulent waters of atomic
ene!gy policymaking.
42 navers, "Atomic Power," 470; Anderson and Ramey, "Congress and Research,"; Price, "Atomic Energy in Congress."

CHAPTER VI
COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING OR PARTN.ERSHIP?-THE HELLS CANYON DECISION

If the Tennessee Valley Authority represented "creeping
socialism" to the adherents of partnership, the creation of

any further valley authorities was certainly anathema.

In

the Pacific Northwest, however, a battle between private
utility development and federal comprehensive planning of
water resources had also been raging over the future of Hells
Canyon, the deepest gorge in the North American continent.
This site, located on the Snake River, was part of the boundary separating Oregon and Idaho.

It was the last great

underdeveloped power site in .the West; in fact, its power
potential exceeded all other sites in the United States.
Moreover, there existed no doubt that development of Hells
Canyon must begin soon to prevent a drastic power shortage
in the Pacific Northwest.
Hells Canyon had been an object of attraction for some
time.

Since forty percent of the nation's potential hydro-

electric power was located in the Pacific Northwest, Hells
Canyon, in particular, drew attention.

At Gifford Pinchot's

suggestion, Theodore Roosevelt had set aside the Canyon as a
potential water power site.
ha~.

by no means

Also, the Department of Interior

overlooked the possibility of constructing a
168
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high dam in the Canyon. 1

The site acquired special appeal

when the New Deal built such large multi-purpose dams as
Bonneville and Grand Coulee, both on the Columbia River.
Thus, in 1946, the Director of the Bureau of Reclamation,
Region I, recommended that a storage and power project be
erected at Hells Canyon.

Subsequently this report was approved by the Secretary of Interior. 2 The Corps of Engineers, not to be outdone, cast an eye on the Canyon.

In a

194? Interim Report, the Corps concluded that the Canyon could
function well as part "of the integrated system of multiplepurpose projects for development of the water resources of
[the] Columbia River Basin."

The foDowing year the Corps

issued its "308 Review Report," an eight-volume comprehensive
plan for the Columbia River Basin.

The Report proposed that

Congress authorize reservoirs and dams at Albeni Falls on the
Pend Oreille, Libby (Montana) on the Kostenai Rivers, Priest
Rapids on the Columbia, John Day and The Dalles dams on the
Columbia River, Glacier View in Glacier National Park, and
Hells Canyon on the Snake River.

The Corps pointed out that

comprehensive development of the Columbia Basin was necessary
to prevent floods, improve navigation, store water for irrigation, and increase the region's power supply.

In arguing

for multiple purpose development the Report maintained there
was no other way to be "assured that the optimum development
1 coyle, Conservation, 196-9?.
2 senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Report No. 2275.(June 19,

1956)' 10.

l?O
of each water use will be accomplished in the best interests
of each sub-basin, the region and of the Nation as a whole;
or that improvements made to meet the present needs will not
block or interfere with the more extensive improvements that
will be required in the future."

Governor Douglas McKay of

Oregon "heartily" endorsed the Report.3

The conflict between

the Corps and Bureau of Reclamation became heated.

The Corps,

for example, severely criticized the flood and irrigation
provisions of the Bureau's report.

When, in 1948, a flood

overcame much of the Pacific Northwest, President Truman
directed the Corps and the Bureau to coordinate their efforts.
The Corps continued to criticize the Bureau's proposal but,
on April 11, 1949, the Secretaries of Army and Interior, the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Chief of
the Engineers finally signed an accord to coordinate their
plans in the Columbia Valley.

Governor McKay approved the

coordinated plan and, despite some serious reservations,
Governor Langlie

of Washington also gave his consent.

As

part of the coordinated plan, the Bureau of Reclamation was
assigned Hells Canyon.

In February 1950, the Secretary of

Interior, Oscar Chapman, forwarded this agreement to Congress. 4
3corps of Engineers, Interim Report No. 3 (194?), Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, no box number; House
of Representatives, 8lst Cong., 2d Sess., Document 531,
Columbia River and Tributaries, Northwestern United States
(8 vols., June 28, 1949), I, xvii, 335, 33?.
4
June 15, 1948, O. E. Walsh, Colonel, Corps of Engineers, District Engineer, to R. J. Newell, Bureau of Reclamation, Regional Director; memo, August 13, 1948, Walsh to
Chief of Engineers; August 27, 1948, w. S. Moore, Colonel,
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In the meantime, the Administration had been developing
an alternate plan.

On several occasions the Administration

proposed the creation of a Columbia Valley Authority (CVA),
modelled after the Tennessee Valley Authority.

But the Corps

of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation, along with private
utility groups and the Forest Service, opposed the CVA, just
as they had previously fought the Missouri and Tennessee Valley Authority.

The Administration felt the CVA would elimi-

nate the conflict between the Corps and the Bureau of Reclamation.

President Truman informed an audience in Boise, Idaho,

that a Columbia Valley Authority would "stop all the fuss"
between the two agencies "and all the rest of the bureaus in
Government."

In his Annual Budget Message for fiscal 1951,

the President again pressed Congress to authorize the CVA.
Senators Warren Magnuson and Henry "Scoop" Jackson, both Democrats from Washington, fought hard for the Columbia Valley
Authority but to no avail.

In 1949 the CVA scheme received

a painful blow when the First Hoover Commission recommended
that the TVA be continued but that the Federal Government
should not initiate any further authorities.

Consequently,

Corps of Engineers, the Board of Engineers for Rivers and
Harbors to Chief of the Engineers; November 15, 1948, Michael
Strauss to Lt. General Raymond A. Wheeler, Chief of Engineers; December 7, 1948, Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of Army,
to Secretary of Interior, in Corps of Engineers, Federal
Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, no box number; H. R.
Document 531, v. 1, xvi; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 8lst Cong., 2d Sess., House Document 473, The Columbia
River: Final Letters of Transmittal and Comments of Affected
States and of ?ederal Agencies (2 vols., February, 1950), I,
69-?o, 65-66,_23, 3-4; McKinley, Uncle Sam, 641-42.
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in 1950, the Bureau of the Budget instead approved the Bureau of Reclamation-Corps of Engineers plan for comprehensive
development of the area.
find success here either.

The Truman Administration did not
Twice bills for the. Hells Canyon

dam failed to secure congressional approval.5
Until now it had been a governmental matter but the issue
took on crucial significance when a private utility, the Idaho Power Company, became involved.

In 1916, the Idaho Power

Company acquired an interest in the area by purchasing a
small plant at Oxbow, a location on the Snake River not far
from Hells Canyon.

While the Corps and Bureau were investi-

gating the area, the Idaho Power Company, in June 1947,
applied to the Federal Power Commission for a preliminary
permit for a new hydroelectric project at Oxbow.

Senator

Glen Taylor of Idaho and the Department of Interior filed a
protest and the Company temporarily suspended its request
for an application.

When the Corps-Bureau plan was voted

down by Congress, Idaho Power, in December 1950, again applied
to the FPC for a license to build the Oxbow project.

Once

more the Department of Interior issued a protest with the
Commission.

On

on the matter.

May ?, 1952, the FPC decided to hold hearings
The Department of Interior and six regional

public power organizations were granted

petitio~~

to intervene

. 5Lesl.ie Miller, "The Battle that Squanders Billions,"
Saturday Evening Post, V. 221, No. 46 (May 14, 1949), 161;
McKinley, Uncle Sam, Ch. XVI, and 643-53; Harry Truman, Public Papers (1950), 8, 90, 345-51; Congressional Record, 'SISt
Cong., 1st Sess., v. 96, part IV (April 14, 1950), 5187-88,
5190; H. R. Document 473, V. l, 4-5; Barrow Lyons, Tomorrow's
Birthright, 274-75.
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in the proceedings against the Company.

The Idaho Power

Company later amended its original five dam plan, now proposing a three dam project for Hells Canyon, Oxbow, and Brownlee.

Thus, there were two alternative plans for tapping the

resources of Hells Canyon.

The Bureau of Reclamation planned

to construct a high multi-purpose dam, while Idaho Power
wanted to construct three small dams with a total power capacity of ?83,000 kilowatts.

The Bureau's dam called for a

capacity of 1,022,000 kilowatts.

Since Congress had not

authorized the Corps-Bureau plan, the center of attention now
moved to the Federal Power Commission as Eisenhower assumed
the Presidency. 6

On taking office the Eisenhower Administration faced a
difficult decision.

As the Denver

~

accurately depicted

the situation, no matter what it did, the Administration
would be open to a torrent of criticism.

Should the Admini-

stration attempt to deny the Idaho Power Company a license
it would be held accountable for the inaction of the Republican-ruled Congress in approving a federal dam.

If, on the

other hand, the Administration allowed the Idaho Power Company
to obtain the license it would be charged with having "sold
out" Hells Canyon to Wall Street.

Eisenhower made two appoint-

ments particularly vital toward a resolution of that dilemma.?
6 senate Report 2275, 10; Lyons, Tomorrow's Birthright,
2?8; Coyle, Conservation, 197; The Interveners included the
National Hells Canyon Association, the Lewis County Public
Utility District of Washington, seven other Public Utility
Districts in Washington, and the NRECA.
?The Denver ~' May 13, 1953.
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When Douglas McKay, a two-term governor of Oregon, became Secretary of Interior it was not altogether certain
where he stood on the issue.

As a firm believer in states'

rights he had vigorously opposed the Columbia Valley Authority.

"We definitely need the United States Government to

develop the Columbia River," he affirmed at his nomination
hearing in 1953.

"Private power can't do it, but I have

opposed the part of the Federal Government in imposing themselves in Authority affairs, because I think the people at
the State level want to retain control of their natural resources."

Yet he had approved both the "308 Review Report"

and the Corps-Bureau agreement.

When he was confirmed by the

Senate, Wayne Morse of Oregon, who had dramatically broken
with the Republican Party during the recent presiden-tial campaign and was a strong advocate of the federal dam, took to
the floor of the Senate to urge his fellow Oregonian's confirmation.

A fellow supporter of the federal project, Sena-

tor Magnuson, however, opposed McKay's nomination because he
disagreed with the nominee's views on development of public
power in the Pacific Northwest. 8
The appointment of Jerome Kuykendall as the new Chairman of the Federal Power Commission raised serious suspicions
in the minds of those who favored construction of a Hells
Canyon dam by the Bureau of Reclamation.

Kuykendall had been

8 senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
Cong., 1st Sess., The Nomination of Governor
be Secretary of the n erior
anuary
Times, January 22, 1953, 1, 10.
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appointed to the Washington State Public Service Commission
by Governor Langlie, a staunch opponent of both the Columbia
Valley Authority and the federal dam.

Consequently, organized

labor in the State of Washington, the National Rural .Electric
Cooperative Association, and the Idaho-Oregon Hells Canyon
Association pronounced Kuykendall guilty-by-association.
"His first objective," Albert Ullman of the Hells Canyon
Association predicted, "will be to accomplish what La.nglie
has

be~n

attempting for a long time--to put the hatchet to

the federal Hells Canyon project."

The United Steel Workers

ot Spokane declared that Kuykendall was "opposed to the development of the Northwest's industrial growth."

While he

would not commit himself on the issue, Kuykendall made it
clear to the Senate Interior and Foreign Commerce Committee,
which heard testimony on his nomination, that it was better
for private capital to do the job when it could, rather than
the federal government.

In other words, the government, he

said, should become involved only when private enterprise
cannot perform the task.

He was thus an exponent of partner-

ship. 9
9senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
83rd Cong., 1st Sess., Nomination of Jerome K. Kuykendall, of
Washington, to be a Member of the Federal Power Commission
for the remainder of the term exnirin§ ,June 22, 1957 (April
22, 1953), 8, 14, ff; Ellis, A Glant ten, 125-27; Telegram,
'W. C. Weyer, President, United Steel Workers Local 338, USA,
CIO, to Eisenhower, April 23, 1953, and telegram, April 23,
1953, D. E. Bandwaun, President, Spokane County CIO Council,
to Eisenhower, in Eisenhower Library, Central Files, GF-43-A,
Box 388; Engl.er, 325-30; New York Times, !1ay 16, 26; April
24, 25; April 23, 24; April 14, 1953, 53.
·
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Furthermore, Bureau of the Budget Circular A-47 and the
Department of Interior's new power policy signaled a reversal
of the New Deal-Fair Deal emphasis on federal projects.
"The New Deal's great public crusade is dead," Business Week
correctly announced.

"But one thing is certain: McKay has

rung down the curtain on the kind of 'damn-private industry,
government-should-build-everything' policy on federal power
followed by his Democratic predecessors at Interior."
Department decided to get the Hells Canyon matter

11

The

cleaned

upn rather than, as one member of the FPC.advised Under Secretary Tudor, to "drag its feet."

Consequently, on May

5,

1953, McKay officially withdrew the Department's intervention
in the case.

In explaining his decision, McKay noted that

legislation favoring the high dam was presently before Congress, but "in view of efforts to balance the budget it appears doubtful that appropriations for the work can be justified now even if the project is authorized."

\./hen McKay's

decision came under fire, Eisenhower defended it, saying that
ttmany, many people" from the concerned area "insisted that
they do not believe in this big .federal dam."

In keeping with

the Administration's partnership policy, McKay explained that
"private enterprise should be allowed to develop power as
long as it does not interfere with the orderly development
of natural resources."

Significantly, he added: "There has

been a tendency in the past to give breaks to all the public
deals."

\./hen the

Denver~

questioned whether this deci-

sion meant the engineers of the Bureau of Reclamation would

1?7
be permitted to testify before the FPC "without political restraints," the Department replied they would be.

"No witness,"

Ralph Tudor assured Kuykendall, "is being controlled in any
way in this matter and no employee who may be called as a
witness need be concerned that his testimony in this case
will have any effect on his future with the Department. 1110
The action of the Department of Interior left adherents
of a federal dam without an organization representing their
interests before the Federal Power Commission.

The National

Hells Canyon Association, composed of various labor, farm,
cooperative, and public utility groups, was quickly formed
to fill this void.

"The interests of these interveners," the

Association told the FPC, "lie in a continuing increased supply of low-cost power and in full development of the resources
of the Columbia River basin."

The National Rural Electric

Cooperative Association also joined as an intervener.

In

July 1953, the FPC officially accepted the Hells Canyon Association as an intervener against the Idaho Power Company.
Clearly neither side would now compromise. 11
lO"McKay: Changing a Power Trend," Business Week (Sept.
1953), 63; McKay's statement explaining the new power policy can be found in Elmer Bennett Papers, Box 6, Eisenhower
Library; the official letter of withdrawal, May 5, 1953,
Clarence Davis, Solicitor, to Kuykendall, in Federal Power
Com.mission, Washington, D.C., Project No. 19?1, Part~; Public
Pa5ers of the Presidentsfl 1953, 287; Newsweek, 41 (May 18,
19 3), 87; Denver Post, ay 20, 1953; Tudor to Kuykendall,
July 16, 1953, Cen~ Files, OF-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower
Library.
11 Federal Power Commission, Petition for Leave to Intervene, June 26, 1953, Project No.· 1971, Part 4; The Denver Post,
~18, 1953, noted that a compromise solution existed. AC::-cording to this solution the.Idaho Power Co. would have
~2,
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About a week after McKay's announcement, the Idaho Power
Company once again filed applications with the Commission for
licenses to construct and operate the three-dam project.

This

time, however, the State of Washington intervened on.behalf
of the Company.

Among other points, Governor Langlie's brief

claimed the project would be "a flagrant dissipation" of federal money that "could more wisely be invested in projects
known to have far greater flood control and hydroelectric potential .1112
But one final problem remained.

While it was officially

neutral in the conflict over which should build the project,
the National Park Service argued that "a master plan" protecting the site's recreational potential ought to be drawn up
before construction began.

Conrad Wirth, Director of the Park

Service, estimated such a study would cost only $60,000 and
could be completed within two years.

He also maintained the

Idaho Power Company should pay for the study in the event the
FPC grants it a license.

Reluctantly NcKay complied with

built multiple purpose dams below Hells Canyon near the river's confluence with the Columbia. Neither side was amenable
to accepting this compromise, however.
12Quoted in Federal Power Commission, Intervener, State
of Washington, Reply Brief to Idaho Power Company, Project
Nos. 1971, 2132, 2133 (February 4, 1955), 1-2; Ralph Tudor,
"Notes Recorded While Under Secretary, Department of Interior,
March, 1953-Sept., 1954," in Eisenhower Library, Tudor Papers,
Box 1, entry for Nay 3, 1953. In his diary Tudor noted that
"about two weeks" before Interior announced its decision to
withdraw from the case, a member of the FPC visited him and
suggested that his department do nothing on the Hells Canyon
matter, and ".perhaps some of the controversy and excitement
will die down." Interior did not agree and went ahead with
withdrawing its intervention.
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Yirth's wishes and so informed the Commission.

In testimony,

the National Park Service told the FPC that a desirable recreational plan could be developed whichever side won the case. 1 3
Outwardly the issue was a re-enactment of the traditional
public versus private power dilemma.

The Administration held

the position that free enterprise must be given an opportunity
to develop the nation's resources.

Obviously McKay and Eisen-

hower saw a danger of government monopoly in the federal dam.
"I don't like monopoly of any kind," McKay once said, "but
the worst type is monopoly by the Federal Government, because
it's so hard to change."

In answering the charge that the

Idaho Power Company also would constitute a monopoly should
the FPC grant it the license, McKay contended that private
enterprise "can be controlled by regulatory bodies."

More

specifically, the Administration felt the Idaho Power Company
should have the right to bring its case to the Commission and,
if the Company satisfied the FPC, it ought to get the license.
The main problems, the Administration argued, were political,
economic and judicial.
13Jviemo, Conrad Wirth to Orme Lewis, Assistant Secretary,
October 8, 1953; memo, Wirth to Aandahl, December 13, 1953;
memo, Tudor to McKay, February 5, 1954; McKay to Kuykendall,
February 8, 1954, in Department of Interior, Office of the
Secretary, Central Files Section, no box number, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. It deserves mentioning that
the NPS testified that if the high dam "were not constructed,
ressures would increase for the construction of Glacier View
DamJ, which encroaches upon Glacier National Park.~' Counsel
or ~he Idaho Power Company objected to this segment of the
Park Service's statement and was sustained. Cf. Memo, John G.
M. Marr, Technical Review Staff, to Tudor, February 9, 1954,
"A Summary of FPC Hearings, Vols. 76-82," p. 5, and "Statement
of the National Park Service," p. 8, in Department of Interior,
Office of the Secretary, Central Office Files, no box number,
Federal Records Center, Suitaland, Maryland.

e
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It was true, as Administration spokesmen repeatedly
pointed out, that twice a Democratic Congress had not seen fit
"to appropriate the tremendous sums needed for Hells Canyon
or even to authorize the project."

Of course, this argument

overlooked the fact that it had been a Dixicrat-Republican
coalition that had defeated the federal dam.

In this connec-

tion, both Kuykendall and McKay emphasized that "the power
supply in 1957 will be adequate in all regions of the country
except the Pacific Northwest."

Since the federal dam was

unable to get congressional approval, it was thus imperative
that free enterprise perform the task, lest the Pacific Northwest suffer a severe power shortage.

Political partnership

also meant a check on the growth of the federal bureaucracy's
power.

In a series of important articles, Raymond Moley, the

Administration's most articulate apologist, agreed there was
little real choice but to opt for free enterprise.

To do

otherwise, he thought, would allow the Bureau of Reclamation's power to continue unfettered.

"To build it," he reminded his readers, "would be the summit of the bureau's ambit:icn." 14
14rnterview with McKay, U.S. News and World Report, v.
35 (October 9, 1953), 62; Eisenhower to Rep. Jack Westland,
December 14, 1953; McKay, Speech to Commonwealth Club, San
Francisco, August 21, 1953; McKay, Speech to American Power
Association, May 14, 1953; Kuykendall and McKay to Arthur
Burns, June 18, 1954, in Central Files, OF-155-C, Box 833,
Eisenhower Library; Tudor, Speech to Idaho State Reclamation
Association, Boise, Idaho, November 4, 1953, Department of
Interior, Special Office Files, no box number, National Archives; Raymond Moley, "Low Blows at High Dams," Newsweek,
47 (May 21, 1956), 124; "The Fair Deal in Hells Canyon, 11 Newsweek, 38 (August 6, 1951), 81; "Hells Canyon Issues," NewS::\:ieel<, 42 (July 27, 1953), 80; Elmer Bennett, A S~~osiUiil'On
Federal, State, and Local Co9peration on Conservaion and
Development of Water Resources, "The Role of the Federal Government,," California Law Review, V. 45, No. 5 (December, 1957);
Davis O.H., 62-63.

....-··
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Considered from the Administration's economic vantage
point the dictates of a balanced budget far outweighed any
arguments for a government-sponsored project.· "This country,"
McKay once told an interested party, "just cannot go on squandering money and survive as free people."

Simply put, the

high dam would have cost too much in lieu of defense expenses; McKay estimated a federal dam would run around $843,000,
000.

Once again, the Administration.averred that since a

private utility was willing to do "a very comparable job"
which would meet the requirements of the Federal Power Act,
the government ought not to throw roadblocks in its way.
This reasoning particularly appealed to congr·essmen outside
the Tennessee Valley and the Pacific Northwest.

They ques-

tioned why their regions should be taxed for a dam in the
Northwest when the burden could just as easily be borne "on
the willing shoulders of the private investor."

Senator Ralph

Flanders of Vermont, for example, saw no sense in being taxed
for a dam in Idaho when instead it would be better "to have
the Idaho· Power Company contribute something to the taxes"
he had to pay.

Contrary to what critics of partnership may

have led some to believe, however, the Administration was
not hostile

t~

every federal project.

The Dalles and John

Day Dams, both part of the Corps' "308 Review Report," and
the Upper Colorado River Storage Project received a partnership certification.

In

1953, Senator Guy Gordon of Oregon,

a strong partnership defender, presented the John Day plan
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to the Senate. 1 5
Finally, legal precedent was weighted heavily in the Administration's favor.

In 1951, the Federal Power Commission

had granted a license to the Virginia Electric and Power Company to build a power plant on the Roanoke River at Roanoke
Rapids, Virginia.

The Secretary of Interior and the National

Rural Electric Cooperative Association of Virginia brought
the case before the Supreme Court, which ruled the FPC was
empowered to grant a license to any private company £or any
power site included in a plan for comprehensive river basin
development, provided, of course, that Congress had not appropriated £unds for construction of that project and if the
licensing was in the public interest as designated by the
Federal Power Act of 1920.

Having ''no disagreement with this

conclusion," the Eiserlhower Administration based its decision
to withdraw Interior's intervention from the Hells Canyon
16
.
case on thi s ru1 ing.
1 5McKay to C. L. Gilstrap, March 22, 1954, Department 0£
Interior, Office of the Secretary, no box number, Federal
Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; Meley, "The John Day Partnership," Newsweek, 44 (July 26, 1954), 88; Ralph Flanders to
Sherman Adams, Central Files, OF-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower
Library.•
16Lyons, Tomorrow's Birthri~ht, 160-62; Ralph Tudor,
Speech to Southwestern Electrica Exchange, Boca Rotan, Florida, March 22, 1954, in Elmer F. Bennett Papers, Box 10,
Eisenhower Library. In a similar case the Supreme Court ruled
that the statutes creating the FPO "expressed general policies
and granted broad administrative and investigative power,
making the Commission the permanent disinterested expe.rt
agency of Congress to carry out these policies." Chapman v.
Federal Power Commission [345 U.S. 153, 168 (1953)].
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Politically,the Ad.ministration's position was endorsed
by the Republican governors of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho,
as well as by both senators from Idaho and one from Oregon.
Reclamation groups, including the Idaho State Reclamation
Association, opposed the Bureau of Reclamation's plan because
it was, in their opinion, "a power dam, pure and simple, and
therein lies its potential threat to irrigation in Idaho. 1 7
The opponents of the Idaho Power Company employed primarily four arguments.

They pointed out, first and most impor-

tantly, that the Idaho Power Company's three-dam plan would
destroy comprehensive planning for the Columbia River basin.
The Corps of Engineers-Bureau of Reclamation plan called for
a network of dams which would supply hydroelectric power,
irrigation, and flood control.

By contrast, the Idaho Power

Company's plan promised only hydroelectric power.

Represen-

tative Gracie Pfost (D-Idaho), knoi.m as "Hells Belle" for her
vociferous advocacy of the federal project, rightly believed
comprehensive planning was "the basic question."

If the Ida-

ho Power Company received a license, she thought, it would
mean comprehensive planning for the Columbia River Basin would
be foresaken in favor of "piecemeal, partial development" for
"the benefit only of a private monopoly."

Oddly enough, the

conservationists and the Bureau of Reclamation, for once,
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were not at loggerheads.

The Bureau defended its plan for a

multiple purpose dam at Hells Canyon before the Federal Power
Commission.

The Bureau reasoned that since the unit cost of

power for both plans would be about the same, the additional
advantages from the multiple purpose development would best
serve the entire needs of the area.

Coincidentally, the Bur-

eau and the conservationists were locked in a heated struggle
over a proposed dam in :Echo Park, Utah, as part of the Upper
Colorado River Storage Project.

The conservationists opposed

the Administration and the Bureau of Reclamation here.

The

:Echo Park conflict, however, had a direct bearing upon Hells
Canyon.

The high dam advocates caught the Department of

Interior in an apparent contradiction.
Reclamation] people," Robert
~'asked,

w.

"If the Bureau [of

Lucas, editor of the Denver

"can miss the mark.so widely on the Snake [Hells

Canyon], how do I know that their concepts of :Echo Park and
the feasibility of that project and others related thereto
are trustworthy at all?"
out this logic to the FPC.

The Hells Canyon Association pointed
Although the position of the Corps

of Engineers was not as plain, there is evidence to suggest
that it also lined up with the high dam advocates.

Two months

after the Department of Interior withdrew its intervention
from the case, the Montana Great Falls Tribune quoted Brigadier General Samuel Sturgis saying that 1.3 million acre feet
of the required 27 million acre feet of flood control storage
would be lost in the event Idaho Power obtained a license.
"We," Sturgis concluded, "can find substitute storage--but
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where I don't know."

When Representative Pfost asked if the

article was correct, the Corps replied it was "substantially
accurate."

Also, in 1956, McKay, campaigning for Wayne Morse's

senate seat, complained that Brigadier General L. H. Foote,
North Pacific Division of the Corps, had made statements
about Hells Canyon to the Oregonian "damaging to the Administration policy and my personal campaign."

Foote, in fact,

expressed concern that "only half the possible flood storage
will be available" according to the plans of the private utility companies in the area.

McKay subsequently asked Sherman

Adams "for help in getting the Army Corps of Engineers back
in step with administration policy c·oncerning Hells Canyon ·

Dam."

Adams, according to McKay, accomplished this task.

While they were not concerned with the power issue, the Wildlife Management Institute and the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources worried over another aspect of comprehensive
planning.

They feared the Idaho Power Company's plan would

result in losses of fisheries, wildlife, and recreational
facilities.

The argument for the comprehensive plan of the

Bureau of Reclamation was perhaps best summed up by the National Farmers' Union.

"The Idaho Power Company project," it

told the FPC, "would contribute absolutely nothing to the
region in the way of benefits to irrigation and substantially
less than the Federal Hells Canyon project to navigation and
flood control."

The public versus private power issue was

only a fig leaf; actually, the. real issue was over the relative
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merits of comprehensive plannine:; and partnership. 18
The second reason the high dam advocates favored the Bureau of Reclamation's plan was economic.

The Pacific. Northwest

possessed an aluminum industry dependent on low-cost power.
Also, rock phosphate, located in southern Idaho, awaited exploitation, but this potential industry also required cheap
power.

The National Hells Canyon Association told the FPC

the high dam "would contribute materially more to alleviate
the hydroelectric power problem throughout the region, including southern Idaho."

In other words, cheap power supplied by

a federal project would entice more industry to the area,
which, in turn, would create more jobs.

Or, conversely, as

former President Truman put it, if the FPC gives Idaho Power
a license, there will be "less power and higher rates, fewer
jobs and lower wages."
tive to this view.

Organized labor was especially recep-

Andrew J. Biemiller of the AF of L and

O. A. Knight, Vice President, C.I.O., both testified before
the House SubcoI:'llD.ittee on Irrigation and Reclamation for the
18 rbid., 6-7, 98; Robert W. Lucas to Tudor, March 16,
1954; Memo, "Summary of volumes 117-132 of the Hearings Conducted by the Federal ?ower Commission on the subject matter
Hells Canyon, John B. Bennett to Tudor, June 24, 1954, Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Files, no
box number, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; Montana Great Falls Tribune, July 2, 1953; Pfost to Brig. General
C. H. Chorpening, July 8, 1953; C. H. Chorpening to Pfost,
July 28, 1953, Corps of Engineers Files,- no box number, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; two telegrams, McKay
to Adams, June 7, 1956, Central Files, GP-140-E-2, Eisenhower
Library; McKay to Adams, June 15, 1956, Gentral Files, GF-109
-A-2, Eisenhower Library; Senate Report 2275, 49; Con~ression
al Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 9, 1956), v. Io , part
Io, 13479; New York Times, October 6, 1953, 34; Seymour Harris, Economics of Political Parties, 308-09.
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federal dam.

Further, after noting that eighty percent of

its membership was unemployed seven months of the year, Elmer
F. Mcintire, executive secretary of the Idaho State Federation of Labor, suggested to the same subcommittee that "lowcost power from Hells Canyon will provide many thousands of
new jobs, as well as firming up the economy for more yearround payrolls which the Northwest needs badly."

For this

reason organized labor in the State of Washington condemned
Governor Langlie's intervention on the side of the Idaho Power
Company, and worked to defeat his bid in 1956 for the Senate
seat of Warren Magnuson, a longtime champion of the federal
dam.

The American Public Power Association also supported
cheap power through a federal dam. 1 9
The public power groups and conservationists painted
the Idaho Power Company as a big business interloper whose
true interests actually rested outside the Pacific Northwest.
Senator Estes Kafauver, for example, charged that the Company's base was in New England and had "few controlling stockholders west of the Hudson River."

If partnership meant

local control, then, he asked, how does Idaho Power fit in?
l9Federal Power Com.mission, Intervener's Brief, Project
No. 1971, Part 7, 23; New York Times, September 8, 20, 21;
October 29, 1953, 32; House Subcommittee on Interior and Reclamation hearings (July 1955), 150-57, 123; Resolution,
International Union of Operating'Engineers to McKay, January
8, 1954; resolution, Central Labor Council of Spokane and
Vicinity, December 27, 1956; resolution, Spokane County CIC
Council, December 27, 1956, J. L. Newlun, President, Y~kima
County Public Power Leage, to McKay, February 23, 1954, in
Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central
Files, no box number, Federal Records Center, Suitland,
Maryland.
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Tom E. Roach, President of Idaho Power, said this image was a
distortion.

The Company's largest shareowner, he wrote Ke-

fauver, represented "an ownership of about 2% of the total
in terms of corporate voting power."

The corporate voting

power of Idaho shareowners alone, Roach continued, was "almost double that of shareowners residing in any other state."
Hence, Idaho Power was not, as Kefauver and others thought,
an

Eastern-based operation, controlled by a few shareholders.

Nonetheless, the Cooperative League, testifying on behalf of
the federal dam, accused Idaho Power of having its "principal
stockholders" in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. 20
Finally, the advocates of the federal project perceived
a parallel between Hells Canyon and Dixon-Yates.

According

to them, a victory for Idaho Power and Dixon-Yates would signify a return to "the power trust" of the twenties.

Senator

Wayne Morse, for example, correctly noted that a majority of
the members of the Atomic Energy Commission disapproved of
the Dixon-Yates contract but Eisenhower nevertheless commanded
the Commission to negotiate the contract.

"How long," Morse

asked, "will it be before the White House tells the Federal
Power Commission how to decide the Hells Canyon [case] or another like it?"

Recognizing the same parallel, Senator Mag-

nuson, Chairman of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce
20New York Times, February 14, 1953, III, 2; Kefauver to
T. E. Roach, February 12, 1954; T. E. Roach to Kefauvsr, February 25, 1954, in Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, no box number, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; House Subcommittee on Interior and Reclamation hearings
(July 1955), 140-41.
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Committee charged with handling FPC nominations, warned that
he was "watching carefully" the activities of the Federal
Power Commission in the Hells Canyon case.

The Hells Canyon

Association, of course, drew the same parallel.

Because,

indeed, the issues were so similar, the advocates of the
federal dam received support from the Tennessee Valley congressional bloc.

Kefauver in 1955 openly questioned Kuyken-

dall' s impartiality in both the Dixon-Yates and Hells Canyon
. .
21
d ec1s1ons.
The Federal Power Commission's Examiner, William Costello,
heard these conflicting arguments from July 1953 to July 1954,
and the parties engaged in another year of protracted legal
maneuvering before a final decision was reached.

In December

1954, the FPC's staff "bought most of the Idaho Company's
arguments."

Their brief reported that while the three dams

would not be any more economica,l .tb.an the single federal dam,
there were advantages to the private operation that overrode
considerations for the federal scheme.

In fact, the staff

brief came out so strongly for the Idaho Power Company that
many Washington observers felt the FPC Examiner, whose duty
it was to make a recommendation to the Commission itself,
could not but agree with the brief.

They were perfectly

co~ressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., v. 100,
part 9 (J y 21, 1954), 11170-?2, 11180, and July 22, 1954,
11346-47; Kefauver to Morse, reprinted in the New York Herald
Tribune, August 6, 1955, in Files of Joseph Dodge, Box.?,
Eisenhower Library; House Subcommittee on Interior and Reclamation hearinGS (July 1955), 121-22. It should be pointed
out that the Democrats (and one Independent, wayne Morse)
fully supported the Democrat~ from the Tennessee Valley in
the Dixon-Yates controversy.
21

190
correct.

On May 6,

1955, the Examiner recommended that the

Commission grant the Idaho Power Company a license.
lo's reasons were curious, however.

Costel-

In short, he found that

the high Hells Canyon dam would be superior to the private
utility plan.

"The three dam plan of the Applicant," Costel-

lo wrote, "would not serve the public purposes and promote
the public interest in the same way as the High Dam Project
might under governmental auspices, but this is not to say that
the Applicant's plan would not serve public purposes and promote the public interest."

The deciding factor in the case,

however, was Congress' unwillingness to pass a bill authorizing the federal project: " ••• the likelihood of the authorization of and appropriation for an undertaking of the site
involved in the High Dam Project is so remote as to make
recommendation to the

Congress.~.that

such a dam be under-

taken by the United States a completely useless action."

When

Costello made his recommendation to the Commission, a flurry
of protests came forth.

The supporters of the comprehensive

plan demanded that Costello had, in effect, exceeded his
authority.

The Examiner's duty, they declared, was to weigh

the evidence impartially on the relative merits of the two
arguments, not to act as "a political weather bureau."

The

high dam congressmen thus vowed an all-out fight in Congress
for their project. 22

22 "Private Power Wins Again," Business Week (December 4,
1954), 32; Ellis, A Giant Step, 129; FPC, .Examiner's Brief
(May 6, 1955), Project No. 19?1, Part 10, 6-7; New York Times,
May ?, 1955. ·
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The worst suspicions of the federal dam advocates seemed
confirmed when, on August 4, 1955, the Federal Power Commission, all Eisenhower appointees, concurred with Costello's
reasoning.

The Commission said that flood control facilities

could be found elsewhere and the navigation and recreation
aspects of the two cases were about equal.

Also, they noted

the benefit-cost ratio for the hydroelectric power between
the two proposals was about one to one.

Finally, the Com-

mission laconically observed that, by law, "it is not in the
public interest for the United States to undertake every
water-power development ••• "

Idaho Power lost little time and,

in November, announced that it had signed a contract with the
:r-Iorrison-Knudson Company, Inc., to build the Brownlee and
Oxbow projects.

Business Week accurately interpreted the

FPC's decision as "a monumental victory for private power,"
and the American Farm Bureau Federation urged uncommitted
Senators to defeat the federal Hells Canyon bill in Congress.
The National Reclamation Association also approved the FPC's
decision.

The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,

on the other hand,

thought the Commission's ruling "prepos-

terous and presumptive," and asked for the resignation of
McKay and two of his assistants.

"This order," Senator Morse

added, "shows how the FPO is responding to the signals of
the Eisenhower Administration for propaganda purposes without actually requiring construction of the thl;'ee dams."

Af-

ter the Commission denied the interveners' request for a rehearing, two·avenues for redress still remained open.

The
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advocates of comprehensive planning appealed the FPC decision
to the Federal Court of Appeals and sought congressional approval for a high dam. 2 3
The conservationists had faced an uphill struggle in
Congress all along.

Between 1952 and 1954 little progress

had been expected from the Republican Congress.

They had

wisely decided to drag out the FPC proceedings until after
the elections o.f 1954, when, hope.fully, a recepti.ve Democratic
congress would be elected.

In these elections Richard Neu-

berger, a nationally known conservationist, defeated Guy Cordon, a veteran Republican Senator .from Oregon.
and Hells Canyon had been the main issues.

Dixon-Yates

The wishes of

the high dam adherents came true; the Democrats recaptured
Congress.

w"nen, shortly after the elections six Democrat;ic

senators .from the Paci.fie Northwest asked Eisenhower to
"recommend early authorization o.f the High Hells Canyon Dam"
in his State of the Union Message, they were told that while
the matter was before the FPC, the Administration would take
no position.

Instead, the President's message reiterated the

2 3Federal Po~er Commission, Opinion No. 283 (August 4~
1955), Project Nos. 1971, 2132, 2133, Part 11, 5-6, 8-9, 11,
16-17, 18-19; House Subcommittee on Interior and Reclamation
hearings (July 1955), 319; Ellis, A Giant Step, 130; Special
Report of the Chairman to Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs on H~arings Scheduled for Week of September
19, 1955 on Subjects of Hells Canyon,, Power Preference Clause,
and Power Partnership (September 1, 1955), 17; "FPC Won't Reconsider Snake River Power Decision," Business Week (October
8, 1955), 158; "Private Utility Gets Hells Canyon," Business
Week (August 13, 1955), 28; Charles C. Butler, American Farm
I3ul:'eau Federation, to Adams, June 29, 1956, Eisenhower Library, Central Files, OF-155-E-l, Box 838; New York Times, August 6, 18; September 2, 23; September 30, 14; October 19,
1954; November 10, 53; November 29, 1955, 21.
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main points outlining his partnership policy.

The Bureau of

the Budget went so far as to ask the Senate Interior Committee to defer its action until the Commission had acted.

In

April 1955, the Senate Interior Committee opened hearings in
the Pacific Northwest on the subject.

That same mo·nth the

Senatorial sponsors of a high dam bill requested that the
Federal Power Commission "hold in abeyance any action on the
application of the Idaho Power Company ••• pending action by
Congress."

The Commission refused, saying the matter was now

before its Examiner and must await his de.cision.

Later, the

Senate Interior Committee and Senator Kefauver's Antimonopoly
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee announced they
would conduct a "series of coordinated hearings on public and
private power program.s." 24
A note of urgency was struck by the high dam advocates.
One of the sponsors of the House bill, Representative Don
Magnuson, for instance, told his colleagues that unless they
24 "Hellspox," Life, v. 35, No. 19 (November 11, 1953),
27; December 30, 19~Senators Murray, Mansfield, Morse, Neuberger, Magnuson and Jackson to Eisenhower, Central Files,
OF-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower Library; Senate, Subcommittee
on Irrigation and Reclamation, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., A Bill
to Authorize the Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of
the Hells Can on Dam on the Snake River Between Idaho and Ore~on, and for Related Ptiraoses
1
, 3 0- l; July , 1 5 ,
larence Davis to Bernar M. Shanley, Secretary to the President, Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central
Files, no box number, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; Senate Report 2275, 34-35; Special Report of the Chairman (September 1, 1955), 18, 19-20, 20-21, 21-22, 23-24. The
Senate Antimonopoly Subcommittee had been investigating the
Dixon-Yates contract and thus these coordinated hearings were
an outgrowth of both the Dixon-Yates and Hells Canyon controversies. It was an effort to discredit the Administration's
entire power program.
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acted that session it would "foreclose forever the possibility
of full development of the hydroelectric
Canyon.

potf~ntial"

in Hells

On July 27, 1955, the same day the FPC reached its

decision, the House Interior Subcommittee, along strict party
lines, narrowly approved a bill authorizing construction of a
government dam at Hells Canyon.

The following year both the

House and Senate Interior Committees favorably reported out
bills calling for a federal dam.

Significantly, the Senate

Interior Committee maintained it had "continuing jurisdiction
••• of the subject matter [Hells Canyon] ••• , in spite of the
issuance by the Federal Power Commission of a license for
construction of the private project.-"
the bill by a vote of 51 to 41.

But the Senate rejected

Afterwards Speaker Sam Ray-

burn decided there would be no attempt to present the bill to
the House. 2 5
The.Hells Canyon issue provided fuel for the political
fires in the Pacific Northwest's elections of 1956.

As early

as 1953 the Denver Post had warned the Administration "that
the political consequences of a final decision on the Snake
River which is not fully justified in terms of the public
interest--present and future--will invite strong reaction at
2 5House Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation (July
1955), 9-10; Senate Report 2275, 10, House of Representatives,
84th Cong., 2d Sess., Report 2542 (July 29, 1956); Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., v. 102, Part 10 (July 19,
1956), 13498; New York Times, July 20, 1956, 1. The FPC had
reached its decision on July 27 but delayed its decision until
August 4, 1955. Also, seven Southern Democrats had voted
against the Senate bill and only two Republicans voted for it.
While this was a victory for partnership, it was also a victory for the Dixicrat-Republican coalition.
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the polls."

In the Senate races Magnuson defeated Langlie in

Washington, Morse defeated former Secretary of the Interior
McKay, and Frank Church, a young unknown lawyer, upset incumbent Herman Welker in Idaho.

The Hells Canyon issue was also

felt in races for the House.

For example, a past president

of the Hells Canyon Association, Albert Ullman, defeated one
of partnership's staunchest defenders. 26
Despite these impressive political victories, bad news
was in the offing.

In October 1956, the Federal Court of

Appeals upheld the Federal Power Commission's ruling.

Typi-

cally, the New Renublic chanted the familiar refrain that
private interests were "buying one of America's great national assets" and the Administration was "selling it because it
hates public power."

Wayne Morse vowed the decision would

be appealed to the Supreme Court.

It was, but in April 1957,

the high court decided overwhelmingly to refuse to review the
Court of Appeal's ruling.

The only remaining possibility for

reversing the FPC decision was immediate congressional action. 2 7
26nenver Post, May 17, 1953; Maley, "Hell's Canyon and
1956," Newsweek, 46 (August 29, 1955), 80; New York Times,
September 5, 32; October 20, 1956, 13. Senator Magnuson
clearly recognized the politics of the issue. He made this
statement in 1953 during Kuykendall's nomination hearings:
"I want to say to the committee, in all fairness to my friend
Mr. Kuykendall, that this has not only become a dispute between the Idaho Power Co. and the people who propose Hells
Canyon, but in some cases, unfortunately, it has become a
part of our political life in Idaho, Washington and Oregon."
Senate Commerce Committee, Kuykendall Nomination (1953), 8.
2 7The decision can be found in: Senate, Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Nomination of Jerome K. Ku kendall of Washington to be a Memoer
0
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It appeared highly unlikely Congress would act swiftly
enough on the matter.

Representative Clair Engle, Chairman

of the House Interior Committee, envisioned a perplexing
problem should federal dam legislation be enacted.

If such

a bill were approved, it would then be necessary, he noted,
to condemn all the work already done by the Idaho Power Company.

Another congressman told Sherman Adams that, after

all, Idaho Power, acting "in good faith," had spent $5? million on construction thus far.

"If this federal dam is ap-

proved," he contended, "this will be money down the river."
By a strange twist of events, however, the Senate quickly
passed the federal dam bill.

On this occasion five

southern~

ers reversed their former stand and voted for the bill.

Com-

menting on this sudden about face, Senator Charles Potter (RMich.) claimed the supporters of a federal dam had sold Eisenhower's civil rights bill "down the river."

It was his belief

that some Northern Democrats, "fellows supposed to be great
advocates of civil rights," had struck a bargain with these
Southern Senators whereby they would vote against putting the
civil rights bill on the calendar in return for their votes
on Hells Canyon.
gation.

The Democrats, of course, denied the alle-

Whether it was true or not mattered little as chances

of extracting the bill from the House Interior Committee
proved slim.
measure.

In July the Committee voted 16-14 against the

Two southern representatives voted along with .a

Profits of .Partnership," New Re~ublic, 135 (October 22, 1956),
2; The Oregonian, October Io, I 56; New York Times, April 2,

195?, 1.
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solid Republican minority to kill the bill.

With that vote,

advocates of comprehensive planning had.run out of rope;
partnership had won an important victory. 28

28 "Dams: Government Will Build More," Interview with
Representative Clair Engle, U.S. News and World Report, XLII,
No. 2 (January 11, 1957), 127-28; Rep. A. L. Hiller to Adams,
July 12, 195?, Central Files, OF-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower
Library; Con~ressional Record, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 103,
Part 8 (June 21, 1957), 9976; New York Times, June 22, l;
July 25, 195?, l; Clyde T. Ellis to Senator Paul Douglas,
June 8, 1957, Paul Douglas Papers, Box ?08, Chicago Historical Society, thanking him for his support of the bill, said
that "at pres·ent that House Interior Committee appears to
have acted negatively on the bill."

CHAPTER VII
RECLAMATION Ort 'WILDERNESS?
A1though it is generally agreed that the multiple purpose
dam is the best form of land and reclamation management, all
potential policy-making problems are not automatically eliminated.

A conflict arises, for example, when reclamationist

and wilderness adherents desire incompatible objectives for
the same site.

In such cases both sides can claim, with jus-

tification, to be advocating "conservation;" politically, the
Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service then draw
support from their client groups outside the government.
Quite often, however, ths·goverr.iment's reclamation and park
bureaus become the prisoners of their constituents, thus
making compromise an all but futile effort.
type developed during

E~senhower's

A case of this

administration over a pro-

posed dam for Dinosaur National Monument. 1
A contest of wills between the National Park Service and
the Bureau of Reclamation, both agencies within the interior
department, arose over the need to develop the upper Colorado
River.

Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico, states com-

prising the upper Colorado basin, were sparsely populated
1 Roderick Nash (ed.), The American Environment: Readings
in the History of Conservation (Massachusetts, 1968), 183;
Coyle, Conservation, 242.
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and had little industry outside the
Sal t Lake-Provo urban centers.

Denver-P~eblo

and Ogden-

And its was obvious this area

would remain "a colony," as one senator put it, until the
upper Colorado River was developed.

Most people in the

upper basin made their living, to some degree, from tourism,
agriculture, or mining.

But the area's economic potential

was severely limited by a shortage of water.

Cheap power,

for example, would have made possible the exploitation of the
region's phosphate rock.

Finally, it was also imperative

that a method be found to eliminate the recurring menaces of
flood and drought that plagued the area.

The Bureau of Reclamation thus set out to remedy these prob1ems. 2
The Bureau of Reclamation had focused its attention on
developing

th~

Colorado River for some time.

When the Bureau

proposed building a reservoir on the Colorado River's lower
basin, the people living in the upper region protested strenuously, feeling that if the reservoir were built.the lower
basin would then acquire prior right to all unapportioned
water, thus hampering future development in the upper basin.
To allay these fears Congress authorized the negotiation of
an interstate compact between the upper and lower basins.

In

1922, Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada,
2 Pb.illip Sirotkin and Owen Stratton, The Echo Park Controvers~ (Inter-University Case Program, Indianapolis, 1959),
1-2. T e Colorado River rises in the Rocky Mountains of
Colorado and western Wyoming, flows across southwestern Utah
and northwestern Arizona, and from there enters the Gulf of
California in. New Mexico. This basin is about 250,000 square
miles or about one-twelfth of the country.
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and California signed the Colorado River Compact at Santa Fe,
New Mexico.

The compact's specified purpose was to establish

order in the Colorado River region by insuring that each of
the signatories would get a fair share of the River's water.
Accordingly, each basin was apportioned a "beneficial consumptive use" of

7.5 million acre-feet of water per annum.

Also,_ the ·upper basin states were obliged not to deplete the
flow of water at Lee Ferry, the demarcation between the upper
and lower basins, below

75 million acre-feet in any period of

ten consecutive years.

Development of the lower basin then

proceeded.

In 1928, the Boulder Canyon Project Act authorized

construction of Hoover Dam and corollary facilities.

The

Bureau of Reclamation leased the dam's power to the City of
Los Angeles, the Southern California Edison Company, and tha
Metropolitan Water District of Southerri California.
When the upper basin states decided to push for development of their area the Department of Interior informed them
that they would be required to negotiate a compact among
themselves for the division of their water before the federal
government could make any commitment.
intractable.

Utah, however, proved

Thinking it would not obtain quality water

once Wyoming received its share from the Green River, Utah
balked at signing the compact.

This impasse was not resolved

until Colorado agreed to let Utah have an annual average of
500,000 acre-feet of Yampa River water.
mained one

s~icky

point.

But there still.re-

Utah could not secure the Yampa

water unless a dam was constructed at Echo Park or some site
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nearby.

To secure this compact, then, all the participants,

including the Bureau of Reclamation, assured Utah that Echo
Park Dam would be built.

In short, Echo Park Dam became the

heart of the entire Upper Colorado River Storage Project;
without it, the whole project might well die and with it the
upper basin's hope for economic progress.

When, in 1950, the

Bureau of Reclamation submitted its report to Secretary Chapman it called for construction of a billion-dollar Upper Colorado River Storage Project, a ten-dam plan for the development of the Colorado River and its tributaries.

Echo Park

Dam was the second largest dam in the Project.3
The National Park Service, which supervised Dinosaur
National Monument, did not become actively involved until
1949, when it first discovered the Bureau of Reclamation's
intentions.

Because of its grandeur and fossil deposits,

Echo Park held great interest for paleontologists and naturalists alike.

Dinosaur National Monument was located on the

Green and Yampa Rivers in western Colorado and eastern Utah.
In 1915 President Wilson had proclaimed an 80-acre tract in
Utah a monument and Franklin Roosevelt, in 1938, had expanded
the monument to about 205,000 acres.

The site became known

3senate, Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), A Bill to Authorize the SecretaR of the Interior to Construct, Operate, and Maintain the
Co orado River Stora e ?ro·ect and Particinatinp; Pro·ects,
an
or 0 er Purposes,
,
erea er re erre
o as
Sen. Subc., Colorado River (1955)]; Commission on the Organization of the .Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force
on Water Resources and Power (June, 1955), 476-79; Sirotkin
and Stratton, Echo Park, 4-8, 27-28, 35, 39.
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as Dinosaur National Monument.

The National Park Service

thus became alarmed when it learned the Bureau of Reclamation
was conducting reconnaissance activities in Echo Park.

A

1946 Park Service report on the recreational resources of the
Colorado River Basin made its position plain.

"Construction

of dams at these sites [Echo Park and Split Mountain]," it
warned, "would adversely alter the dominant geological and
wilderness qualities and the relatively minor archeological
and wildlife values of the Canyon Unit so that it would no
longer possess national monument qualifications."

In April

1949, the Park Service's Washington office informed its
field offices that it intended to oppose construction of a
dam at Echo Park.

Meanwhile, the Bureau of Reclamation had

continued surveying the monument.

Echo Park's superintendent

advised the Park Service to do something

immediately~...to

halt

the Bureau's activities.

By this time, however, the Bureau
had defined its plans for Echo Park. 4
The conflict was thus thrown into. the lap of the Secretary of Interior.

In April 1950, Secretary Chapman held hear-

ings to determine which agency would prevail.

The Department

heard a wide range of testomony, including upper basin senators and congressmen, the two Interior bureaus, and various
conservation leaders.

The congressional delegation from the

upper basin states was unanimous in its advocacy of the dam.
Senator Elbert D. Thomas (D-Utah) succinctly expressed'their
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interest: "From earliest pioneer times, the lack of abundance
of water has controlled our destiny, and times have not
changed."

The Bureau of Reclamation, of course, agreed, not-

ing that the Project constituted "the most efficient means
of attaining comprehensive reservoir development in the Upper
Colorado River Basin."

The National Park Service and its

constituency, on the other hand, was not timid in delivering
its views.

Newton Drury, Director of the Park Service, said:

"We feel that this issue should be dealt with from a longrange and national standpoint and not from the standpoint of
temporary and local interests."

The lines were now clearly

drawn~

After the hearings Chapman carefully reviewed the record.
While he weighed the evidence each side besieged him to rule
in its favor.

Senator Arthur V. Watkins of Utah pressed Chap-

man to speed up his decision so Congress would have time to
authorize the Project for 1951.
not adverse to
lay either.

m~king

political

Watkins, a Republican, was
capita~

out of Chapman's de-

Democratic congressmen from the upper basin were

equally mindful of the political significance of Echo Park
Dam and the Upper Colorado River Storage Project for their
own off-year elections; an, adverse decision, they

conten~ed,

could ruin their chances for reelection.

Drury also contin-

ued to defend his bailiwick's position.

With characteristic

sarcasm, for example, he asked Chapman: "How about wasting a
national monument? 11

In June Chapman finally ruled in favor

of the reclrunationisus.

He pointed out that the Bureau of
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Reclamation's plan was the most economical one in a desert
river basin and that construction of the dam would not, as
the wilderness enthusiasts had argued, set a precedent for
future invasions of other parks or monuments.

"Much superb

wilderness within the monument," he added, "will not be affected, excepting through increased accessibility."
Chapman's decision fully alerted the wilderness advocates that the fox was now at the gate.

In a poignant arti-

cle in the Saturday Evening Post, Bernard Devoto, a nationally known wilderness enthusiast, sounded· the call for oppo-.
sition to Echo Park Dam.

"The parks do not belong to any

bureau, a!\Ygroup of planners or engineers, any state or section," he protested.
them?

"They belong to all' of us.

Will our grandchildren want them?"

Do we want

Until his juncture,

the wilderness defenders had been ill-organized; henceforth
they were no·t.

The Bureau of Reclamation would indeed have

to fight to preserve its position.5
The forces marshalled against the dam sought to convince
Chapman that he had erred.

Nature Magazine frankly declared

that it did not trust the intentions of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs also dissented.

Within the government, the National Park Service

5Ise, Park Policy, 478; Department of ~he Interior, P££ceedin s before the De artment of the Interior. Hearin-s on
Dinosaur Nationa Iionument 2cho Park and S lit r·!oun ain Dams
Apri
,
, ,
,
; June
,
, Wa ·ins o _c apman; Memo, June 27, 1950, Chapman to Drury and Straus; Memo,
June 16, 1950, Drury to Chapman, in Department of Interior,
Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53,
Box 3597, National Archives; Bernard DeVoto, "Shall We Let
Them Ruin Our National Parks.?", Saturday Evening Post (July,

1950), 17-19, 42-49.

205
persisted in its opposition to the dam.

While it was prohib-

ited from publicly criticizing the decision and from distributing the DeVoto article, Drury told the Secretary of Interior
that "the fundamental question" raised by the article "is
still the number one problem of your National Park Service."
Drury's usefulness to the cause was doubtful, however,

f~r

the political objectives and personalities of Drury and Chapman clashed at every point.

They had never gotten along any-

way, but so long as the Park Service was headquartered in
Chicago during the war the distance separating them ameliorated the tension.

After 194?, when the Service returned to

the nation's capitol, Chapman and Drury were in close proximity and their feud bubbled over with the Echo Park decision.
wnen Chapman, bent on getting rid of the Park Service director,
offered him a lesser post than his present one, Drury resigned.
Nonetheless, the Park Service continued to oppose Chapman's
decision.

The wilderness crusaders were joined by other

government agencies opposing the entire Upper Colorado River
Storage Project.

The Corps of Engineers questioned the econ-

omic feasibility of the Project; the staff of the Department
of Agriculture likewise felt that the Project's irrigation
provision would not stand .up under careful scrutiny; and the
Federal Power Commission was simply noncommittal.
In December 1952, these efforts were rewarded when Chapman revised his decision.

In recommending that the Upper

Colorado River Storage Project be submitted to Congress,
Chapman advised that a dam b.e built at Echo Park or some
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alternate site, depending on further studies of the problem
by

the Department of Interior.

While this temporary re-

prieve gave the Park Service reason to breathe more easily,
the Bureau of Reclamation was greatly distur'Qed.

:Michael

Straus, Commissioner of the Bureau and not a man to mince
words, charged that the opposition ("self-styled conservationists") had shown "a complete lack of vision."

He asked:

"Why don't we try again and get out from behind the 'iron
curtain'?"

The final decision on Echo Park's fate now rested

in the hands of the new Secretary of Interior and Bureau of
the Budget. 6
It was difficult to tell what the new Administration's
position would be on Echo Park Dam, in particular, and the
Upper Colorado River Storage Project, in general.

There was

no doubting the new partnership policy was hostile to public
power and the Bureau of Reclamation.

What the Republican

campaign fulminations against the New Deal bureaucracy did
not reveal, McKay's decision on Hells Canyon seemingly did.
In addition, the Bureau of Reclamation's budget was dramatic611Let's Be Fair," Nature :Magazine, v. 44 (October 1951),
425; Arthur H. Carhart, "The Menaced Dinosaur Monument,"
National Parks Magazine (January-March, 1952), 1-12; Resolution of the Federation of Outdoor Clubs, Labor Day, 1950;
Memo, July 19, 1950, Drury to Chapman; Memo, Aug. 14, 1950,
Dr~. to Regional Directors, in Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, Box
3597, National Archives; :Memo, Dec. 15, 1952, Straus to Chapman et al, and Dec. 12, 1952, Chapman to Truman, in Department
of IiiterTor, Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files,
1937-53, Box 3577, National Archives; 84th Cong., 2d Sess.,
House Document 364 (1954), 323; 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate
Report 128 (1955), 37-38; Ise, Park Policy, 479-80; Donald
Swain, Wilderness Defender: Horace M. Albri ht and Conservation (C icago,
•

\
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ally reduced from $364 million in fiscal 1950 to about $165
million in fiscal 1955, a reduction of more than fifty percent.
Shortly after taking office McKay directed Undersecretary
Ralph Tudor to personally review Echo Park and the Project.
From the beginning McKay did not, as he told the governors
of Wyoming, New Mexico, and Colorado, intend to withhold his
approval of Echo Park Dam unless Tudor's

investiga~ion

proved

"conclusively" that there was a substantially better plan.
In November 1953 Tudor recommended that Echo Park Dam be included in the Upper Colorado Project.

Even though "the al-

teration [of the site] will be substantial" Tudor felt that
"the beauty of the park will by no means be destroyed and it
will remain an area of great attraction to many people."

The

important upshot: "None of the alternative sites which have
been suggested can compare from·the standpoint of evaporation."
McKay then

pproved Tudor's recommendation and sent it to the

Bureau of the Budget.

The Secretary explained the apparent

incongruity between his Hells Canyon and Echo Park decisions
to the National Rivers and Harbors Congress.

"The Department,"

he said, "will support the construction by the Federal Government of river basin projects, including hydroelectric developments, where such projects are needed and where they are
beyond the means of local public or private enterprise."

In

short, the Idaho Power Company was in a position to build
the dam in Hells Canyon whereas local interests did not possess sufficient financial resources to construct the Upper
Colorado Project.

In other words, the Federal Government was
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not needed in Hells Canyon but was in the Upper Colorado
Basin.?
It appeared the main obstacle would be the Administration's Bureau of the Budget.

Through Circular A-4?, the Bur-

eau of the Budget had seriously circumscribed the Bureau of
Reclamation's activities.

The Circular did not sit well with

the Bureau of Reclamation's primary constituent, the National
Reclamation Association.

In 1954 the Association warned that

it would not stand for an executive veto "over what new projects may be presented to Congress for consideration."

Its

finger suggested that Circular A-4? "should [be] so modified·
or administered as to require the Bureau of the Budget promptly to submit to the Congress those projects which have been
approved by the Secretary of the Interior together with any
appropriate comments."

With record speed the Bureau of the

Budget approved, with some qualifications, the Upper Colorado
River Storage Project.

The National Reclamation Assocation
interpreted the Bureau's approval as a victory of sorts. 8

?Memo, Nov. 11, 1953, Tudor to McKay; July 3, 1953, McKay
to Governor Thornton et al, Secretary of Interior, Office of
the Secretary, Centrar-crassified Files, 1937-53, Box 369?,
National Archives; House of Representatives, Subcoill!Ilittee on
Irrigation and Reclamation, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 1718 rmore often referred to as House Subc. on Colorado Project
(19"54)]; House Document 364 (1954), 44; Dec. 12, 1953, Press
Release, Eisenhower Library, Central Files, OF-155-A, Box 828;
McKay, Speech to National Rivers and Harbors Congress, May 25,
1954, Washington, D.C., Elmer F. Bennett Papers, Box 11, Eisenhower Library.
8 National Reclamation Association, National Water Polic~
Statement, ~esented to the Task Force On Water Resources an
Power of the Commission on the Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government (Denver, Colorado, May l?, 1954), 10,
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Opposition to the Upper Colorado River Storage Project
was centered around an unstable coalition consisting of preservationist advocates, economic opponents, and Californians.
The preservation crusaders were opposed solely to construetion of Echo Park Dam, not to the rest of the Project.

The

National Park Service, of course, opposed the dam but exerted
little influence after McKay made his decision.

Conrad Wirth,

Director of the Park Service, found himself in a touchy situation.

He had been appointed to the post by Truman and, like

Drury, had pressured Chapman to revise his opinion on Echo
Park.

When !1cKay, the new Secretary of Interior, dismissed

Albert Day as Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service for
his "independence," Wirth knew he had better tread softly.
Besides, Wirth was even suspect within preservationist circles, for he championed recreational as much as wilderness
values.

Wirth did, however, publicly oppose Echo Park Dam

before Tudor made his recoI:ll:lendation to McKay.

But once the

Secretary of Interior approved the Project, the Director of
the National Park Service fell silent on the issue.

The

fight to save Dinosaur National Monument was carried on
mainly by the friends of the Park Service residing outside
the goverr..ment.9

39-40; Proceedin s of the Twent -Second Annual Meetin •
!\ationa i.ec ana ion j_ssociation \./ashington, D.C., 1 53),
314, in Elmer F. Bennett Papers, Eisenhower Library; Sen.
Subc., Colorado River (1955), 731-32.
9swain, Albright, 194, 291-92; Sirotkin and Stratton,
Echo Park, 65-66; l~ov. 2, 1953, Rep. Douglas Stringfellow to
NcKay; I·ieno, !Iov. 16, 1953, Wirth to McKay; Dec. 17, 1953,
McKay to Stringfellow; Memo, July 9, 1953, Wirth to Tudor;
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The proponents of wilderness values were national in
scope.

Bernard Devoto of Harper's and John B. Oakes of the

New York Times wrote extensively against the dam, while the
Wilderness Society,

l~ational

Parks Association, Izaak Wal ton

League and the Wildlife Vianagenent Institute applied pressure to congressmen.

The Sierra Club, based mainly on the

West Coast, also figured prominently in the fight.

Influen-

tial individuals, like Alfred A. Knopf, the publisher, contributed to the cause as well.

In order to better coordin-

ate their efforts, the leaders of 32 opposition organizations
created the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources to act
as a registered lobbying agent.

All in all, as one partici-

pant estimated, "somewhere between a million and two million
conservationists, in one way or another," took
struggle. 10
The preservationists argued that construction of the dam
would set a dangerous precedent for the future.

The rape of

Hetch Hetchy was a constant reminder of what could happen if
the Bureau of Reclamation won.

Once the Bureau of Reclama-

tion had invaded Echo Park, it would, they felt, then attack
Memo, May 26, 1953, Wirth to Ass. Seer., in Depart:CTent of
Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files,
1937-53, Box 3597, National Archives; "Echo ?ark Dam Threat:
An Editorial," Nature Magazine, 47 (March 1954), 145; Angus
M. Woodbury, "Colorado Dan Controversy," Scientific Monthly,
82 (June, 1956), 310; Fred N. Packard, l~a tional Parks Assn.,
to McKay, July 10, 1953, Department of Interior, Central
Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3577, National Archives..
10sirotkin and Stratton, Echo Park, 18-23; Jan. 4, 19·54,
Alfred A. Yillopf to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-155-E-l,
Box 838, Eisenhower Library;_ Horace Albright O.H., 836-41.
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Glacier, Olympic and Yellowstone National Parks, among others.
If Congress should follow the recom:r;iendation of the Secretary
of Interior, Devoto flatly predicted, "the national park
system as we know it, as it was intended to be, will be open
to destruction."

In lieu of an expanding population, what

was needed, they therefore emphasized, were more parks, not
fewer.

Besides, the majestic view of Dinosaur National Monu-

ment possessed an intangible value.

Senator Paul Douglas

noted that Echo Park Dam would flood an "awe-inspiring canyon" that "gives man a sense of his littleness in the :face of
the mighty :forces of nature."

(To make this point the wilder-

ness proponents stressed that the President ought to visit
the park to see :for himself.

To their disappointment, however,

the ?residant only flew over tha area, rather than touring it
from the ground.)

Consequently, they felt that rather than

destroying it, Echo Park ought to be raised to national park
status.

Finally, the wilderness advocates sought to use FDR's

proclamation of 1938 as legal evidence to prevent the Bureau
of Reclamation's encroachment. 11
While the wilderness forces opposed only Echo Park Dam,
11 Bernard Devoto, "Intramural Giveaway," Harper's, 208
(Narch 1954), 10 and "Parks and Pictures," 208 (Feb. 1954),
12ff; New York Times, April 20, 1955; Sen. Subc., Colorado
River (1955), 381; House Subc. on Colorado Project (1954),
791-93, 857-58, 872; May 4, 1954, Charles H. Wilkins, Colorado Citizens Comnittee, to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF155-A, Box 828, Eisenhower Library; March 7, 1955, Harold C.
Bradley to Sherman Adams, and Hay 26, 1954, David Brower to
Adams, in Central Files, 0§-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower
Library; John B. Oakes, "Conservation: Federal Program," ·
New York Times, April 4, 1954, II, 25; W. K. Oliver," Izaak
Walton League, to Eisenhower, March 27, 1954, Central Files,
OF-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower Library.
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there were opponents to the entire Upper Colorado River
Storage Project.

Strangely enough, Senator Paul Douglas,

a New Dealer, Raymond Moley, generally an apologist for
partnership, and Leslie I1iller, foroer governor of Wyoming
and presently head of the task force on power for the Second
Hoover Commission, fell into bed together over this issue.
They criticized the entire Project for its economic infeasibility.

They argued, among other things, that the power

costs of the project were too high to justify construction.
The trio objected especially to the basin account method of
financing the Project.

Moreover, it made little sense, they

observed, to irrigate land which would stimulate more agricultural production in the area when farm surplus was already
a problem requiring governmental subsidy.

Finally they noted

that alternate power sources, coal, shale and oil, were available in the area.

Douglas contended, in fact, "that on the

Upper Colorado River power can be generated more cheaply from
coal, in all probability, than it can by the use of water
power ••• "12
12Moley, "Stop, Look and Listen," Newsweek, 43 (May 10,
1954), 108; "Water, Land, and Bookkeeping," Newsweek, 43
(April 12, 1954), 112; "Pork Unlimited," Newsweek, 54 (May 9,
1955), 108; Leslie Miller to Eisenhower, June 11, 1954, Central Files, OF-155-A, Box 828, Eisenhower Library; Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 101 (April 18, 1955),
4574-80. Several times opponents of the Project suggested
that Congress defer action until the Second Hoover Commission
could make its recormendations. The proponents of the Project
did not take this suggestion seriously on the legitimate
ground that Miller, already publicly opposed to the Project,
was the head of the Commission's task force on power. For
example, when Ben P. Griffith, President of the Board of Water
and ?ower Coo.o.ission of the City of Los An~eles, suggested
that Congress wait for the report of the Second Hoover Commission, Senator Anderson shot back: "You want to leave it to
the fellow you know will kill it?" Sen. Subc., Colorado Riv~ (1955), 506.

..
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Opposition to the Upper Colorado Project was rounded out
by the State of California.

Basically California feared that

its $695,000,000 investment in facilities for supplying water
and power from the Colorado River would be seriously impaired.
It took particular exception to the Bureau of Reclamation's
argument that the upper basin states fulfilled their obligation so long as 75,000,000 acre-feet of water were allowed to
California in each ten-year period.

California instead em-

phasized that the Compact of 1922 provided that the upper
basin states were not entitled to more than 7,500,000 acrefeet in an

given year and, besides, they were obligated to

allow 75,000,000 acre-feet to California in each ten-year period, even if it meant cutting their own share below the
7,500,000 acre-feet for a year or so.

P~n..,..ec:::e-nt~ +:;'ti"~
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Hosmer of California contended that the problem was even crucial to the defense of the country.

Southern California, he

noted, was important to the nation's defense aircraft industry.

"This and all other activities of the area," he conclu-

ded, "depend on full availability of the Colorado River water
to which the region has rights."

California remained intransigently opposed to the Project throughout the controversy. 1 3
The political coalition favoring authorization of the

Project was composed of the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal,
state, and local political officials, bureaucratic and quasil3Sirotkin and Stratton, Ee.ho Park, 87, 90-91; Sen. Subc.. ,
Colorado River, 403-51, 503-38; House Document 364 (1954), 11,
13, 17-19, 294-98; Feb. 20, 1956, Craig rtosmer to Bryce Harlow, Central Files, OF-155-A, Box 828, Eisenhower Library •
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bureaucratic officials, the Upper Colorado River CoI!lIDission,
and local business leaders.

Basically the attitude of this

coalition was, as Senator Barnett of Wyoming put it, the
West ought to be allowed to develop the Upper Colorado as it,
and not as the East, wished.
The Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service
derived their strength from different clienteles.

Support

for the Park Service's position was national in scope while
the Bureau of Reclamation's was confined to the region of
the Upper Colorado.

Hence, the Bureau worked closely with

regional political officials.

The Bureau's strength was

based mainly in the Senate; the Park ·service's advantage came
in the House where populous non-reclamation states had heavy
representation.

Moreover, unlike the Hells Canyon episode,

the Bureau now had the full support of the Ad.mini~tration. 14
The opponents of the Project contended that construction
of a dam at Echo Park would constitute an invasion of the
national park system, thus setting a dangerous precedent for
future invasions, and would be a flagrant legal violation of

FDR's proclamation in 1939.

The Bureaus of the Budget and

Reclamation, the Upper Colorado River Commission, and Senator
Arthur Watkins took exception to this reasoning.

The Upper

Colorado River Commission felt the fears of the wilderness
advocates were unfounded.

"Similar circumstances," the Com-

mission suggested, "do not exist in connection with the
14sirotkin and Stratton, Scho Park, 16-18, 21; House
Subc. on Colorado Project (1954), 236-37.
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creation of any other national park or monument, and, therefore, the authorization based upon the unique circumstances
of this case would not constitute a precedent for others."
While the area was to be definitely administered by the Park
Service, the proponents of the dam further pointed out that
Roosevelt's proclamation clearly did not intend to use the
area exclusively for park purposes to the exclusion of needed
power projects.

Quite the contrary, power and water conser-

vation, they said, had "prior right" to use of the park.
Watki!s, in fact, did not think the area was then or ever
had been "under the exclusive possession and justification
of the National Park ad.ministration; ·rather than being an invasion by the Bureau of Reclamation, he interpreted it as
just the reverse, an invasion of reclamation areas by the
National Park Service.

The Federal Power Commission substan- tiated Watkins' contention. 1 5
The proponents also noted that electric power was essential if the region was to develop industrially and economically.

Industry, they argued, would be enticed to the region

only if there were sufficient power potentials.

The revenues

produced from this power development would then pay for the
irrigation costs.

Irrigation, in turn, would encourage agri-

cultural development of the area.

In other words, without

maximum generation of power, the entire plan would fall
15
.
Memo, undated, Carl H. Schwartz to Dodge, Central Files,
OF-155-A, Box 828, Eisenhower Library; Congressional Record,
84th Cong., l~t Sess., v. 103, part 3 (March 28, 1955), 380?16; Sen. Subc., Colorado Pro~ect (1955), 18, 382-83; House
Subc. on Colorado Project (1 54), 890-91.
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through.

Accordin~

the entire concept.

to Tudor, Echo Park Dam was essential to
" ••• the elimination of Echo Park and the

substitution of any alternative," he said, "decreases the
total amount of power that can be generated and, by the same
token, reduces the revenues that are available."

The National

Rural Electric Co-operative Association, in putting its stamp
of approval on the Project, further noted that the preference
clause provision would aid rural electric cooperatives.

The

Federal Power Commission, Corps of Engineers, and Department
of Agriculture, all of whom in varying degrees had formerly
opposed or had been noncommittal to the Upper Colorado Project,
now approved it. 16
The Ad.ministration did not ignore the specific charges
of Moley, Douglas, and Miller.

First off, it was conceded

there was no disputing the trio's facts.

But the matter, as

the Administration viewed it, was a question of choosing be-

7 tween

a financial consideration and economic feasibility.

Thus: "If the administration feels that in the broad sense it
[the Upper Colorado River Project] adds to the economic strength
of the nation to populate these arid areas by attractive irrigation inducement, that is an economic benefit which transcends figures."
purpose ••• "

In short, this was a subsidy "for a worthy

~xheimer,

Commissioner of the Bureau of Recla-

mation, especially took out after Miller and Moley.

He pointed

16House Subc. on Colorado Project (1954), 15, 22-23;
House Document 364 (1954), 20, 24; 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Report 1983 (1954), 18-19; Sen. Subc., Colorado River
(1955), 330-31.
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out that ":cost of the products of western irrigated farms"
were already under price support or acreage control and thus
were not surplus.

Besides, he said, seventy-five percent of

the irrigated land would go toward livestock--not agricultural--production.17
The problem of evaporation at the Echo Park site was
crucial to the reclamationists' argument.

The Bureau of Re-

clamation reports purported that Echo Park was the best available site because water evaporation would be lowest there.
The wilderness forces, under the leadership of General U.S.
Grant III, a former member of the Corps of Engineers now
representing the American Planning and Civic Association,
challenged the Bureau's data.

Through an extensive statis-

tical analysis Grant sought to demonstrate that the Bureauis
figures were in error and that, in fact, Echo Park was not
the best site.

The preservationists contended that, Glen Can-

yon, for example, would be preferable to Echo Park.

When J.

R. Riter, chief hydrologist of the Project Development Branch
of the Bureau of Reclamation, scrutinized the plan the Bureau's evaporation figures declined from 300,000 to between
100,000 to 200,000.

Upon taking the reins of the Interior

Department, McKay instructed Tudor, a former engineer, to
conduct a personal examination.
Riter's.

Tudor's findings agreed with

Using simple arithmetic, David Brower of the Sierra

1 7Memo, May 26, 1954, J. S. Bragdon to Arthur Burns, John
Bragdon Papers, Box 11, Eisenhower Library; May 13, 1955,
Press Release, Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation,
Elmer F. Bennett Papers, Box 11, Eisenhower Library. Bragdon's emphasis.
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Club laid even these revised figures to waste before the
House Subcoomittee on Irrigation and Reclamation.

If Con-

gress approves the Project, Dinosaur Monument, DeVoto lamented, "will have been ruined and the national park system
undermined on the basis of errors in arithmetic too gross to
be permitted a schoolboy."

Nevertheless, the Bureau of

Reclamation refused to concede the point; quite the contrary,
the Bureau attempted to demonstrate that its figures were
indeed the correct ones.

But in the end, TUdor admitted that

the Bureau's evaporation figures for Echo Park and Glen Canyon had been nistaken.

Nevertheless he did not conclude that

Glen Canyon would be a justifiable substitute for Echo Park.
Significantly, though, the preservationists had cast doubt
on the accuracy of the Bureau of Reclamation's arguments.
With this crack in the dike water now began to seep through. 18
In 1954, the Echo Park Dam champions met strong resistance in Congress and had to cancel their plans until the next
session.

A couple of days after the Senate Interior Committee

favorably reported out the bill, a coalition of eastern, southern, and California representatives combined to defeat the
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project for Colorado in the House.

Since

the issues were essentially the same, this was generally
interpreted as a test vote for the Echo Park reclamationists.
18 nepartraent of Interior, Hearings on Dinosaur National
Nonument (April 3, 1950), 375-87; House Subc. on Colorado
Project (1954), 794-99, 824-30; Devoto, "And Fractions Drive
Me Nad," Harter's, 209 (Sept. 1954), 11; May 13, 1954, Ralph
Tudor to lJil iam H. Harrison, Central Files, OF-155-1, Box
838, Eisenhower Library; Sirotkin and Stratton, Echo Park,
28-30.
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Actually, the Department of Interior and Bureau of the Budget
regretted ever having approved the Fryingpan Project in the
first place and now wanted it to die in the House.

Charles

Willis correctly foresaw that "the long-range political problems of sponsoring such a piece of legislation might be much
more severe" than allowing it to be defeated.
agreed.

Sherman Adams

Nevertheless, the defeat of the Fryingpan-Arkansas

bill sent tremors up the spines of the supporters of the Upper
Colorado Project.

The Denver

~'

for instance, accused the

Republican leadership of allowing the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project to die and inferred that the leadership had also destroyed
any chance that the Upper Colorado .Proje.ct would be passed.
Senator Wallace F. Bennett complained to Eisenhower that the
Post editorial uindicates the extent to which our opponents
are prepared to go to turn it against us even though in this
case the [Fryingpan-Arkansas] bill was actually killed by the
Democrats in the House."

When he requested a "top-level

statement" reaffirming the Administration's support of the
Upper Colorado Project, Eisenhower complied.

In

a letter to

Bennett, the President announced his continued support of
the Upper Colorado Project.

At the urging of Senator Watkins,

who had recently overseen the senatorial censure of McCarthy
for the President, the Upper Colorado Project was included
in the Budget message.

The ?reject was also endorsed in his
State of the Union message. 1 9
l983rd Cong., 2d Sess., House Report 1943 (1954); Memo,
July 23, 1954, Charles F. Willis, Jr., to Adams; Memo, undated,
Adams to Willis, in Central Files, OF-155-K, Box 841, Eisenhower Library; Aug. 5, 1954, Wallace F. Bennett to Eisenhower;
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Indeed, the Upper Colorado Project ran a gauntlet well
prepared by the opposition coalition.

The Western-dominated

Subcommittees on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Senate and
House held hearings on the Upper Colorado Project.

Echo Park

Dam was included in both of their favorable reports.

Led by

Representative John Saylor (R-Pa.) the preservationists made
the full committee vote in the House so close (13 to 12) that
the pro-dam advocates were more determined than ever to get
as good a vote as possible in the Senate.

The Senate Interior

Committee voted overwhelmingly to approve the Project.

Never-

theless, not long before the test vote on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, Sherman Adams conceded to the governor of Wyoming
that "at the present time prospects for enactment of this
legislation [Upper Colorado Project] do not appear bright."
A.fter the test vote on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, the
Upper Colorado bill was dropped until the next session of
Congress. 20
After the Democrats recaptured Congress in the 1954 elections, the Administration continued to support inclusion of
Echo Park Dam in the Upper Colorado Project.

"Our power policy

Sept. 15, 1954, Eisenhower to Bennett, Central Files, OF-125B, Box 643, Eisenhower Library; Con~ressional Record, 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess., v. 100 (July 28, 1 54), pt. 5, 12453; Arthur
V. Watkins, Enourrh Ro e: The Inside Ster of the Censure of
Senator Joe HcCart
His Co lea ues, ••• New Jersey, 1
),
-·

20Nash, 'Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven, 1967),
215; John Oakes, "Conservation: The Echo Park Issue," New York
Times, June 6, 1954, II, 29; 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., House Report 1774 (1954); New York Times, July 25, 1954, 45; 83rd Cong.,
2d Sess., Senate Report 1983 (1954); July 13, 1954, Adams to
C. J. Rogers, Central Files, OF-155-A, Box 828, Eisenhower
Library.
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has not changed," McKay announced shortly after the elections.
"We still look with favor on legislation proposing partnership projects that we believe fall within the scope of our
policy."

The Secretary then reiterated his support of the

Upper Colorado Project.

Western Republican and Democratic

senators banded together in an effort to push the Upper Colorado Project through the next session of Congress.

For their

part, the preservationists evinced a disposition to withdraw
their opposition to the Project, providing Echo Park Dam was
dropped from the bill.

Richard Neuberger, the first Demo-

cratic senator iri the history of Oregon, found himself torn
between these two positions.

In his.campaign to unseat vet-

eran Republican Senator Guy Cordon.in 1954, Neuberger, a
nationally known conservationist, had largely campaigned on
the public power issue.

He excoriated the Administration for

its offshore oil, Dixon-Yates, and Hells Canyon decisions.
Yet, as an outdoorsman and member of the Wilderness Society,
he also held preservationist sympathies.

In the end, however,

he voted in committee for the Project, while seeking an
ment to delete Echo Park Dam. 21

amen~

In the next session of Congress, the bill sailed through
the Senate Interior Committee with comparative ease.

After

its hearings, the committee rejected an amendment by Ueuberger
to exclude Echo Park from the Project.

Senators Clinton Ander-

son, a disciple of Aldo Leopold, one of the fathers of modern
21

.
New York Times, Dec. 16, 40; Dec. 12, 59; Nov. 18,
1954, 23; Senate Report 128 (1955}, 33.
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ecology, and Thomas Kuchel of California joined rreuberger.
The bill then passed out of coI!ll!littee and was approved by
the Senate.

Once again, however, the fate of the Project was

determined in the House, where the wilderness crusaders had
most of their support.

After the House subcommittee accepted

an amendment by Saylor to exclude Echo Park Dam from the bill,
the bill then passed out of the comnittee.

The pro-Echo Park

Dam reclamationists recognized, as Representative William A.
Dawson of Utah said, that their plan faced "certain defeat,"
unless Echo Park were deleted.

In view of this impasse, in

August 1955, watkins, .McKay and Dexheimer huddled for a strategy session in Denver.

On

November 1, the upper basin gover-

nors and congressmen agreed to strike Echo Park Dam from the
Upper Colorado River Storage Project.
•1
· wis
· h es. 22
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Not long afterwards,

Even with the passing of this storm, the Project faced an
uncertain course in Congress.
stacles.

There were two remaining ob-

First, the revised bill provided certain technical

provisions to which the Bureau of the Budget and John

s.

Brag-

don, Special Assistant to the President for Public works Planning, had serious objections.

The bill increased the pay-out

period for power from the normal fifty years to one hundred
22 Nash, American .Mind, 217-18; New York Times, March 30,
5; June 10, 23; June 15, 31; July 27, 12; Nov. 5, 9; Nov. 30,
1955, 66; Sen. Subc., Colorado Pro~ect (1955), 5-9; Senate Report 128 (1955); Con§. Record, 84t Cong., 1st Sess., v. 101,
part 4 (April 30, 19 5), 4866, 4813; Aug. 18, 1955, Bernard M.
Shanley to Watkins, and Aug. 24, 1955, .Memo for the Record,
in Central Files, OF-125-B, Box 643, Eisenhower Library.

223
years and another provision stipulated that while the payment
of excess revenues would go to the states of the upper basin
it limited their use to prepayment of costs of the projects.
The Administration was now put in the embarrassing position
of publicly supporting a bill which, if passed, would require
the Administration to revise its entire water policy statement.

"It might be difficult," Bragdon warned Fred Seaton,

the new Secretary of Interior, "to veto a bill authorizing a
development which has been supported by the Administration,
even though financing arrangements may be objectionable, and
yet its approval could not but result in a complete reorientation of the rate structures for the existing projects and
in a breakdown in the requirements for a demonstration of
financial feasibility for future projects."

Moreover, the

Ad.ministration objected to new units being added to the House
and Senate bills.

Also, the House bill omitted the provision

that the participating projects should be subject to a reexamination by the Secretary of Interior with the cooperation of
the Secretary of Agriculture.

After the bill passed the House

and Senate, the conferees acceded to the wishes of the Administration. 23
The second obstacle laid in actually securing passage of
the bill.

There was some apprehension over whether Eisenhower

2 3Memo, Feb. 24, 1956, Bragdon to Seaton; Feb. 28, 1956,
Memo for the Record; and March 29, 1956, I!emo for the Record,
Floyd D. Peterson, in John S. Bragdon Staff Files, Box 11,
Eisenhower Library; Hemo, March 1, 1956, Rowland Hughes to
Bryce Harlow, and Memo, March 2, 1956, Homer Gruenther to
Harlow, in Bryce Harlow Papers, Box 23, Eisenhower Library.
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would seek another term.

The problem was simple: if he chose

not to seek reelection, many congressmen might vote against
the Project; otherwise, these congressmen might well cast
their lot with the President's wishes for obvious political
reasons.

Simply, by the Administration's own estimates,

there were nd;enough votes to obtain passage of the bill.
Part of the difficulty was put at the doorstep of the Saint
Lawrence Seaway states.

The states of the upper basin felt

betrayed because, according to their analysis, they had been
"mainly responsible'' for passage of the Saint Lawrence Seaway
legislation.

But now the Saint Lawrence states were balking

in cooperating on the Upper Colorado Project.

Thus, Senator

Denis Chavez (D-N.M.), chairman of the Public Works CoI:lIIlittee,
assured the Administration that he would delay all requests
for public works projects, including approval of $125 million
for channel development in the Great Lakes as part of the
Saint Lawrence Seaway project.

Arthur Watkins argued that a

state like Ohio was "a tremendous beneficiary of an extensive
water development program" stimulated by the federal government, and, therefore, Ohio now ought to assist the Upper Colorado states escape their "crown-colony" status.

This was

not a partisan cause, for some Republicans strongly opposed
the Project.

In the end, however, these obstacles were over-

come, Congress passed the Project, and Eisenhower signed the
bill. 24
24Memo, Jan. 26, 1956, Gruenther to Harlow; Memo, Jan.
27, 1956, Gruenther to Harlow; Watkins, letter to the editor,
Cincinnati Times-Star, Jan. 31, 1956; and Feb. 20, 1956,
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The Echo Park controversy had aroused intense feelings
Richard H.

and at least one casualty was left in its wake.

Pough, chairman of the Department of Conservation and General
Ecology of the American I'Iuseum of Natural History, had opposed construction of Echo Park Dam.

In one article, for

example, he had sharply defined the issue: "Shall we preserve
our National Parks and Monuments as originally intended for
the benefit of all, or shall we hand them over one by one to
powerful special interests?"
fired Pough.

During the dispute, the Museum

Opponents of the dam charged that the dismissal

was a result of Pough's outspoken objections to the dam.

Hor-

ace M. Albright, for example, believed the Museum's action was
a reaction to Pough's stand on Echo Park.

Dr. Albert Parr,

Director of the Museum, called such allegations

0

complete non-

sense. "25
While Echo Park Dam received most of the national publicity, it was not the only wilderness controversy of the decade.
The preservationists were quite correct, indeed, in contending that plans were being formulated to attack other recreational and wilderness areas.

As part of its "308" Report,

the Corps of Engineers put a keen eye on Glacier View in Glacier National Park.

The Department of Interior opposed such

a dam; instead it recommended a dam at Paradise or Clark Fork
sites.

Thus, while the Corps and Interior Department were

2 5Richard H. Pough, "Would You Dam Dinosaur National Monument," Natur<;.l History Magazine, 63 (March 1954), 144; "As
Dinosaur Goes ••• ," Natural :-J:isto~ Ma~azine, 64 (Feb. 1955),
60-62; New York Times, l'iay 3, 19 , 2 •
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able to reach an accord on development of the Columbia River,
they left developoent of Glacier national Park to the future. 26
When McKay took office he was confronted with making a
decision on what to do with Glacier National Park: turn it
over to the Bureau of Reclamation for a tunnel development
with Canada or leave it as it was?

Conrad Wirth of the Park

Service opposed even allowing the Bureau of Reclamation to
conduct reconnaissance surveys and studies in the Park.
ally, the Department sided with Wirth.

Fin-

With the Echo Park

controversy so much in the headlines, apparently the decision
makers at Interior were sensitive to the accusations of the
preservationists.

One Interior official expressed it thus:

"While it might seem harmless to allow a reconnaissance-type
survey for the purpose of gathering data, such an action could
and probably would be interpreted as implying Departmental
interest in the possibilities of the tunnel project.

I do

not wish that anyone should gain such an impression .• "
In a similar vein, Olympic National Park, which had figured

prominently during Franklin Roosevelt's administration, reemerged as an issue in the fifties.

When Governor Langlie of

Washington set up the Olympic National Park Review Committee,
the wilderness advocates interpreted this as the beginning
of an attack on that park.
ther.

Noalterations were made here ei-

The opposition to alterations in Echo Park, Glacier

View, and Olympic National Parks had been effective. 27 26r-lcKinley, Uncle Sam, 636-3?, 639-40, 641-42.
2 7July 22, 1954, Memo, Wirth to Lewis, and Nov. 3, 1954,
Clarence Davies to J. Hugo Aronson, Gov. of Montana, in Office
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The preservationists were not only defenders, however.
With the cooperation of the Department of Interior, Jackson
Hole Preserve, located in Wyoming, was made part of the
national park system.

In 1929 the National Park Service had

secured the Grand Tetons but Jackson Hole remained beyond its
grasp.

The acquisition of Jackson Hole thus became one of

Horace Albright's lifelong projects.

Like the Echo Park dis-

pute, this controversy involved the weighing of national and
local interests.

The local hunters, ranchers, foresters, and

developers were arrayed against the National Park Service.

A

deciding factor was John D. Rockefeller, Jr., who had purchased the land but was prohibited by local interests from
donating it to the Federal Government.
Jackson Hole became a national monument.

Nevertheless, in 1943,
Fearing loss of

their grazing rights, the cattle interests had vigorously
opposed even this.

Under the leadership of Wyoming Senators

Joseph O'Mahoney and Hunt, a reconciliation of views was
reached.

In 1950 all but nine thousand acres of the monument

were transferred to Grand Teton, National Elk Refuge, and the
Teton National Forest.

When Rockefeller asked the Eisenhower

ad.ministration to supply matching funds for acquisition of
privately owned lands in Jackson Hole Preserve, he received
its full cooperation.

" ••• it is our belief," the Bureau o:f

of the Secretary, Department of the Interior, Central Classi:fied Files, no box number, Suitland, Maryland, National Archives; Riesch, "FDR and Conservation," 319-20; John B.
Oakes, "Conservation: Debate on National Parklands," New York
Times, Feb. 17, 1954, II, 25; New York Times, Feb. 21, IV, 8;
Jan. 24, 1954, IV, 10.
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the Budget significantly told Sherman Adams, "that funds for
the acquisition of lands by the National Park Service, either
on a matching basis, or at full cost to the Government, would
be used for genuinely worthwhile purposes."

The Administra-

tion subsequently asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation for such purposes. 28
While the preservationists' political clout was impressive, they were not able to obtain passage of a bill establishing a National Wilderness System during Eisenhower's
ad.ministration.

Representative Saylor and Senators Humphrey,

Douglas, and Neuberger submitted such bills but they were not
successful until, in 1964, the Wilderness Act was passed.
While the preservationists were winning major victories,
the recreationists were likewise successful in a war of their
own.

Simply, the volume of visitors to the national parks

had outrun the National Park Service's capacity.

An Admini-

stration study in 1954 showed convincingly it was now time
that progress be stimulated in the area of recreational activity.

"As our economy grows," the study noted, "our parks

provide an increasing opportunity for rest, relaxation, and
inspiration, and the maintenance of human productiveness and
morale."

For example, as the study indicated, paid vacations

had tripled in the past twenty-five years.

And it was also

28 rse, Park Polic~, 491-502; Swain, Albright, 282-84;
March 31, 1954, Kennet Chorley to Wirth; Memo, April 15, 1954,
Adams to Dodge; Memo, April 26, 1954, Rowland Hughes to Adams,
in Central Files, OF-4-Q-3, Box 122, Eisenhower Library; 82nd
Cong., 2d Sess., House Document 428 (1954); 85th Cong., 2d
Sess., HR 301·3 (June 18, 1958) and 85th Cong., 2d Sess., S.
4028 (June 18, 1958).
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true, as John Bragdon showed, that the number of visitors to
the national parks continued to increase dramatically; in
1952, 42,300,000 people had visited the parks and, in 1954,
47,834,000 had come.

The ratio of visitors to the popula-

tion had also increased "at a striking rate," from 1 in 300
in 1916 to 1 in 3 in 1954. 29
The idea of increased appropriations for the National
Park Service received impetus, once again, from John D. Rockefeller, Jr., who wrote Eisenhower in late 1953 expressing his
concern over the future of the national parks.
then asked McKay to look into the matter.

The President

The National Recre-

ation Association suggested that the President convene a conference to deal with the nation's recreational problems.

The

Administration decided against holding such a conference,
however.

Of course, the preservationists who had opposed

Echo Park Dam took the opportunity to note that what was needed was not less but more recreational facilities, along the
line of Echo Park.

While all of these lines of communication

undoubtedly exerted some influence on the Administration's
thinking, the political aspect to the equation certainly
loomed large.

There was concern that the Democrats would

use the inadequacy of national park facilities as an issue
in the elections of 1956.

Michael Kirwin, a member of the

House Democratic Election Committee, had frankly conveyed his
party's intentions to Representative John Heselton (R-flass.).
29Sept. 9, 1954, John G. Marr to Bragdon, and June 27,
1955, Bragdon to Joseph S. Davies, in Bragdon Papers, Box
87, Eisenhower Library.
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In turn, Adams suggested to McKay that this certainly was "a
vulnerable point" for the Administration.

It seems, therefore,

that the Administration would be receptive to the idea of
increased funding for the Park Service.30
The Park Service struck while the iron remained hot.

In

its study, the National Park Service reviewed the evolution
of the concept of the national park, the creation of the Park
Service and its subsequent history.

It bleakly reported:

"Developed and staffed to meet the needs of perhaps 25,000,000
visitors, the [national park] System is now called upon to
take care of twice that many."

It anticipated that the num-

ber of visitors would be about 80 million by 1966.

The Park

Service then recommended "Mission 66 11 --a_plan calling for
sufficiently updating the national park system by the decade
ending in 1966.

The National Park Service estimated the total
cost for "Mission 66" at $124,165,600.31
Subsequently the Administration recommended Mission 66
30Eisenhower, Mandate, 549-50; Dec. 10, 1953, John D.
Rockefeller, Jr., to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-4-Q-3,
Box 122, Eisenhower Library; Feb. 15, 1955, National Recreational Assn. to Eisenhower; March 18, 1955, Adams to Otto
Mallery; March 17, 1955, Minnich to Adams, Central Files,
OF-142-A-5-A, Box 733, Eisenhower Library; Nature Magazine,
49 (June 1956), 287; Sept. 26, 1955, John Hesselton to Adams;
Sept. 29, 1955, Adams to McKay, Central Files, OF-4-Q-3, Box
122, Eisenhower Library.
31 Department of Interior, National Park Service, Mission
66: To Provide Ade uate Protection and Development of the
National ?ark S~stem for Human Use Jan. 1
, in OF- -Q-3,
Central Files,ox 122, Eisenhower Library. Floyd Peterson
estimated the cost of the Mission 66 program to be $786,545,000
for the entire ten-year period. The major portion of the increase in park appropriations would go for maintenance and
operating costs. Memo, Feb. 16, 1956, Peterson to Bragdon,
Bragdon Papers, Box 60, Eisenhower Library.
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and Congress passed it.

The plan's significance was that the

National Park Service had now officially emerged from the governmental doldrums to which it had been cast during the war
years.

In 1942, as part of the wartime pinch., the Park Ser-

vice's budget had been slashed about fifty percent and its
permanent staff substantially reduced.

Furthermore, the Park

Service bad been ostracized to Chicago.

Politically the Park

Service was thus in no position to protect its own interests.
After the war, however, it returned to Washington and, once
again, began to defend its protectorate from encroachment by
the Bureau of Reclamation, Corps of Engineers, and private
interests.

With Mission 66 the Park Service's budget sky-

rocketed.

Finally, the National outdoor Recreation Resour-

ces Review Commission was established in 1958 to study the
role of the Federal Government in outdoor recreation.

Among

the political members of the Commission were Senators Anderson, Neuberger, Barrett and Watkins and Representatives Saylor, Pfost, Al Ullman, and John Rhodes.3 2
While they had not immediately secured all they had
wanted, by 1960 the preservationists could at least point to
signif'icant successes in having defended the integrity of the
national park system.

Also, the National Park Service amply

demonstrated that it was again a political power to be
. 32 swain, Albright, 292-93, 260; John B. Oakes, New York
Times, May 2, 1954, II, 28; Feb. 2, 1956, Eisenhower to Rayourn, and Feb. 2, 1956, Eisenhower to Nixon, Central Files,
OF-4-Q-3, Box 122, Eisenhower Library; Public Law 85-470,
85th Cong., S. 846 (June 28, 1958); Sept. 28, 1958, Press
Release, in Central Files, OF-143-I, Box 735, Eisenhower
Library.
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reckoned with in terms of defending its domain and, when
possible, in increasing its appropriations.

~

I

I

CHAPTER VIII
BENSON AND PARTNERSHIP
Although the main struggle confronting it was parity,
the Department of Agriculture (USDA) also became critically
involved in partnership politics--so involved, in fact, that
the futures of two New Deal-created agencies, the Soil Conservation Service and the Rural Electrification Administration were seriously jeopardized.

Grazing and timber rights--

always hot items out West--invited controversy for the Department as well.

The personality and beliefs of the new

Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, thus set the
tempo for the department.
Benson became Secretary of Agriculture at the President's
personal insistence.

Like Eisenhower, he was deepiy religious

and steadfastly opposed to the concept of government aid; the
two men, in fact, equated religion and democracy with an individualistic economy.

Benson had earned a masters degree in

agriculture at Utah State Agricultural College.

Politically

he paid his dues to the Taft wing of the Party.

In 1952,

Benson had lent his name to a Citizens for Taft Committee.
In short, for many, Benson's appointment symbolized a refreshing trend toward restoring free enterprise and dismantling
the New Deal.

Allan B. Kline, President of the American Farm

Bureau Federation, for example, thought the appointment was
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"top-notch."

When the rumor spread that he might retire from

the Cabinet because of some severe criticism, Representative
Harris Ellsworth of Oregon exemplified the attitude of the
Secretary's admirers.

"It is our obligation to fight the

20-year trend toward paternalism, statism and socialism,"
he reminded Benson.

"It is not necessarily our obligation to

win political victories.

But if we turn and run after our

first contact with the enemy we shall have denied our primary
obligation and deserve political failure."

Benson, of course,

did not resign, and, instead, accepted a central role in the
drama unfolding over partnership. 1
Right from the start Benson found himself in a skirmish.
Shortly after taking office he announced a major departmental
overhaul, although, he emphasized, it would not entail massive dismissals,

Benson was indirectly critical of his New

Deal predecessors for allowing the department to swell "into
a huge bureaucracy of twenty agencies and bureaus ••• "

Ac-

cording to his reorganization plan, the department's agencies
were regrouped into five new categories.

Ostensibly the pur-

poses of this reorganization were "to simplify and make effective the operation of the Department of Agriculture, to plan
1 Eric Goldman, The Crucial Decade--And After America,
1945-60 (New York, 1960), 242; Kenneth S. Davis, ''A Bigger
Ifole for Farm Co-ops," New York Times, Jan. 4, 1954, IV;
Senate, Committee on Agriculture and .Forestry, 83rd Cong.,
1st Sess., On the Anticinated Nomination of Ezra Taft Benson,
of Idaho to be Secretar of A~riculture (Jan. 15, 1953);
Eisen ower, Nandate,
; Novem er , 1953, Ellsworth to
Benson, Central Files, OF-1, Box 1, Eisenhower Library (Ellsworth's emphasis).
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the administration of farm programs close to the State and
local levels, and to adapt the administration of the programs
of the Department to regional, State, and local conditions."
Politically, as Benson freely admitted, the reorganization
constituted an attempt to blunt the Democratic Party's influence with the farmer.

The Agricultural Conservation Program,

for example, was pulled out of the Production and Marketing
Administration (PMA) because it had, in Benson's estimation,
"become ••• almost bigger than the Department itself."

He felt

H1A, with its system of county committeemen, had become grafted onto the Democratic Party.
reorganization, was eliminated. 2

In short, PMA, under Benson's
Some critics, likewise inter-

preted the proposed reorganization as nothing more than a
subtle attempt to emasculate the Soil Conservation Service
and the Rural Electrification Administration.
The Soil Conservation Service (SCS) had been created in

1935 as an agency designeq. to hel:p j;each farmers·
methods for tilling their soil.

t~e

proper

Among the enemies it had

accumulated over the years were the §arm Bureau, Extension
Service, and agricultural colleges.

SCS, a line and "action

2 Public Pa~ers of the Presidents 1953, 122-26; Con~res
sional Record,3rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), part 4, v.9,
5652; New York Times, Jan. 23, 1953, l; Benson, Cross Fire:
The Eight Years with Eisenhower (New York, 1962), 52. Benson's original plan called for organizing the Department of
Agriculture into these five agencies: (1) Commodity Marketinf!; and Adjustment; (2) Research, Extension and Land Use;
(3) Departmental Administration; (4) Agricultural Cred~t; and
(5) Office of the Solicitor. Benson also added fuel to the
flames by submitting to Congress a revised version of Truman's
budget. Benson's budget called for approximately 10% less
than HST's had. The heaviest cuts were in conservation and
land use categories.
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agency," rubbed raw nerves in by-passing state and local agencies in its operations.

Instead it operated through its own

network of Soil Conservation Districts.

The Service was dis-

tinguished from its chief rival, the Extension Service, a
highly decentralized agency acting primarily as a research
and education program in cooperation with the agricultural
colleges.

In its political struggles SCS had always success-

fully resisted efforts to combine it with other national programs and agencies.

And this was not a partisan issue either.

In 1950, the Service aided in defeating President Truman's
reorganization plan for the Department of Agriculture.

While

the following year the Service felt compelled to bow to renewed pressure for reogranization, it still retained consider'%

able control over its affairs./
In the early years of the Eisenhower Administration, however, the Soil Conservation Service's back was forced to the
wall.

Under Benson's plan SCS would have been transferred to

the newly created Research, Extension, and Land Use category-together with the Extension and Forest Services.

\.Jhen he at-

tempted to eliminate seven SCS regional offices and to transfer their functions to state agencies he provoked a fury of
protest.

The Izaak Walton, League and the National Associa-

tion of Soil Conservation Districts charged Benson with
3For background on SCS, cf. Charles Harden, The Politics
of Agriculture (1952), Ch. IV; David Cushman Coyle, Conservation: An Auerican Stor of Conflict and Aecom lishment (New
Jersey,
, 11 - ; Barrow Lyons, Tomorrow s Bir
ight: A
Political and Economic Inter retation of Our Hatural Resources
New
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attempting to take soil conservation out of the hands of the
farmer and instead giving it over to the Farm Bureau Federation and its ally, the Extension Service.

Nevertheless,

Eisenhower and the Farm Bureau Federation continued to support the plan. 4
The Soil Conservation Service was saved from apparent
emasculation through passage of the Watershed and Flood Prevention Act of 1954.

The Watershed Act had first been intro-

duced in 1951 and was reintroduced in the following Congress.
It gradually gained support and was passed.

The Act provided

for strong local initiative and the SCS quickly accommodated
its watershed program to this dictate.

It was clear, as the

Second Hoover CoI!ll:lission correctly noted, that the Service
envisioned "a prodigious construction program."

In 1955, the

SCS' appropriation was $7,250,000 and by 1959 it had more than
tripled.

Dam construction thus became the Service's central

activity, so much so that today it now has a project orientation similar to the Corps of Engineers.5
The department's reorganization plan also attacked another prominent New Deal bailiwick, the Rural Electrification
Administration (REA).

The REA, created in 1935 as an indepen-

dent agency to revolutionize rural life, was authorized to
4 Benson, Cross Fire, 154-55; John B. Oakes, New York
Times, Nov. 8, 19~3, II, 29.
5Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democrac
(New York, 1966), 225-2 ; ornmission on Organiza ion o
e
Executive Branch of the Government (June, 1955), 785, 780-82.
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borrow funds fron the Secretary of the Treasury which, in
turn, were to be loaned to local farmers.

The emergence of

rural electric co-operatives grew apace.

By 1953, REA pro-

vided funding both for rural electrification arid telephone
programs.

And the rural electrification program was an ob-

vious success; in 1935 nine out of ten American farms had no
electricity but by 1950 the ratio had been narrowed to one in
ten.

During the decade of the fifties electrical consumption

per farm served almost doubled.

But REA was not without its

enemies, for the agency was widely viewed as a powerful political instrument of the New Deal.

For instance, Congressman

John V. Beamer (R-Ind.) complained to Sherman Adams in 1953
that REA had labored against his recent re-election.

"How-

ever, under the influence of the men working under Mr. Wickard [the REA Administrator]," he further protested, "it is
evident that their organization now wants to promote Federal
ownership of public utilities."

The Administration devised
its own plan to curb REA's influence. 6
As part of Benson's reorganization plan the REA, previously an independent agency, was incorporated into the Department
of Agriculture's newly formed Agricultural Credit Services
division.

This proposal was not entirely new, however.

The

aborted reorganization plan of 1939 and the First Hoover
6 Harold Vatter, The U.S. Economy in the 1950's (New York,
1963), 174; William Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and
The New Deal; 1932-1940 (New York, 1963), 157-58; Coyle, Conservation, 1 6-67; Jan. 26, 1953, Beamer to Adams, Centrar-~iles, GF-18-0, Box 332, Eisenhower Library.
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Co!1rlission had aade a similar recownendation.

In 1953, the

plan for REA caused barely a ripple of criticism as it easily
sailed through Congress.7
But Benson opened the flood gates when he decided to
replace the present REA Administrator, Claude R. Wickard,
with his own appointee.

When Benson approached him about

resigning his post, though, Wickard at first balked, informing the Secretary that two years remained in his tenure.
After some persuasion, however, Wickard, a .former Secretary
of Agriculture, relented.

"He did resign" Benson later said,

"and I'm glad of it and I think we can improve the administration."

Ancher Nelson, recently elected lieutenant governor

of Minnesota and long active in the Farm Bureau affairs, was
appointed to take wickard's place.

~a~ura~~Y ~e~son

was in

accord with the Administration•s·partnership goals. 8
The firing of Wickard aroused the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.

The Association looked upon

Wickard's resignation as a portentious sign of the Administration's true intentions.

Even some Republicans, though support-

ing Benson's decision, thought its "timing" had been poor and
?Benson, Cross Fire, 450; Eisenhower, Mandate, 392; Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Department of Agriculture, A Report to the Con~ress
(Feb. 1949); 86th Cong., 1st Sess., House Report 235 (1959
8 Benson, Cross Fire, 108-09; March 16, 1953, Wickard to
Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-J-2, Box 10, Eisenhower Library;
New York Times, March 25, 1953, 27; Ancher Nelson, "Eisenhower Administration," transcript of a tape recorded interview
conducted by Ed Edwin (Columbia University, for Dwight D.
Eisenhower Oral History Project, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library,
Abilene, Kansas, 1971).
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that it might prove "costly to the friends of the Administration who are also strong R.E.A. supporters."

But the deed

was done and the fight had begun.9
The Administration revealed its intention by directly
attacking REA's loan structure and cutting back the funds
for adainistering the agency.

As early as 1954 the National

Rural Electric Cooperative Association protested that reductions in funding for administering the REA program were creating a backlog in service.

The Administration was reluctant

to increase these funds because, as the President's Council
of Economic Advisors noted, "90% of U.S. farms have already
been electrified so that REA's prime purpose would appear to
be about accomplished."

Consistent with the Administration's

thinking on REA, the Second Hoover Commission recommended that

REA be reorganized on a "self-supporting basis."

Specifically

the Commission felt REA should be abolished and replaced by
a new financial corporation which would use private capital
.
10
rather than government funding.
In keeping with these general recommendations the Administration stirred the ire of REA advocates by refusing to approve a $60-million loan for a group of Indiana cooperatives
9clyde T. Ellis, A Giant Step (New York, 1966), 106-0?;
undated memo, Homer Gruenther to Wilton Persons, Central
Files, OF-J-2, Box 10, Eisenhower Library.
10sept. ~O, 1954, J. E. Smith to Eisenhower, Central
Files, OF-140-A, Box ?25, Eisenhower Library; memo, June 28,
1954, Council of Economic Advisors, Bragdon Papers, Box 68,
Eisenhower Library; Commission on the Executive Branch of
the Government, Lending Agencies, A Report to the Congress
(March 1955), 75-?6.
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planning to supply power to a local aluminum company.

In-

stead, the Bureau of the Budget and Department of Agriculture
drafted legislation which would "ultimately" permit the Federal Government to withdraw from financing REA".

In his Annu-

al Budget Message for fiscal 1959, Eisenhower proposed that
the interest rate at which REA loaned money be increased.
The Administration maintained that the present rate of 2%
did not cover the current costs of the program.

Besides,

the President pointed out, "approximately one-half of REA electric power now goes to rural industrial and nonfarm consumers,
and in the future these nonfarmer users will account for a
larger share of the increasing demands. 1111
REA's friends, however, did not rest idly by.

In 1959,

Senator Hubert Humphrey and Representative Melvin Price introduced bills transferring REA out of the Department of Agriculture.

The measure was sparked by the general disgruntle-

ment of public power advocates with the Administration's
partnership policy.

The "resignation" of Wickard had been

only the beginning, in the eyes of the supporters of the bill.
Although Nelson tenaciously denied it, Clyde Ellis of NRECA
charged that in 1957 Benson "moved in to usurp the authority
of the REA Administrator and [to] take over personal control
of.the agency •••• "

Moreover, Joseph Campbell, the Comptroller

· 11Memo, Jan. 8, 1958, Maurice Stans to Jack Anderson;
memo, Feb. 10, 1958, Stans to Sec. of the Treasury; and memo,
Feb. 11, 1958,. Anderson to Adams, in Central Files, OF-1-J-2,
Box 10, Eisenhower Library; Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958,

66-67; Eisenhower, Mandate,

393.
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General, was accused of attempting to revise the REA law so
that all rural electrification growth would cease.

Ellis,

not one to miss an analogy, wryly pointed out that formerly
Campbell had been a commissioner "on the AEC long enough to
help launch the ill-fated Dixon-Yates scandal."

One congress-

man subsequently called .for the Comptroller's resignation.
Finally, Price summed up the reason prompting his bill: "It
has since become obvious that the lack of independence on the
part of the [REA] Administrator in certain areas and particularly in the loan area, could eventually destroy REA., should
it become subservient to any administration which had not
created it and might be lacking in enthusiasm for it. 1112
The Price-Humphrey bill passed Congress and was sent to
Eisenhower's desk.

.A!llong others, the American Farm Bureau

Federation urged the President to veto the bill.

Contending

that the REA had been "working well and progressing efficiently
under the existing administrative arrangements," Eisenhower
did just that.

The Senate overrode the veto but the House

sustained it by only four votes.

Hence, the Department of

Agriculture retained control of REA but that agency's interest
rates remained unchanged. 1 3
12House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Government
Operations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Modif ing Reor anization
Plan No. II of 1939 and Reor anization ? an Ho.
Rura Elecrification Adninistra~ion
1
, , lff, 1 ; Aug. 3,
1958, Rep. LeRoy Anderson to Eisenhower, Central Files, GF18-0, Box 332, Eisenhower Library.
1 3cong. Rec., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 105, pt. 4 (1959),
5526; Cong. Rec., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 105, pt. 5 (1959),
6022-6023, 69.f9'; Cong. Rec., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 105, pt.
6 (1959), 7207; U.S. Senate, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959),
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The Department of Agriculture also found itself in the
middle of a heated controversy over grazing on Forest Service lands.

The Forest Service managed 168,000,000 acres of

land, much of it leased for grazing.

In the 1952 election

the Democratic and Republican parties had adopted differing
views of how these lands could be best managed.

Stevenson

told a group in Phoenix, Arizona that he was "unalterably
opposed to turning over control of these lands to private
interests."

In other words, he favored strict management

and regulation of the lands.

The Republican platform, on the

other hand, pledged itself to the elimination of arbitrary
bureaucratic practices on these lands.

Specifically the GOP

favored "legislation to define the rights and privileges of
grazers and other cooperators and usars, to provide protection of independent judicial review against administrative
invasions of these rights and privileges, and to protect the
public against corrupt or monopolistic and bureaucratic favoritism."

As the

soon discovered, it was no
easy task fulfilling its platform pledge. 14
Administ~ation

In early 1953,

Representativ~

wesley D'Ewart (R-Mont.)

and Senator Frank Barrett (R-Wyo.) introduced a grazing bill
admittedly drawn up by the western stockmen.

The net effect

of the bill would have been to grant the prsent grazing permi ttees increased legal property rights on government owned
Document 25; April 21, 1959, Charles B. Sherman to Eisenhower,
Central Files, GF-18-0, Box 332, Eisenhower Library.
14Coyle, Conservation, 14; New York ~imes, Sept. 13,
1952, 8.
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land while decreasing the government's administrative authority.

In a speech before the Mid-Century Conference on Re-

sources for the Future, D'Ewart justifi·ed his bill's objectives by arguing that "whenever possible, private responsibility for protection of land is best for this country."

The

private individual, he thought, ought to be permitted ownership of the land.

"The people of the fourteen western states,

where half of the surface is federally controlled," D'Ewart
explained, "think that they have grown up, that there are
those among their citizens who are to be trusted to wisely
operate in the management of these areas in the best public
interest ••• "

Western wool growers and the Farm Bureau Federation sang from the same hymna1. 1 5
The Forest Service and all.the conservation organizations
vehemently objected to the stockfilen's bill.

They claimed the

bill would give the present permittees preferred status,
would encourage a concentration of permits in the hands of a
l5Resources for the Future, Mid-Century Conference
(Washington, D.C., 1953), Sec. 4, 3-5; Wesley A. D'Ewart,
"Eisenhower Administration Project," transcript of a tape
recorded interview conducted by Ed Edwin (Columbia University,
for Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History Project, Dwight D.
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, 1967), 79-81; June 24,
1953, Frank Barrett to Aiken, Central Files, OF-125-B, Box
643, Eisenhower Library; Aug. 3, 1953, James Hooper to John
Davis, no box number, Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service
Files, Suitland, Maryland. The D'Ewart-Barrett bill would
have given the present grazing permittees the "privileged
right" to range resources. The permittees, moreover, would
have been allowed to transfer their grazing privileges to
their successors. The permittees would have been required
to follow the regulations established by the Department of
Agriculture, based on the advice and recommendations of the
local advisory boards. Finally, public ranges were to be
closed to all but the present permit holders, except for the
purchase of the existing "base property" rights.
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relatively few operators, and would tie the hands of the government in regulating the land.

The bill provided that appeals

would be subject to formal hearings and that the decisions
of the Secretary of Agriculture would be subject to court
review.

The Forest Service, on the other hand, felt that the

ad.ministration of public lands required technical decisions
based on professional knowledge and, therefore, these decisions would be better left to the discretion of the Department of Agriculture than to the courts.

The Izaak Walton

League flatly characterized the D'Ewart bill "a further endeavor by the favored few who are blessed with grazing privileges
on our national forests to obtain legal status and convert
their privileges to rights. 1116
The uproar over the bill was sufficient to persuade its
original sponsors that compromise would be necessary to get
passage of a grazing bill.

In June 1953, Senator Barrett and

Congressman D'Ewart met with Senator George Aiken, Chairman
of the Senate Agricultural and Forestry Committee, Forest
Service officials, and Earl Coke, Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture, to revise the bill.
drawn up.

A new grazing bill was

Coke agreed to submit a favorable report to the

Department of Agriculture on the Hope-Aiken bill and it was
assumed the Bureau of the Budget also would support this
16

Memo, Hay 18, 1953, Laura lJ. Lokke to McKittrick, Central Files, OF-124-G, Box 644, Eisenhower Library; Hearings,
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture, 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess., National Forest Grazing Lands (July 14-15,
1954), 21-22; Aug. 21, 1953, True D. Morse to James Hooper,
Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service Files, No box number,
Suitland, .Maryland.
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compromise measure.
The new bill provided that the Secretary of Agriculture
should encourage range improvements.

To do this the Secre-

tary would be authorized to conpensate a permittee for whatever improvements he made on the land he leased from the
Forest Service when the permittee lost that land through
"subsequent governmental action ••• not caused by unlawful
acts ••• "

No permit was to be issued which would entitle a

new permittee until that prior permittee was compensated by
either the Federal Government or the new permittee.

Also,

the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to conduct "a
comprehensive economic study" to determine a method of charging grazing fees.

Finally, the bill provided for a compli-

cated system of appeals in the event a permittee disagreed
with a decision of the Chief of the Forest Service.

The per-

mi ttee, according to the bill, could petition to have the
Chief's decision reviewed by a three-man advisory board.

One

of the members of the board was to be an employee of the
Department of Agriculture, but not of the Forest Service;
the second would be chosen by the permittee; and the third
was to be selected by the first two.

After the hearing, the

board would make a recommendation to the Secretary of Agriculture.

If the board's recommendation was not to his liking

the permittee could petition the Secretary to review the
entire case de novo.

Should this decision still not sit well,

the permittee was entitled to take his case to the United
\

11,

I

j

I~
111,

'
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States Court of Appeals. 1 ?
Hearings were not held on the Hope-Aiken bill until the
following year, even though the Bureau of the Budget and the
De.partment of Agriculture lent it support.

Senator Aiken

and the Bureau of the Budget thought it would be better first
to hold hearings in the West on the general problem of grazing.

For the most part the stockmen approved of Hope-Aiken,

although with some qualifications.

The attitude of the Utah

State Wool Growers Association was typical.

The Association

did not feel the bill offered "sufficient protection to the
stockmen's rights and privileges," but did consider it a
ttstep in the right direction."

Its main objection was that

the bill did not provide enough stability for the livestock
operators. 18
Although the Department of Agriculture officially approved the Hope-Aiken bill, the Forest Service harbored some
reservations.

The Service wanted the bill extended to include

all national forests administered by the agriculture department, not just those in the fourteen Western states.

Also,

the Service suggested that the Appeals Board be broadened to
include timber and recreation interests, as well as stockmen.
Furthermore, the Forest Service pressed for the establishment
l?HearinGs, U.S. Senate, Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., Administration of the National
Forests (Jan. 21-22, 1954), 2-4.
18Memo, June 30, 1953, Dodge to Adams, Central Files,
OF-125-B, Box 643, Eisenhower Library; Senate, Administration (1954), 6-9.
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of multiple-use advisory councils, the members of which should
have their travel and subsistence expenses paid by the government.

Finally, the Forest Service felt that if a permittee

incurred a loss occasioned "by action of an agency other than
the Department of Agriculture," that agency, not the Forest
Service, ought to provide the compensation to the stockmen.
In this way, the Forest Service was attempting to protect itself from the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers.
As one Service official succinctly put it:. "It would be unfortunate if the Forest Service had to provide the funds from
its meager allotments for compensation in such cases."

The

bill introduced by Aiken in January 1954 incorporated all
19
~h--e
~~~--es
" c;:,
\,;
1.1.Cl.il!:J
•
The revised Hope-Aiken bill received the tacit support
of the Forest Service and the stockmen.

The cattlemen favored

the bill, despite some concern that it did not go far enough,
because it offered them more security of tenure.

Now, they

surmised, it would be easier for them to obtain loans for
range improvements.

Moreover, it was felt that the stockmen

would be more amenable to obligating themselves for long range
capital improvements on the.range.

In the past stockmen had

been reluctant to make such improvements, lest they lose their
l9Memo, Nov. 13, 1953, H. E. Marshall to Earl Loveridge;
memo, Nove. 24, 1953, Behre, for the record; memo, Crafts to
McArdle; memo, Dec. 28, 1953, Crafts, for the record, in
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service Files, no box number, Suitland, Maryland; Senate, Administration (1954), 1,

42-54, 6-9.

r
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investments through an arbitrary bureaucratic decision.

The

Hope-Aiken bill, they maintained, now would give them the
necessary financial security for making these investments.
"If this bill is written into law," ore analyst argued, "it
will then be possible for the banks, FHA [Farmers Home Administration], and other leaders to make loans for the purpose of range improvements."
the provision for a fee study.

They did object, however, to
It was their belief that such

a study would constitute a threat of increased range fees
and, therefore, would act as a deterrent to stockmen to make
investments in range improvements.

The American Farm Bureau

Federation, National Grange, American National Cattlemen's
Association, and National Wool Grower's Association exerted
their support on behalf of the bill. 20
Despite its numerous revisions the conservationists remained adamantly opposed to the bill.

Only the National Wild-

life Federation supported the Forest Service after the last
revisions were made on Hope-Aiken.

The conservationists sim-

ply could not see a need for any legislation at all.

In fact,

they contended that the very reason the stockmen wanted a law
in the first place was precisely because the Forest Service
performed its duties too well.

They, therefore, declared

that the regulations and administration of the range should
be left in the palms of the Forest Service.

In their estim-

20Memo, May 27, 1955, Sherman Hazeltine to B. P. Atchley;
July 1, 1955, Harvey Dahl to Jay.Taylor; memo, Feb. 9, 1954,
C. A. Joy, for the record; Feb. 2, 1954, David H. Jones to
Benson; in Dept. of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary, no
box number, National Archives; House, National Forest (1954),
48, 59, ?8-79, 89-90.

250
ation the core of the grazing problem was not administrative;
rather, it was, as the Director of the Wilderness Society
put it, "the condition of the range.

The biological law of

forage growth and maintenance cannot be altered by legislation."

Moreover, the Conservation Society feared that des-

pite its new amendments, the bill would "be a move in the
direction of establishing vested rights" on the range.

The

conservationists particularly objected to the provision allowing for judicial review of the Secretary of Agriculture's
decision.

How, they asked, can a judge be expected to render

a more competent or just judgment than an expert in the area
of range management, such as the Secretary of Agriculture? 21
The Hope-Aiken bill was reported out of the Senate Agricultural and Forestry Committee.

The Senate then passed it

but the bill met a snag in the House Interior Committee.

Con-

sequently, when the ·House was considering the agricultural
bill for 1954, Clinton Anderson presented the Hope-Aiken
measure again, this time as an amendment to the Senate's version of the agricultural bill.

The amendment narrowly slid

out of the Senate but did not escape the House.

While the

21 The National wildlife Federation's difference of opinion with the other conservation organizations can be found in
the Files of the Forest Service. Some of the more significant documents are: memo, Sept. 9, 1953, Hugh B. Woodward to
Charles Callison; Feb. 8, 1954, Woodward to William Voigt,
Jr.; memo, Sept. 12, 1953, Woodward to Voigt, Jr.; Jan. 18,
1954, Woodward to Ira Gabrielson, in Dept. of Agriculture,
Forest Service Files, no box number, Suitland, Maryland;
Hearings, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., National Forest Grazing Lands
(Feb. 25-26, 1954), 40-43, 95-100, 73-75, 113-15, 161, 123-25;
Cong. Rec., 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., v. 100, pt. 11 (Aug. 10,
1954), 13900.
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House-Senate conferences were deliberating the fate of Anderson's amendment, Eisenhower publicly urged the conferees to
retain the amendment in the final version of the agricultural
bill.

The President's overture came to naught, however, as

they dropped Anderson's grazing amendment from the agricultural bill. 22
There were varying interpretations of the significance
of the failure to achieve passage of the Hope-Aiken bill.
"The recent scrimmage over [Hope-Aiken]," C. R. Gutermuth of
the Wildlife Management Institute commented, "represents only
another encounter in the long 'range feud,' and they will be
back again in the next Congress."

The Forest Service still

favored legislation along the lines of Hope-Aiken.

"The Graz-

ing Bill was a good bill," the .Executive Secretary of the
American Cattlemen's Association contended.

"It should have

been passed and we resent the fact that we were made the victims of a very obvious political coup."

One thing had to

be admitted by all the parties to the controversy: the conservationists' opposition to this bill, as in the Echo Park
dispute, ~roved formidable. 2 3
While the stockmen may have been unsuccessful in securing
22
.
Senate Report 1042 (March 3, 1954); Con~. Rec., 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess., v. 100, pt. 11 (Aug. 10, 1954 , 13889-13890,
13906; Public Paners of the Presidents 19 , 18; New York
Times, Aug. 14, l
•
2 3c. R. Guttermuth, "Why the Furor Over the National
Forest Grazing Bill?" (Mimeographed, Aug. 1954); Nov. 18,
1954, McArdle to Woodward; and F. E. Mollin to Clifford
Hope, in Department of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary,
Central Files, no box number, National Archives.

l..
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passage of the Hope-Aiken bill, they did obtain new grazing
advantages on land regulated by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).

The Bureau, by its own estimation, administered

142,403,429 acres of grazing land.

In 1953, Orme Lewis,

Assistant Secretary of Interior, established a survey team,
under the direction of Floyd Hart, President of Timbers Structures Corporation, to study the organization and operations
of the Bureau of Land Management.

Hart's report concluded

there was too great a concentration of operations in the
Washington and regional offices.

Thus: "The number of super-

visory and operating personnel should be reduced •••• Operations
should be decentralized to the field."

The report was approved

by McKay who instructed the Director of the Bureau of Land
Management to institute its reorganization proposals.

The

end result of this decentralization, however, was to put more
power and decision-making influence into the willing hands of
the large local stockmen.

Also, the Bureau's range fee sys-

tem, although reformed under the new Director, Edward Woozley, still remained lower than the Forest Service's and those
fees charged by private owners of range land.

Finally, the

Bureau and its political sponsors successfully resisted a
proposal to incorporate the BLM with the Forest Service.

The

conservationists interpreted all of these policies of the
Bureau as another example of the Administration giving away
the nation's natural resources.

The Administration, on the

other hand, contended that these policies only represented an
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attempt to return power to the local communities. 24
But grazing was not the only land interest the Forest
Service and Bureau of Land Management shared in common.
also regulated timber lands.

They

Early in the Administration

Congressman Harris Ellsworth sponsored what came to be known
as the timber transfer bill.

The intent of Ellsworth's bill

was to protect the operations of private owners of timber
lands displaced by federal projects, such as dam construction.
The bill permitted private owners whose lands were taken by
the Federal Government to obtain Federal forest lands as compensation for the loss of their private lands.

Ordinarily

the Federal Government pays cash for the acquisition of such
private property.

According to this bill, however, the trans-

fer of federal forest land to private lumber operations would
be sanctioned.

In this process the Forest Service and the

Bureau of Land Management would lose control over the selection of the lands to be exchanged. 2 5
The Department of Interior was divided on the Ellsworth
24Memo, Dec. 18, 1953, Survey Team (Floyd Hart, Chairman)
to Sec. Lewis, Dept. of Interior, Special Office Files, no
box number, National Archives; U.S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau
of Land Management, Delegation Order 541, April 21, 1954, in
Federal Register (April 28, 1954), 2473-77; Philip O. Foss,
Politics and Grass: The Administration of Grazing on the
Public Domain (New York, 1960), 192-93, 91-92, 96-98; memo,
March 12, 1953, Persons, for the record, in Gerald Morgan
Papers, Box 9, Eisenhower Library; March 18, 1953, McCarran
to Eisenhower, Central Files, Office of the SoligJtor, OF-4-A,
Box 117, Eisenhower Library; March 11, 1953, Goldwater to
Adams, Central Files, OF-1, Box 1, Eisenhower Library; McConnell, Private Power, 206-07; Oct. 7, 1955, Morse to Chardoff,
Dept. of Agriculture, Office -of the Secretary, Correspondence,
1955, Box 2720, National Archives.
25
.
John B. Oakes, New York Times, March 7, 1954, II, 27.
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bill.

BLM approved it, provided some amendments were made.

The Bureau wanted a proviso stipulating that the displacing
agency or project would "pay for the cost involved in losses
both to federal and private sustained-yield forestry operations."

In this sense the Bureau was attempting to protect

its own budget.

Elmer F. Bennett, the Department's legis-

lative counsel, Otis Beasley, and Administrative Assistant,
and the Bureau of the Budget argued that BLM's amendment
should not be included in the bill.

"Governmentally-owned

forest lands," Bennett explained, "are not the property of
the administering bureaus, but, rather, they are the property
of the United States."

Consequently, when lands are trans-

ferred from forest purposes to reclamation it involves a policy decision as to.which of the two purposes serves "the
greater public interest."

Thus, the whole question of reim-

bursement, Bennett concluded, became a totally irrelevant
matter. 26
The conservationists, the National Park Service and the
Forest Service becane exercised over the bill.

The original

draft of the bill exempted national parks, national monuments,
wilderness areas and wildlife refuges from the bill.

In a

revised draft of the bill, however, this stipulation was notably absent.

When the Emergency Committee on Natural Resour-

ces heard of this development it began to lobby against the
bill.

The Park Service, of course, demanded the reinsertion

26Memo, Nov. 30, 1953, Woozley to Lewis; memo, Dec. 1,
1953, Bennett to Lewis; and memo, Dec. 11, 1953, Beasley to
Lewis, in Dept. of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central
Files, no box number, National Archives.
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of the clause.

The Department of Interior recommended that

the bill be enacted provided that clause were reinstated.
These efforts were unsuccessful, as the bill reported out of
the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee did not
exempt Park Service timber. 2 7
The Forest Service, for its own reasons, opposed enactment of the bill.

The Service predicted that the bill would

result in timber land being removed from multiple-purpose
and permanent sustained-yield management and that the "economy of communities dependent on national-forest timber would

be disrupted and dependent operators would be discriminated
against. 11

Finally, the Forest Service objected to the fact

that public timber would be removed from competitive sale to
the highest bidder;

instead, the timber iiwould be transferred

through mandatory exchange to a single individual."

Offi-

cially the Department of Agriculture and the Forest Service
took a noncommittal position, although the Service expressed
a willingness to work with Ellsworth and the House Interior
Committee in developing a solution the Department could support. 28
The bill was supported by the National Lumber Manufactures Association which to,ok particular exception to the Forest Service's arguments.

The Assocation pointed out the

27Memo, June 15, 1953, Lanigan to Solicitor; memo, July
23, 1953, Tolson to Solicitor; and Jan. 22, 1954, Lewi~ to
Miller, Dept. of Interior, Central Files, no box number,
National Archives.
28Memo, Aug. 27, 1953, Crafts to Hendre; memo, Dec. 28,
1953, Crafts, for the record', in Dept. of Agriculture, Forest
Service Files, no box number, Suitland, Maryland.
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federal government was not alone in practicing sustained-yield.
''Watershed, wildlife, recreational and other tangible and intangible values arising out of good land management," it said,
"are as everpresent on private lands as on federal lands."
The Association also contended that the economies of only a
few communities would be affected by this legislation, contrary to what the Forest Service seemed to imply.

Finally,

the lumberers thought the Forest Service's argument concerning competitive bidding put the shoe on the wrong foot.

Ra-

ther: "In the first instance, it is the privately-owned timber that is renoved from competitive sale by the acquisitioning or condemnation activities of the federal government. 112 9
Ellsworth's bill was passed out of committee and came
to the floor, where it gained ardent support from Representatives Sam Coon of Oregon and Wesley D'Ewart, both staunch
defenders of partnership.

Representatives John Saylor and

Lee :Metcalf (D-Mont.), both leading opponents of Echo Park
Dam, led the fight against the bill.

The Emergency Committee

on Natural Resources and the Forest Service won a victory as
the House, on a motion by Metcalf, recommitted the bill to
comnittee.30
The Forest Service's image also was enhanced by a major
timber land controversy in Oregon.

Originally the area in

2 9 11 Personal and Confidential," July 16, 1953, Leo Bodine
to Coke, Dept. of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary, Central Files, no box number, National Archives. Cf. also, "Personal and Confidential," July 28, 1953, E. L. Kurth to Benson,
same source.
30Cong. .Rec., 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., v. 100, pt. 2 ( Feb.
16-1?, 1954), 1835, 1840, 1936-3?.
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question had been staked out as a gold claim but not enough
gold was found to justify large development.

Thus, in 1924,

a physician from Birmingham, Alabama, Herbert McDonald, became interested in these unexploited claims and organized Al
Sarena, Inc., which obtained the twenty-one old claims and
filed on two others as well.

The twenty-three claims encom-

passed a total area of four hundred acres.

But very little

was done with the claims until, in October 1948, Al Sarena
applied for patents (clear title) on its claims.

If the

patents were granted the company would have been permitted
to sell all the products of the land, including the timber.
The law concerning the granting of such patents specified
that a miner must prove a valid discovery of minerals and
must spend $500 developing each of the claims.

The company

paid its fees and, in 1949, the twenty-three claims were put
on the tax rolls of Jackson County, Oregon.
some of the taxes were paid.

Subsequently,

Until this point the case was

routine but thereafter it became confused in a web of partisan
and bureaucratic politics.31
The Al Sarena case assumed significant importance for

I·

the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management because
of the increased demand for timber after World War II.

For

example, between 1946 and 1952 the price of timber sold from
the Oregon and California land jumped from $4 to $25 per 1,000
board feet.

After three investigations the agencies concluded

31 For background cf. William Worden, "Grudge Fight in

Oregon," Life, 229 (Aug. 4, .1956), 26-27 ff.
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that the company had not sufficiently demonstrated a discovery
on fifteen of the claims to warrant granting the patents.
Moreover, the two agencies contended the company had not done
enough work on the claims.

Consequently the regional offices

of the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service contested 15 of the 23 Al Sarena claims.

The fifteen claims
were located within the Rogue River National Forest.3 2
In 1950 a hearing was conducted before the manager of
BLM's Portland office to decide the validity of Al Sarena's
request.

When the hearing manager, Pierce Rice, denied a

company motion for demurer, Al Sarena's counsel left the
hearing, charging that the manager had violated an oral agreement the company had negotiated with the Solicitor of the
Department of Interior.

Nevertheless, Rice heard the Forest

Service's evidence, prepared the case, and transmitted it to
the Director of the Bureau of Land Management.

He asked the

Director to render the original decision in the case since
he had been accused of being "prejudiced and highhanded."
The Director, however, returned the record to Pierce with
instructions for him to make the decision anyway.
then decided in favor of the Forest Service.

Pierce

The company

appealed-this decision but, on April 27, 1951, the assistant

32 Joint Hearings, Special Subcommittee on the Legisla-

tive Oversight Function, 84th Cong., 1st and 2d Sessions, The
Al Sarena Case (1956), 26-35, 3, 5, 104-05; Marion Clawson,
The Bureau of Land Management (New York, 1971), 20, 22, 47,
49. Since the Forest Service administers the surface resources of the national forests and the Bureau of Land Management
administers the mining laws both departments had an interest
in these mining claims.
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director of BIJ1 sustained Pierce's decision.

The claimants

next took their case to the Secretary of Interior, where it
rested until the new administration took over.33
When Clarence Davis joined the Department of Interior
there were 2?8 cases pending, one of which was the Al Sarena
claim.

In March 1953, a meeting arranged by Congressman

Ellsworth, between Davis, Herbert, McDonald, and his brother,
took place.

The claimants asked Davis for a speedy decision

because five years had elapsed from when they had originally
filed for the patents.

In that time taxes had accumulated on

the property and now they were threatened with foreclosure.
Further, they insisted that the Bureau of Land Management had
acted in collusion with the Forest Service, thus prejudicing
the case against them.
their reasoning.

Congressman Ellsworth concurred in

After reviewing the record Davis, agreeing

with the claimants' charges, ordered an independent assay of
the claims.

The new mineral investigation was overseen by

Richard Appling, a mining engineer for the U.S. Bureau of
Mines.

Appling and D. Ford McCormick, a representative for

Al Sarena, took sanples from the disputed lands.

At McCor-

mick's suggestion, these samples were then sent to the A. W.
Williams Inspection Company in Alabama.

A.

ysis found Al Sarena's claims to be valid.

w.

Williams' anal-

Eyebrows were

raised when Appling divulged that he had not rechecked the
reserve samples that had been retained after sending the primary
33Joi·nt Heari'ngs, Al Sarena (1956) 143 67 3 5 9 11
'
'' ' ' '
15-17.

-
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ones to Alabama.

Indeed, since he had destroyed the reserve

samples there was now no way to double check the report of
A. W. Williams Company.

Subsequently, without giving the

Forest Service prior notice, Davis issued a patent to Al
Sarena for all 23 claims.34
The Al Sarena case was used by the opponents of the Administration to illustrate their more general charge that the
Department of Interior was giving away the federal government's property.

Richard Neuberger was a consistent critic

of the Administration on this score.

While an Oregon state

senator he relentlessly chided Douglas NcKay for generally
following the wishes of the large timber interests.

And after

his election to the U.S. Senate in 1954, Neuberger employed
the Al Sarena case to prove this contention.

He pointedly

charged that the "culprit in this [Al Sarena] case is the Department of the Interior."

He questioned, for example, the

Department's use of a private assay made in "far-off Mobile,
Alabama, to cancel out assays undertaken by the Forest Service, by the Bureau of Land Management, and by the Bureau of
Mines Laboratory in Albany, Oregon."

Neuberger emphasized

that since Davis' decision there had been no mining of minerals on the twenty-three

cl~ims

"but over 2 million board feet

of lumber had been cut commercially."

While Neuberger found

fault with the Interior Department he had nothing but high
praise for the Forest Service and Secretary Benson as

-

34 Joint Hearings, Al Sarena (1956), 530-32, 539-46, 89-90,
109-25, 124-25, 136-43, 16-15, 419, 35.
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representinG

11

the public interest and welfare" in the Al

Sarena case.35
Clarence Davis and Congressman Ellsworth, of course,
had their side of the story.

The Al Sarena case, they

argued, was not a matter "of discretion or of political action;" rather, it was a legal question.

They noted it was

for this reason, in fact, that the case had been brought
directly to the Solicitor of the Department of Interior, whose
decision was final unless the Secretary specifically requested
to intervene personally.

Davis thus made it clear that, con-

trary to the accusations of Neuberger and other critics, :McKay
had absolutely no part in deciding the case.

At any rate,

Davis and Ellsworth noted that Al Sarena, Inc., had complied
with the letter of the law by spending the requisite amount of
money on development of the claims and had proven a valid
discovery of minerals.
deserved the patents.

Therefore, they surmised, the company
Finally, the Solicitor pointed out

there was "no reference to timber in the minerals law; whether
there is much, little, or no timber makes no difference whatever as a.matter of law. 11 36
While to Ellsworth and Davis the case may have been simply a legal matter, it certainly provided fuel for the 1954
off-year elections in Oregon.

The nationally syndicated

35ueuberger, "Westerner Against the West," New Re~ublic,
129 (Dec. 7, 1953), 11-12; Con~. Rec., 84th Cong., 2d ess.,
v. 102, pt. 2 (Feb. 6, 1956), 045=46.
36 Joint Hearings, Al Sarena (1956), 51-52, 530, 533,

546-50.
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columnist Drew Pearson accused the Administration of hankypanky in the case and the Eugene Register Guard ran an extensive five-part series of articles on the matter exonerating
Ellsworth, Davis, and McKay from any wrongdoing.

During the

campaign Ellsworth even accused the Forest Service of actively working for his de.feat.
however.

The Service denied the charge,

The case was also instrtIBlental in Senator Wayne

Morse's de.feat of Douglas McKay in the 1956 senatorial race
in Oregon.3?
Whatever its electoral ramifications, the Al Sarena case
had the effect of causing the enactment of a new subsurface
mining law.

The American Forestry Association was in the fore-

front proposing such a revision of the law.

At its fourth

Annual Forest Congress in 1953, the Association approved a
general framework for a national forestry policy.

Likewise,

shortly after the elections of 1954, Secretary McKay, addressing the Western Forestry Conference, encouraged conservationists and western foresters to support legislation safeguarding against abuses of the mining laws.

Consequently, in Feb-

ruary 1955, the American Forestry Association hosted a meeting of representatives of the Departments of Agriculture and
Interior and the mining industry to design a revision of the
old subsurface mining law.

Out of this meeting came a bill,

sponsored by Ellsworth and others, which sought to revise the
3?Joint Hearings, ·Al Sarena (1956), 55-78; March 6, 1954,
Ellsworth to Adams, and .March 16, 1954, I1cArdle to Willis,
in Central Files, OF-134-E, Box 678, Eisenhower Library •

..
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mining laws in such a way as to correct abuses arising from
the filing of mining claims when a claimant's actual intention is to gain control of the timber, grazing land, and
water on the land.

In short, the bill's intention was to

encourage legitimate multiple use of subsurface mining
elaims.38
The major contestants in the Al Sarena case approved of
the bill.

Both the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Manage-

ment urged its enactment and, although he noticed "one glaring defect," Senator Neuberger also supported the bill.
mining interests likewise lined up behind it.

The

Congress passed

the bill and Eisenhower signed it into law.39
While they gave the Department of Agriculture high marks
for its part in the Al Sarena case, conservationists condemned
Benson's attitude toward REA, SCS, and grazing.

As with the

Federal Power Commission and the Department of Interior, the
department was viewed as a tool of big business interests.
This interpretation of the Administration's oil, natural gas,
public power, grazing and timber policies spilled over into
the electoral arena, where the citizenry expressed its confirmation or rejection of partnership.
38senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., Multiple Surface Uses of the Public Domain
(.May 18-19,1955), 128; American Forestry Association, riFirst
Step Toward Correcting Abuses of the Mining Laws," reprinted
in Cong. Rec., 84th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 101, pt. 5 (May 10,
1955), 6003-04; New York Times, Dec. 9, 1954, 50; Henry Clepper and Lowell Besley, "Forests" in Callison (ed.), America's
Natural Resources (New York, 1957).
39senate Committee on Interior, Multi~le Surface Uses
(1955), 16-55., 81-82, 108-09; Senate Hepor 554 (1955), 22;
New York Times, July 24, 1955, 41; Paul Wallace Gates, His~g~; of Public Land Law Development (Washington, D.C., I9bB),

CF..API'ER IX

CONGRESS AND ELECTORAL PARTNERSHIP
The litmus test of popular acceptability for partnership

was

t~n

in the 1954 and 1956 elections.

The Pacific North-

west, as correctly recorded by contemporary commentators,
was the area in which the two sides most clearly stood at
sword's length.

Moreover, while the impress of Presidential

power is always deeply felt in congressional elections, the
power of the opposition party should never be underestimated,
particularly when it controls Congress.

All of these poli-

tical factors were freely vented in these elections.
In 1954, four senate races, in particular, drew attention
to the partnership controversy.

In Oregon, Richard Neuberger,

a state senator, author, and nationally known conservationist,
challenged the incumbent, Guy Cordon, an Eisenhower favorite
and chairman of the crucial Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs.

Cordon's importance was shown by the power-

ful support he received during the campaign.

In his Newsweek

column, Raymond Maley endorsed him as one of "the half dozen
most intelligent, useful, and constructive members" of the
Senate; Under Secretary Davis stressed Cordon's seniority;
McKay praised the Senator's efforts to secure passage of the
McNary and Dales dams; and, indeed, President Eisenhower, in
dedicating McNary Dam, claimed that responsibility for the
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dam was due to the tireless labor of "my good friend, Senator Guy Cordon. 111
Cordon and Neuberger disagreed specifically on the Tidelands Oil, Dixon-Yates, and Hells Canyon issues, in addition
to the Hope-Aiken grazing and Ellsworth timber bills.

Cor-

don had been a strong supporter of the Administration on all
of these questions.

Al Ullman, past president of the Hells

Canyon Association and now a candidate for Congress, put the
issue squarely; Cordon, he claimed, had "played power politics with Hells Canyon dam and must take responsibility for
lack o:f congressional authorization."

Nueberger relentlessly

pursued this and other conservation arguments.

He denoted

Cordon's partnership as a "giveaway" of natural resources to
big business--a policy, he contended, that would be the cause
of major unemployment for the Pacific Northwest unless it
were stopped irnmediately.

To be sure, the AF of L agreed and

endorsed Neuberger and his fellow Democrats.
answered such charges.

Cordon, of course,

Rather than contributing to an employ-

ment crisis, the Senator countered that actually partnership
would increase employment by stimulating the mechanism of free
enterprise.

The Oregonian accurately described the contest

as "bitter. 112
1 The Oregonian, Sept. 24, Oct. 6, 1954; Sept. l?, 1954,
Davis, speech before the Republican Council of Oregon Women,
Inc., Portland, Oregon, in Department of Interior, Special Office Files, no box number, National Archives; Meley, "The John
Day Partnership," Newsweek, 44 (July 26, 1954), 88 and "The
Quiescent Northwest," Hewsweek, 44 (Aug. 23, 1953), 80.
2

.

~

·.

Cf. The. Oregonian for Sept.-Oct., 1954·
ceived daily coverage.

The race re-
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In Wyoming New Dealer Joseph O'Mahoney, whose re-election effort had been buried by the Eisenhower landslide of
1952, staged a successful comback against Congressman William
Henry Harrison.

An especially heated campaign was waged in

Montana between Representative Wesley D'Ewart, author of the
original stock.men's grazing bill, and Senator James E. Murray.
D'Ewart tried to paint Murray's New Dealism with McCarthyite
brushes.

In Idaho, Len Jordan, the state's former Republican

governor, ran for the Senate against Glen Taylor, the Vice
Presidential candidate on Henry Wallace's ticket in 1948.
Except for Jordan, these exponents of partnership went
down to defeat.

In fact Neuberger became the first Democrat

ever to win a Senate seat in Oregon.

Additionally, ·the Penn-

sylvania conservationists, led by Representative John Saylor,
a Republican, achieved victory.

Some pundits even attributed

the defeat of Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky to the
unpopularity of the Administration's position on Dixon-Yates.
Also, Senator Clinton Anderson was re-elected.

In short,

Congress now fell under the dominance of the Democrats, though
they gained a majority in the Senate only when Wayne I1orse,
a maverick who had campaigned actively for Neuberger, allied
with them for organizational purposes.

Bernard DeVoto could

hardly contain his jubilation and Business Week conceded that
indeed the election results were a setback for the administrati on' s partnership policy.

Meley,

howeve~r,

threw cold water

on any speculation that the Democratic victory automatically
decreed partnership dead.

Noting that the "conservative wing
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of the Democratic Party will be stronger than ever," he forecast that the President still would have a working ideological majority.

While Haley's point was basically correct it

overlooked that the chairmanships of the powerful Senate Commerce and Interior committees would now fall into the hands
of two New Dealers, Warren Magnuson and James Murray, respectively.

Entrenched in these two influential positions the

opponents of partnership possessed a solid base from which to
launch their attacks on the Administration during the succeeding years.3
If the Administration had faced stiff opposition in the

1954 elections it was even more so in the races two years
later.

Clearly the Administration had its work cut out.

"The

power program of the Administration," Cordon observed in the
middle of 1955, "has not been accepted by the general public
because there has been no effective, coordinated effort on
the part of the Administration to inform the public of its
programs ••• "

The defeated Senator suggested that the Admini-

stration "immediately undertake a real 'selling' program."
The elections of 1956 were to prove how well his advice had
been heeded. 4
The platforms of' the two parties widely·diverged on the
3New York Times, Nov. 5, 1954, 9; DeVoto, "One-Way Partnership Derailed," Harner's, 201 (Jan. 1955), 12-14; "Democrats' First Target, 11 Business Week, 1315 (Nov. 13, 1954), 27;
Moley, "Pattern of Conservatism, 11 Newswee~k, 44 (Nov. 15, 1954),
124.
4

Memo, May 26, 1955, Hughes to Adams, Howard Pyle Papers,

Box 38, Eisenhower Library.
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issue of natural resources.

The Democrats, calling for a

return to New Deal solutions, characterized the Eisenhower
partnership policy as a "faithless performance."

Conversely,

the Republicans called attention to their achievements, such
as Mission 66, the Upper Colorado Storage Project, and developments in atomic energy.

The pronouncements of the two pres-

idential candidates, Adlai Stevenson and Dwight Eisenhower,
simply mirrored these rivaling contentions.

Several censer-

vationists, such as Rachel Carson, John Ise, Lyle Watts, and
Hugh Bennett, banded together to support Stevenson.

As Eisen-

hewer's record on natural resources was widely criticized by
conservationists, Sherman Adams and Gabriel Hauge asked Horace M. Albright to publicly endorse the President.

Now that

Echo Park dam was defeated and Mission 66 secured, Albright;
late in the campaign, commended-Eisenhower on his first term,
stating that the public land, national park system, wildlife
refuges and national forests were "better protected than ever
before."

While the presidential contest stimulated some con-

cern over the partnership policy, other world and national
issues pervaded the race making it difficult to measure what
influence--if indeed any--the issue of conservation had on
the election's outcome.

In the congressional and senatorial

races in the Pacific Northwest, however, there was no doubt.5
From their vantage point on the Senate Interior Committee
5New York Times, Aug. 16, 13; Aug. 22, 1956, 17; Sept.
28, 1956, Shirley Allen to Fellow Conservationists; and Nov.
2, 1956, Albright to Eisenhower, in Central Files, OF-134-B,
Box 677, Eisenhower Library; Swain, Albright, 302-03.
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the opponents of partnership now mounted a concerted campaign
against the Administration in preparation for the 1956 races
in Oregon, Idaho, and Washington.

Murray's interior commit-

tee, in conjunction with the Senate Committee on Public Works,
for example, passed a resolution condemning the Bureau of the
Budget's Circular A-47.

The crux of the resolution: "The pur-

pose of this Senate resolution is to correct a situation in
which the executive agencies of the Government are progressively arrogating to themselves land and water resources
development policymaking functions which properly reside with
the Congress."

Ironically the resolution resembled the same

anti-bureaucratic arguments the Republicans had used in 1952,
only this time the cast of characters was reversed. 6
The spotlight especially was focused on the Oregon senatorial race, for here all the political facets of the partnership issue came to a climax.

For one thing a script writer

could not have asked for two more dramatic characters than
Wayne Morse and Douglas McKay.

Morse, the incumbent, was

anathema to the White House on personal and ideological
grounds •. As a Republican he had bitterly chastised Eisenhower during the 1952 campaign, then he turned Independent,
and after helping elect Neuberger in 1954, he provided the
majority vote so the Democrats could organize the Senate.
Before the 1956 race Morse officially became a Democrat.
6

.

Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., v. 102, pt.
8 (June.13, 1956), 1015-55; Senate Report 2686 (1956), l;
Memo, June 15, 1956, Colonel .Meek to Bragdon, in Bragdon
Papers, Box 69, Eisenhower Library.
·
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Thus, when the governor of Oregon, who had been scheduled to
run against Morse, suddenly died, Sherman Adams and Leonard
Hall, Chairman of the Republican national Committee, prevailed upon :McKay to pick up the cudgel.
agreed.

McKay reluctantly

Both men shared one characteristic in common--a pen-

chant for blunt outspokenness.

But they could not have been

any different in their views.7
In 1955, the Democratic-controlled Interior and Public
Works committees prepared the way for Morse's re-election
campaign by holding public hearings in Oregon.

The ostensi-

ble purpose of these hearings was to investigate the Ad.ministration's timber policy, in general, and the Al Sarena case,
in particular.

The committees' majority report condemned the

Administration; s timber policy as part of the ngiveaway::
philosophy.

The Republicans charged, probably correctly,

that the hearings and report were politically inspired and
directed specifically toward helping re-elect Morse and defeating Congressmen Harris Ellsworth and Sam Coon. 8
?Adams, Firsthand, 235-36; Eisenhower, Mandate, 550;
Davis Oral History, 54-55. Not everyone felt l'-lcKay should
make the race. Benson, for example, feared that McKay would
lose viability in ~he Oregon primary. Benson, Cross-Fire,
330. There was a primary but Benson's fears were for naught.
Cf. Memo, July 6, 1956, Pyle to Adams, Pyle Papers, Box 28,
Eisenhower Library. The campaign had personal overtones.
Early in 1953 Morse wrote a letter to a friend expressing his
misgivings about Eisenhower. "I have," he said, "absolutely
no confidence in him and I am satisfied that he is lacking in
all political morality. In my judgment, he is the most dangerous man who will ever have been in the White House." The
White House never forgave him for this remark after the letter was published.
8 Joint Hearings, Senate, Special Subcommittee on the
Legislative Oversight Function of the Committee on Interior

271
When McKay resigned from the interior post to announce
his candidacy, Eisenhower was left in the politically sensitive position of having to appoint a successor.

Clarence

Davis, the acting secretary, had the support of the Republican senators and governors from the West, as well as from
two influential private organizations, the national Cattlemen's Association and the National Reclamation Association.
Howard Pyle, a White House election aide, warned that the
Oregon race would be "tough ••• at best" and agreed that Davis
should receive the appointment "at least until the present
term expires," lest it appear the President was repudiating
his former Secretary of Interior, McKay.9

Instead, Eisenhower

chose Fred Seaton, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense
and presently a member of the White House staff.

It seems

likely that Davis did not get the appointment because the
forthcoming Al Sarena report condemned his involvement in the
case. 10
The two issues that predominated in the campaign were,
in fact, Al Sarena and public power.

McKay proudly defended

his tenure as Secretary of Interior.

For example, regarding

and Insular Affairs, and House, Subcommittee on Public works
and Resources of the Government Operations Committee, 84th
Cong., 1st and 2d Sessions, 2 parts (1955-56); Joint Hearings, Al Sarena (1956), 2, 52-53, 117, 248; House Report 2960
(1956), 13, 29-31; Seymour E. Harris, The Economics of the
Political Parties (New York, 1962), 30 •
9The recommendations can be found in Central Files, GF17-A, Box 308, Eisenhower Library; and I1emo, May 22, 1956,
Pyle to Adams, same source.
10
.
New York Times, May 30, 1956, 17, 19.
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Al Sarena, NcKay stated flatly: "They were legitimate mining
claims by mining people."

Morse's tactic was to continually

attack his opponent's record.

He effectively used Hells Can-

yon and Al Sarena as examples of the Administration's "giveaway" policy and contended that Mission 66 saw the light of
day only because 1956 was an election year. 11
Oregon's congressional races were also injected with the
partnership debate.

While Harris Ellsworth had won re-elec-

tion by a comfortable margin in 1954 his percentage had declined drastically from 66.3% in 1952 to 55.9%.

Ellsworth

was, as one White House insider noted, "marked for destruction in 1956 ••• "

Representative Sa.I:l Coon .found himself in

a similar predicament.

Two years previous he had won with

52.6%, a decline of approximately 6% from his 1952 performance.

It was felt, nevertheless, that he was not in any

serious trouble.

Howard Pyle, sent by the President to size

up the political prospects in the Pacific Northwest, reported
in March 1955 that the Administration must do a better job of
selling itself, a message Cordon also conveyed.

Toward that

end Coon and Heuberger publicly debated the merits and criticisms of partnership ten times during October and September,

1955. 12
11speech, May 8, 1956, McKay, in Pyle Papers, Box 16,
Eisenhower Library; The Oregonian, Sept. 6, 14, and 16, 1956.

12Memo, March 19, 1956, Pyle, "The Situation in Oregon,"

Pyle Papers, Box 38, Eisenhower Library; Con~ressman Sam Coon
vs. Senator Richard Neuberger (Oregon, 1955), in Elmer F.
Bennett ?apers, Box 12, Eisenhower Libra.ry.
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In Washington an equally inportant senatorial race loomed
large on the partnership horizon.

Senator Warren Magnuson,

Chairman of the Commerce Committee, was challenged by popular
three-term governor, Arthur Langlie.

Langlie was reluctant

to make the race but it was felt he was the only Republican
with a chance of winning the seat. 1 3 Magnuson, like Morse,
had consistently opposed partnership and had the full backing
of organized labor.

Langlie had been especially outspoken

in his defense of the Administration's decisions on Hells
Canyon, Tidelands Oil and natural gas.
In Idaho the senatorial situation was somewhat different.
Here thirty-two year old Democrat Frank Church challenged a
Republican incumbent, Herman Welker.

The Republicans also

decided to take aim on Representative Gracie Pfost.

And

Hells Canyon was predicted to be one of the poignant issues.
In fact Howard Pyle recommended that the

Federal Power Com-

mission should be urged to release its decision on Helis Canyon "as soon as possible."

He reasoned that delay only aggra-

vated the political situation but that if the decision favored
the Idaho Power Company "the work on the dams could be well
underway previous to the 1956 election. 1114
The Montana senatorial race, once again, revolved around
the partnership issue.

This time Wesley D'Ewart squared off

l3Nemo, March 30, 1956, Pyle, "The Situation in Washington," .P;y~le Papers, Box 38, Eisenhower Library; Moley, "Washington Turns Right," Newsweek, 48 (July 30, 1956), 88.14
Memo, April 4, 1955, Pyle, "The Situation in Idaho,"
Pyle Papers, Box 38, Eisenhower Library.
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against I'like Mansfield.

After his unsuccessful bid in 1954,

D'Ewart ran into still another roadblock.

When Orme Lewis

resigned as Assistant Secretary of Interior, Eisenhower nominated D'Ewart to become the replacement.

The nomination

never got past the Senate Interior Committee, however.

Sen-

ator James Murray, chairman of that committee, made it clear
he still harbored a personal grudge over D'Ewart's smear tactics in the recent race.

Consequently he stepped aside and

let Senator Anderson chair the hearing.

Nevertheless the

cards were stacked against the nominee; Neuberger, O'Mahoney,
Henry Jackson and Anderson vigorously cross-examined D'Ewart
about his political philosophy and campaign techniques.

The

Citizens Committee on Natural Resources joined this chorus of
criticism.

Subsequently the committee turned thumbs down on

D'Ewart•s nomination.

Sherman Adams then convinced him to

run against Mansfield and Charles Willis, a White House aide,
pledged he would receive "all the support" the Administration
could give him. 1 5
The results of the congressional races indicated an overwhelming rejection of partnership, even though Eisenhower swept
the presidential election.
obvious.

In Oregon the rejection was most

Representatives Coon and Ellsworth were defeated

1 5n'Ewart Oral History, 14, 121-29; Memo, Feb. 17, 1954,
Willis to Adams, Central Files, OF-138-A-4, Box 700, Eisenhower Library; Senate, Interior and Insular Affairs Committee,
84th Cong., 2d Sess., Nomination of Wesle A. D'Ewart to be
Assistant Secretar of the Interior July 11 and 13, 19
,
1- , , .?l, 5; Robert Griffi h, 'i' e Poli tics of Fear (Uni-.
varsity Press· of Kentucky, 1970), 224-25.
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and Morse narrowly beat McKay.

In the election postmortems

it was variously conceded that McKay's downfall could be
attributed to the negativism of his campaign and, by contrast,
to the professionalism of Morse's campaign.

Also, part of

the blame was given to the vagueness of the partnership policy itself.

One anonymous Administration source put it suc-

cinctly: "The partnership policy has never been adequately
explained nor properly implemented since its inception in

1952."

In other important races Church won in Idaho, Mag-

nuson in Washington, and Mansfield in Montana.
Belle" Pfost retained her seat in the House.

Gracie "Hells
The Democrats

won the gubernatorial seats in Washington, Oregon and Idaho
as well.

All in all these victories strengthened the hand

of the opponents of partnership in congress, especially in
the Senate where the Jerome Kuykendall and Lewis Strauss
nominations required advice and consent. 16
Early in the new session of Congress Eisenhower nominated Jerome Kuykendall for another term as FPC Chairman.
The Commission's activities became a target of investigation
for congressional opponents of partnership.

In an inquiry

into the operation of the regulatory agencies, the House Sub16For more information on the Senate and House races see
Richard Austin Smith, "Five Hot Senate Races," Fortune, 54
(Oct. 1956), 1?2ff; Ernest K. Lindley, "Politics Be 1 Damned,'"
Newsweek, 48 (Oct. 15, 1956), 52. For the Administration's
postmortem estimation see Memo, Dec. 17, 1956, anonymous, "In
Re Water Resources and Partnership," in G·erald Morgan Papers,
Box 30; "Post Election Survey, 4th Congressional District, Oregon, December 1956;" Nov. 14, 1956, Robert Short to Charles
I·Iasterow; I-lemo, Dec. 3, 1956, "Survey of Oregon: Condensed Report, Nov.-Dec. 1956;" Memo, Dec. 6, 1956, Paul F. Ewing to
Seaton, in Pyle Papers, Boxes 42-43.
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committee on Small Business, for example, scrutinized Kuykendall's past political associations in the State of Washington and his involvement in the Hells Canyon and Dixon-Yates
controversies.

In its scathing report, the subcommittee

concluded that the FPC, among other regulatory agencies, was
no longer an independent body; rather, it surmised, the Commission was subjected to so much outside influence that it
was now nothing more than an adjunct of the Executive Branch,
particularly the Bureau of the Budget. 1 7
The nomination was routed to the Senate Commerce Committee, where Kuykendall could expect a tough time.

For one

thing, :Magnuson, the chairman of the ·committee, had just defeated Kuykendall's political mentor, Arthur Langlie.

Also,

several Democratic senators from the Pacific Northwest were
irked by Eisenhower's recent refusal to meet with them to
discuss the Hells Canyon case.

Thus Kuykendall received the

blunt edge of their criticism for his participation in the
Hells Canyon, natural gas and Dixon-Yates decisions.

Sena-

tor Neuberger, for instance, castigated Kuykendall for permitting "the FPC to be used as the tool of a political decision"
which had "wholly destroyed a painstaking, detailed, integrated, comprehensive plan for the Nation's second largest river
basin [the Snake River], proposed by thorough and objective
l7House, Subcommittee No. 1 of the Select Committee on
Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., The Organization and
Procedures of the Federal Re ulator Cor:l.CTissions and A encies
and ?heir Zffect on Srna 1 Business 1
; House
Report 2967 (1956), 42, 72-81.
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engineering studies of the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the United States Bureau of Reclamation."

Further-

more, Neuberger pointed out that McKay had been "retired from
public life" and that other public power advocates had defeated partnership senators in the Pacific Northwest.

These

victories, he concluded, signified that the citizenry wanted
the Federal Government to develop the Hells Canyon site.
Newly elected Congressman Ullman and the National Hells Canyon Association also opposed Kuykendall's nomination--just
as they originally had in 1953.

The Washington Public Util-

ity District Association, the National Farmers Union, and,
of course, the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
expressed dissatisfaction with Kuykendall's handling of FPC
affairs. 18
Kuykendall's propriety in executing the Administration's
desires on natural gas legislation was also put under a critical magnifying glass.

After Eisenhower vetoed the Harris-Ful-

bright bill, the FPO Chairman had been instructed by Gerald
Morgan, a presidential legal advisor, to begin drafting a
new bill.

In pursuing this objective Kuykendall met secretly

with representatives of southern gas producers and northern
gas distributors in an attempt to reach a compromise between
them.

When nationally syndicated columnist Drew Pearson made

18senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., Nomination of Jeror:ie K. Kuykendall, of
Washin ton to be a Me:r::tber of the ?ederal ..:?ower Coomission for
the
Ex irinr- June
1.
ointcrent
-15, 45-4 ' 1 o.
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this disclosure public Kuykendall was called on the carpet
by his congressional enemies.

Congressman Torbert Macdonald

(D-Mass.), a member of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee which was then considering revised natural
gas legislation, led the charge.

Macdonald accused Kuyken-

dall of betraying his oath of office because consumer interests had not been represented at the secret meeting.

In short,

the Chairman's opponents questioned how he could claim to be
impartial when he consulted only industry leaders to the exclusion of consumer representatives. 1 9
In a lengthy statement to the Commerce Committee Kuykendall defended his conduct in Hells Canyon, Dixon-Yates and
formulation of natural gas legislation.

He denied the deci-

sion favoring the Idaho Power Company had been the result of
his own predisposition or pressure from the White House.

His

former association with Langlie, Kuykendall said, was not a
factor in that decision.

The Chairman's critics had pointed

out that the FPC had ignored the adverse report of the Commission's Bureau of Law when it recommended approval of the
Dixon-Yates contract.

To put it mildly, was this not a rather

significant oversight, they asked?

Kuykendall explained that

the AEC had asked the FPC only for its recommendations on the
19senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Nomination of Kutkendall (1957), 41-42, 52ff., 88-104. Senator
Morse put the ma ter squarely: "The issue is the propriety of
the head of a regulatory agency to sit down, in secret, with
the representatives of an industry subject to his agency's
jurisdiction and work out proposed legislation without making
the fact known when the result is formulated into a legislative recor:lillendation and without notice and opportunity for
other groups with a vital interest to confer on the same terms."
~·' 36-3?.
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contract's power provisions--not for legal advice.

The AEC,

he added, "had the assistance of the Attorney General and
their own lawyers."

Finally, Kuykendall defended his meeting

with representatives of the gas industry.

His participation,

he lamely explained, "was to endeavor to frame a bill which
met the requirements of the President's veto message ••• "

It

should be recalled, he noted, that the President had objected
to "arrogant lobbyists," not to the bill itself.

Also, since

consumer interests would countenance no change in the law
there was no reason, in his estimation, to consult them.
Although Magnuson succeeded in holding up confirmation for
about five months, Kuykendall finally received senatorial
approval.

Even though that trout had gotten away the public
power senators caught a much larger fish later. 20
In one of the most bitterly fought confirmation proceedings, the Senate rejected the nomination of Lewis Strauss
for Secretary of Commerce.

In October 1958, Sinclair Weeks

resigned as Secretary of Commerce.

Senator Clinton Anderson

had made it clear that Strauss probably would not be confirmed by the Senate if he were renominated to the AEC.

In-

stead, then, the President appointed Strauss to fill the commerce vacancy.
nomination. 21

The following year the Senate took up the

20senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Nomination of Kuykendall (1957), 172-74, 186-99, 202-20; Con~ressional ~ecord, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 103, part I I Aug. 15, 1957), 14886-87; New York Times, July 26, 1957, 38.
21 oct. 28, 1958, Weeks to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF2, Box 14, Eisenhower Library; Benson, Cross-Fire, 457-58;
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There certainly was no doubting that Strauss was walking
headlong into a lion's den, for his nomination was sent to
Magnuson's Commerce Committee.

Strauss' brusk demeanor had

personally piqued many senators and his participation in the
Oppenheimer case had earned him the antipathy of a good number
of prominent scientists.

But the Dixon-Yates controversy pro-

vided the political catalyst; in fact, his enemies cited
Strauss• role here as documentary evidence of his utter contempt for Congress itself.

Strauss, it was alleged, had

failed to keep the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic
Energy "fully and currently informed," as Section 202 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 had demanded.

This point was

stressed at great length by Strauss' longtime nemesis, Clinton Anderson, whom the committee allowed the senatorial courtesy of participating in the hearings as an interrogator.

The

attack on Strauss was not entirely partisan, for Senator william Langer, a New Deal Republican, described the secretary
designate as "one of the chief conspirators" in a scheme to
wreck TVA and REA.

Perhaps the case against Strauss was best

articulated by Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.).

Basically

McCarthy argued that cabinet officers had become "much more
than advisors to the President, and much more than simple
administrators of clearly stated laws of limited application."
Since· these public officials were delegated "discretionary
authority" by both the Congress and the President, they exercise

executiv~

and legislative powers.

In sum: "It is •••

vitally important that the men in charge of these high offices
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be responsive to the will of the Congress as well as to the
will and interest of the President, as they interpret and
apply the law ••• "

McCarthy predicted, therefore, that a

vote for Strauss "could be fairly interpreted" as an approval
of "unwarranted extension of executive secrecy and the independence of the Executive Branch in determination of policy
and the administration of laws passed by Congress."

Both

Fortune and the New Eepublic commented that, correctly or
incorrectly, Strauss was being boiled in this political water
because Congress felt the encroachment of the Executive Branch
on its prerogatives had gone too far.

Hence, Strauss had be-

come a symbol of excessive presidential authority. 22
In his own behalf Strauss argued that he had always complied with the law.

The JCAE, he contended, had been kept

informed and no information necessary for its proper functioning had ever been kept from it.

Three members of the Joint

Committee on Atomic Energy, Democrat Pastore and Republicans
Bricker and Hickenlooper, confirmed Strauss' defense.

Citing

the importance of maintaining the President's prestige in the
world, Albert Gore, one of the nominee's more consistent
Senate, Hearings, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings on the Nomination of Lewis L. Strauss to be
Secretary of Commerce (1959), 50?.

22Francis Rourke, "Administrative Secrecy: A Congressional
Dilemma," American Political Review, 54 (Sept., 1960), 684-85;
Rosenthal and Green, Government of the Atom, 94; Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Nomination of Strauss (1959),
365-66, 429-45, 492-97, 508-10, 712-24, 782-83; New York
Times, May 29, 48; 21, 1959, 4; "Why Thresh Old Straws?" New
Republic, 140. (May 11, 1959), 4-5; "Editorial I~otes," Fortillie,

59

(June 1959), 96.
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critics, announced his intention to vote for confirmation.
Describing his old friend as ''un-poli tical," Herbert Hoover
expressed support for Strauss.

And from the scientific com-

munity Dr. Edward Teller added an influential voice to
Strauss' case. 2 3
As a harbinger of future trouble, the Commerce Committee
passed the nomination by only a single vote.

Three Democrats

had voted with the committee's six Republicans to make the
majority.

Eisenhower publicly pledged to use all the influ-

ence at his disposal to get full Senate approval.

Neverthe-

less, by a vote of 49 to 46 the Senate dramatically rejected
Strauss.

Indeed, Senator Anderson and the other opponents of
partnership had won a very large victory. 24
The Adilli11istration was ilot completely routed, however,
for one of its prime objectives, limiting the influence of
TVA, was accomplished.

Since the Authority had received no

appropriations from Congress, a new plan to finance TVA had
to be devised.

One thing was certain: the Administration

wanted to get the Federal Government out of TVA's business.
In April 195?, Walter von Tresckow suggested that TVA undertake its own financing through the sale of revenue bonds.
2 3senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Nomination of Strauss (1959), 636-37, 711, 775, 576-83, 584629; New York Times, Hay 24, 33; and May 16, 1959, 28;,May 9,
1959, Hoover to Magnuson, Central Files, OF-2, Box 14, Eisenhower Library.
24
science, 129 (June 5, 1959), 1533-34; Congressional
Record, 86th ~ong., 1st Sess. (June 5, 1959), 99 2-87; New
York Times, June 18, 1959, 14.
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Although this idea was not entirely new, it held a certain
appeal for Percival Brundage, Director of the Bureau of the
Budget.

If TVA financed itself through the issuance of rev-

enue bonds, Brundage thought it would allow the Federal Government to reduce its own investment in the Authority to a
more manageable size.

But when Senator Robert Kerr introduced

legislation partially designed to accomplish this purpose, the
Administration raised some objections.

Fundamentally the

Bureau of the Budget feared that Kerr's bill would give TVA
"a blank check" in the issuance of revenue bonds and in the
use of power revenues for plant expansion--the very aims that
were absolutely contrary to the dictates of partnership.

Among

other terms, the Administration proposed that the TVA power
service area be "specifically and precisely" limited and that
the use of power revenues for expansion of power facilities
be made subject to the approval of Congress in connection
with the President's budget recommendations.

In other words,

the Administration desired to retain control over TVA's budget while the Fe.deral Government no longer financed it. 2 5
In 1959, the Administration succeeded in getting its
plan approved, though not without some diff~lty.

The Kerr

bill was resurrected, once.again, and amassed sufficient
stre~gth

to pass Congress.

While this bill provided for

2 5April 22, 1957, von Tresckow to Adams; Memo, April
30, 1957, Brundage to Adams; July 1, 1957, Robert Merr~am to
Jack Martin, in Central Files, OF-51, Box 235, Eisenhower
Library; I1ay 27, 1955, Vogel to Sen. Chavez, Bryce Harlow
Papers, Box 23, Eisenhower Library.
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containment of TVA expansion, the Bureau of the Budget and
some members of Congress still objected.

"When they [TVA]

get this bondraising authority, they will be ready to expand
TVA all over the South," Congressman Scherer of Ohio warned.
"The illusory fence placed around TVA's service area in this
bill will fold like a stack of cards."

The President, for

his part, felt that enactcent of the bill would constitute
an erosion of Presidential power.

Consequently, Eisenhower

balked at signing the bill until Congress agreed to an amendment providing for Executive review of TVA's construction
program.

To do otherwise, the President pointed out, "could

result in budgetary chaos."

After the TVA Board--the members

of which had been appointed by Eisenhower--and the congressional leadership assured the President they had no
to such an amendment, Eisenhower signed the bill.

obj~ctions

The partner-

ship policy toward TVA had not been entirely successful but
with passage of the TVA Revenue Bond Act the Authority was
now financially independent but still accountable to Congress
and the President.

Thus, the Administration accomplished one
~

important objective: the Authority was limited in the area to
which it could expand. 26
It should also be recalled that the Administration and
26wildavsky, "TVA and Power Politics," American Political Science Review, 55 (Sept., 1961), 588-90; July 23, 1959,
Eisenhower to Case; July 28, 1959, Scherer to Eisenhower;
Aug. 6, 1959, Press Release; Aug. 14, 1959, TVA Board to
Eisenhower; Aug. 14, 1959, Eisenhower to Vogel; Aug. 20,
1959, Vogel to Eisenhower, in Central Files, OF-51, Box 236,
Eisenhower Library.
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its enemies stood each other off concerning the future of
REAo

The Humphrey-Price bill (1959), taking REA out of the

Department of Agriculture, passed Congress and was vetoed.
The Senate overrode the veto but the House barely did not.
The TVA Revenue Bond Act and, to a lesser extent, the failure
to override the REA veto simply confirmed, as Moley had predicted earlier, that the Dixicrat-Republican alliance provided
the President with a working ideological majority.

CHAPrER X
CONCLUSIONS AND SOI1E PERSPECTIVES
While the implementation of the policy of partnership
was only partially successful, the debate it engendered gave
the guise of grappling with the fundamental issues of modern
industrial America.

And, indeed, in some respects it did; in

many other ways, though, both the conservationists and partnership exponents were confronting much older issues.

The

politics of partnership thus must be set in a wider perspec\"'-.

tive.

Simply put, the philosophy of partnership attempted to
shrink the role of the Federal Government and, accordingly,
to restore free enterprise to its once preeminent place in
American life.

As one high Administration official capsul-

ized: "I shall like to remind you that this [New Deal-Fair
Deal] philosophy is not new, that it is bottomed upon the
Government control of all natural resources, water, land, and
energy, and that that program is the heart of the program of
State Socialism." 1 Politically, it consisted of a coalition
of Republicans and Dixicrats; as long as the Southern Democrats stuck with Eisenhower, as in the offshore oil, Hells
Canyon, TVA Revenue Bond, and natural gas legislation,
1 speech, April 25, 1955, Clarence Davis before Idaho·
State Reclamation Association, Idaho Falls, Idaho, Department
of Interior, Special Office Files, no box number, National
Archives.
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partnership was victorious.

But partnership was only a brick

in a much larger Administration edifice.

'Jhile there might

have been disagreements on certain specifics, by 1952, both
political parties had arrived at a basic consensus on a foreign policy of rigid anti-communism.

Actually the widest

political differences arose over domestic policy.

Partner-

ship was, in effect, the reverse side of the Republican Party's foreign policy.

For according to this weltanschauung,

the New Deal had given birth to an invidious creed--direct
governmental intervention in the economy.

TVA, REA, and SCS,

for example, were equated with an evil vaguely described as
"creeping socialism."

Thus being associated with the New

Deal was tantamount, in theeyes of the apostles of partnership, to lean.ing toward accepting coiilliiunisill on both domestic
and foreign levels.

Yalta and TVA were only opposite sides

of the same coin.
Eisenhower was only partially successful in implementing
his policy.

Offshore oil, Hells Canyon and the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954 were unequivocal successes while deregulation of
natural gas certainly would have been except for the Case
affair and subsequently the questionable involvement of the
Chairman of the Federal Power Commission in a secret meeting
with industry leaders.

The Administration also met certain

failure on the Echo Park, Dixon-Yates and grazing issues.
Moreover, other than reorganizing the RE.A, the bureaucracy
successfully

~esisted

administrative change, just as it al-

ways had in the past; the Corps of Engineers, Forest Service,

\

\
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and Bureau of Land Management all remained exactly where
they had been at Eisenhower's first inauguration.

One thing

was certain, however; without question, the Eisenhower
Administration took a more active interest in the development
of natural resources than past histories of the decade have
indicated.
The politics of partnership highlighted one of the fundamental dilemmas of the twentieth century--the growing interrelationship between the Federal Government and the business
community.

Federal regulation and management of natural re-

sources was of utmost concern to the business community.

The

Federal Power Commission, Atomic Energy Commission, and the
TVA Board were all staffed with advocates of partnership.

In

the Hells Canyon, natural gas, and Dixon-Yates questions the
Federal Power Commission unswervingly hewed to the White House
line; the activities of the AEC in Dixon-Yates and the TVA
Board in the Revenue Bond Act of 1959 were likewise pro-Administration. 2

The direct tie between the White House and the

commissions clearly unveiled the shortcomings of the regulatory system instituted by the progressives and New Dealers.
To wit: to what extent, one may legitimately ask, is it conceivable for regulatory commissions to perform their duties
trl.lly independent of pressure from the executive branch of
2 0f course the regulatory commissions
agencies involved. In the Al Sarena case,
Secretary of Interior acted against one of
the Bureau of Land Management, in favor of
a business concern.

were not the only
for example, the
his own agencies,
the interests of
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the government?

Naming Jerone Kuykendall and Lewis Strauss

chairmen o.f the Federal Power Commission and Atomic Energy
Commission, respectively, was akin to putting a rabbit in
charge of the lettuce patch.

Surely, Kuykendall's role in

helping formulate natural gas legislation after President
Eisenhower vetoed the Fulbright-Harris bill raises a serious
question of propriety.

Furthermore, that the commissions

were heavily weighted in favor of business is clearly evident
from the lack of consumer representation on the FPC and AEC.
As a corollary, it should be observed that the men appointed
to these commissions formerly came from the very businesses
they were now supposed to regulate.

This interlocking direc-

torate makes one wonder if, indeed, the regulatory commissions
themselves were not actually being regulated by the industry,
rather than vice versa, as the law directed.

In other words,

did the tail of business not wag the governmental dog?

Fin-

ally, the growth of the power of this bureaucracy meant a
further diminition of the power of Congress and an increase
in presidential power.
The effect of the close relationship between business
and government becomes even clearer in the case of the coal
and oil resources.

Conceptually the energy market operates

on the idea of competing alternate forms of energy.

In the

1950s the moribund coal interests opposed legislation favorable to atomic energy, oil and natural gas.
should have been.

This was as it

By the middle of the 1960s, however, the

coal industry had recovered from its depressed state.

But
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ownership of coal had substantially changed hands.

The oil

industry, seeing a resurgence of coal, had bought a controlling interest in its competitor.
efforts paid rich dividends.

By 1971, the oil industry's

It accounted for 84% of the

nation's refining capacity, 72% of the natural gas production and reserve ownership, 30% of the domestic coal reserve,
and 20% of the domestic coal production capacity.

The oil

industry also bought into the source of another competitor,
the slowly developing atomic energy industry.

Presently, the

oil industry's investment accounts for over 50% of the urani-

um. reserves and 25% of the uranium milling capacity.3

In

short, the oil industry bought a predominant interest in two
of its competitors.

One is led to the inescapable conclusion

that the anti-trust laws were soft-pedalled because of the
inordinate influence of the big oil interests in the Federal
Government.
The position of the conservationists, on the other hand,
became apparent enough by the end of Eisenhower's first year
in office.

In warning the White House of the dangers ahead,

Palmer Hoyte, editor and publisher of the influential Denver
Post, accurately summed up the conservationists' perception
of partnership:
It would seem to me that it would be a very bad thing
for the Eisenhower administration if Idaho Power

3cf. House of Representatives, Subcorr.mi ttee on Special
Small Business Problems, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Concentration
b Com etinO" Raw Fuel Industries in the Ener
Market and Its
•
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[CompanyJ was able, for example, to destroy the Hell's
Canyon site by building one dam ••• It would be unfortunate if the people of the United States got the idea
that the Eisenhower administration was more interested
in the 'interests' than in the interests of the people ••••
Certainly that issue was somewhat clouded in
the Tidelands Oil case. It could be even more clouded
in the Hell's Canyon case. Let us hope that the
stockmen of the west will not make any substantial
around end at the expense of the ta.xpayers.4
The Ad.ministration's openly skeptical attitude toward the MidCentury Conference on Resources for the Future simply confirmed these suspicions.

From then on the nation's conserva-

tion leaders painted the Administration with old New Deal
colors.

Accordingly, partnership was variously depicted as a

"giveaway" to big business, that is, to "the special interests."

Actually, their arguments contained little original-

ity; even their phraseology was borrowed from a past era.
Indeed, for the most part, the conservationists were only
defending the integrity of such New Deal agencies as the REA,
SCS, and TVA.

They made little--if any--contribution toward

new perspectives on the environment.
The apostles and opponents of partnership thus showed
great purblindness in their level of insight.

Essentially

both sides continued to think in the same utilitarian terms
originally defined at the turn of the century and continuing
through the New Deal.

While the role of the Federal Govern-

ment in the development of natural resources was examined,
other equally crucial questions went virtually untouched.
4

May 25, 1953, Hoyt to Adams, Central Files, OF-155-E-l,
Box 838, Eisenhower Library.
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Aside from certain limited aspects of the Echo Park imbroglio,
neither side gave much serious thought to the more serious
problem of ecology.
The modern trend in American conservation has sh.own a
strong utilitarian bent.

According to this view nature is

inherently at odds with man, thereby requiring man to subdue
and conquer her if he is to survive.

The theory of Social

Darwinism and the frontier experience served to confirm this
attitude.

Reclamation, for example, was seen as man taming

an essentially hostile force in nature, in this particular
case, water.

Electricity, one of the modern marvels turned

necessity, was, of course, placed in.the same category.

To

utilitarians the primary question, then, was whether government or private enterprise ought to direct the .American
fight to conquer nature.

There was no doubt that man was

compelled to fight nature if he--the fittest--was to survive.
Bureau of the Budget Director Joseph Dodge was not far off ·
the mark when, in 1953, he advised President Eisenhower that
the conservation movement was stagnant and "has not had a
new thought for fifty years. 11
It was not until 1962 that "the new conservation movement" was officially born.

In that year Rachel Carson pub-

lished Silent Spring, a book attacking the use of the pesticide DDT while contending that man was part of nature, not
an entity hostile to it.

Although the least representative

of her ecolog.ical thinking, Silent Spring harkened to a tra-7

dition whose war ings largely had been silenced by the
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twentieth century's fixation with utilitarianism.

Among Car-

son's intellectual ancestors were the New England transcendalists Emerson and Thoreau, George Perkins Marsh, and John
Muir.

But it was Aldo Leopold who really breathed life into

the new conservation movement.

Leopold, who had joined the

U.S. Forest Service in 1909 and was one of the founders of
the wilderness Society in 1935, vigorously argued preservationists' sympathies.

His two books, A Sand County Almanac

(1949) and Round River (1953), were, as one observer commented, the Tablets of the Law for the new conservation movement.

The main leaders of the movement, Rachel Carson and

David Brower, executive director of the Sierra Club from
1952 to 1969, acknowledged their debt to Leopold.
While the utilitarians stressed chemistry and physics,
the ecologists accented the study of bacteriology, zoology,
botany, and geology.

Rachel Carson obtained a Masters degree

in zoology and afterwards worked for the U.S. Bureau of
Fisheries and later the Fish and Wildlife Service.

And John

Muir, who successfully fought to make Yosemite a national
park, was a geologist and biologist.

In short, these thinkers

pointed less to man's relation to man than to "the relation
of all life" and, therefore, of life to its physical environment.5
5The main characteristic of the ecologists of the 1960s
and 1970s was their bent toward the biological sciences.
Among others, Paul Ehrlich is a professor of biology at Stanford University; Barry Commoner's academic career centered
around plant physiology; Rene Dubos studied soil bacteriology;
and before becoming professor of human ecology, Garrett Hardin taught biology at the University of California {Santa
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At the turn of the century the ecological and utilitarian views contended with one another until finally the utilitarian won out.

The ecologists, led by John Muir and his

Sierra Club, favored preserving nature as it was.
the establishment of inviolate national parks.

They urged

The utilitar-

ians, led by Gifford Pinchot and his Forest Service, believed
in regulating the exploitation of nature.

Accordingly, re-

sources on federal properties should be prudently used--but
used nevertheless.

The crowning battle between these two

opposing camps took place over the future of Hetchy-Hetchy
Valley, located in Yosemite National Park.

The cutting edge

was whether a dam ought to be constructed in the Valley or
left undisturbed.

Muir opposed the dam and Pinchot supported

its construction.

In 1914, Pinchot won and the utilitarians

gained the upper hand in the con·servation movement.

The ecol-

ogists won a victory of sorts when, in 191?, the National
Park Service was created within the Department of Interior.·
The Forest Service (Department ··of Agriculture) and National
Park Service (Department of Interior) have been at odds ever
since.
The Eisenhower Administration's basic attitude toward
Barbara).
For works discussing the origins of and the present study
of ecology see, Donald Fleming, ".Roots of the New Conservation Movement," Pers ectives in Anerican Eistor , VI (Charles
Warren Center, 1
,
; Davi Lm·1en .a , George Perkins
Marsh (New York, 1958); Roderick Hash, 'w'i.lderness and the
American Mind (New Haven, 1967); and Samuel Hays, Conservation and ~he Gos el of Efficienc • The Pro ressive Conservation Movement, 1890-19 0 Cambridge, 1 5
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nature was expressly the ru38ed utilitarianism of the businessman in free interprise and the frontier.

It favored Echo

Park dam much the same as its utilitarian predecessors had
Hetch-Hetchy dam.

The Administration's appointments also be-

trayed a discrimination against biologists.

Businessmen,

mathematicians, engineers, chemists, and physicists were all
appointed to the commissions; but it was not until 1973 that
a biologist joined the AEC.

And, the conservationists did

not raise the issue either.

To the contrary, the Eisenhower

Administration replaced Albert Day, a career biologist, with
a businessman as Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service.
To their credit, the conservationists unsuccessfully protested
this move.
tention.

Further, water pollution received little real atThe Water Pollution Control Act of 1956 did little

to advance the cause of clean water.

Instead of creating a

new agency to deal specifically with the problem, the responsibility was turned over to the Public Health Service, an
agency that could be counted upon not to rock the cradle. 6
Moreover, the Administration--as well as many of its critics-ignored the attendant problems of technology, population,
growth, and water and air pollution.
From the study of

par~nership

politics there also emer-

ges a glimpse of the Eisenhower personality.

Far from being

a bumbling, naive President, Eisenhower was, in fact, a highly
sophisticated and determined politician.
6

His military-

Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy
(New York, 1966), 228-29.

296

background had well prepared him for the Presidency.

Both

as President and Allied Commander during World War II Eisenhower believed in establishing a clear chain of command; as
Chief .Executive he outlined policy and the Cabinet was
charged with its execution.
grasp of foreign policy.

He had a particularly good

Contrary to popular opinion Eisen-

hower ran foreign policy and was far less dependent on his
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, than has been realized.

One could hardly imagine even Dulles making a move

without first consulting with the President for permission.
Both as Supreme Allied Commander and later as commander of
the NATO forces, Eisenhower became well versed in the nuances
and dictates of diplomacy.

Moreover, he came away from his

long sojourns in Europe with definite ideas as to what policies the United States should pursue.
Domestic issues, however, were not as important to this
essentially military-minded man.

Yet there is no doubting

Eisenhower's innate conservatism.

Throughout his life he

remained faithful to the puritan ethic in all of its economic,
political, and religious implications.

He had learned it as

a youth in Abilene, Kansas, and as he steadily climbed the
military and political ladder Eisenhower took this ethical
baggage along.

Because domestic affairs did not interest

him, he delegated much authority in this area to aides who
shared his philosophical outlook.

Sherman Adams, his poli-

tical alter ego, could always be relied upon.

Ezra Taft

Benson, a Taftite, was personally recruited by the President,
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for their views on domestic issues coincided perfectly.

The

appointment of Governor Douglas McKay to the interior department came upon the recommendation of Senator Cordon after
Governor Arthur Langlie had turned down the post.
Furthermore, contrary to many misconceptions, Eisenhower
was shrewd in

~anipulating

men and his public image.

He cer-

tainly was aware that his untarnished image bequeathed him a
singular advantage over his political opponents.
his military experience helped.

Once again,

There was no more egotistical

and obstreperous an individual than General George Patton,
yet Eisenhower was one of the few men who could handle him.
Likewise, there is little reason to believe that he abandoned
this forte upon becoming President.

Quite the contrary, while

giving the public impression of not participating in political infighting, Eisenhower conveniently let willing surrogates do his bidding.

In rather scathing terms Vice Presi-

dent Richard Nixon and Secretary Dulles attacked the President's foreign policy critics while McKay was let loose on
the Administration's domestic policy critics.

And discreetly

Eisenhower gave Senator Joseph McCarthy enough rope to hang
himself.
McKay's senatorial bid in 1956 was part of this pattern.
The Secretary of Interior was given credit for helping fashion
the partnership policy and had been one of the Administration's most vocal defenders.

If the New Deal had not been

exactly socialism, according to this view, it came dangerously close.

By 1956 McKay's outspokenness perhaps had become
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a political liability.

Thus Adams and Leonard Hall of the

Republican National Committee encouraged McKay to seek Wayne
Morse's seat in the Senate.

The Administration, it seems,

had everything to gain and very little to lose.

If Morse

lost, the Administration would have one more sure vote in
the Senate; in any case, should McKay be defeated, a distinct possibility, a political liability would be eliminated.
By contrast, McKay's successor, Fred Seaton, was remarkably
low key, less abrasive, and more tactful.

Nixon also came

close to meeting the same fate, as there were serious signs
of Eisenhower bowing to liberal pressure to dump his vice
president in 1956.

Evidently Eisenhower tolerated McCarthy

until he too had become an embarrassment.

In other words,

once McKay and McCarthy had outlived their political usefulness, they became expendable.
The picture of Eisenhower that can now be sketched
reveals a man well on top of the situation.

So long as

Nixon, Dulles, McKay and McCarthy operated in the forefront
as a political shield the Democrats could hardly lay a glove
on Eisenhower; his image was as unblemished in 1960 as it had
been when he first took office.

Had the Constitution not pre-

vented it, there is little doubt he easily would have won a
third term.

But when one of these men became an embarrass-

ment he was expended.
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